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 Abstract 
The prime objective of this thesis is to offer a conceptual explanation for Pakistan’s providing 
aid to other countries with their nuclear programmes. It focuses on an analysis Pakistan’s 
structure of control over its nuclear organisations from three perspectives: a) the influence of 
the organisational culture of Pakistan’s state apparatus on its control system; b) the strategic 
environment of the national security policies; and c) the links between the different entities in 
the control system and the state apparatus. 
The aim of the thesis is to provide a broader context for the understanding of Pakistani 
sponsored nuclear proliferation by an analysis of the institutional structure that has thought to 
control Pakistan’s nuclear agencies. This will demonstrate the likelihood that Pakistan’s 
proliferation activity has been a by product of organisational culture and the nature of its 
control system. The methodology will be based on five approaches:-  
1) An examination of the evolution of the Pakistani control system and its historical 
procedures (as it stands until 2004).  
2) Scrutinising the operation of the system as part of Pakistan’s defence establishment.  
3) Comparing the connections of the control system with AQ Khan’s proliferation network 
and the connections of the defence establishment with militant organisations. 
4) Defining Pakistan’s control system and appraising it on a comparative basis.  
5) Evaluating similarities between Pakistan’s and China’s control systems as two nuclear 
weapons countries with influential militaries. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is the argument that much of the nuclear aid offered by Pakistan 
to other countries was probably approved of and perhaps, at times, suggested by elements 
within the Pakistani Army. Thus, Pakistan’s military will be the main state organisation under 
analysis in this thesis. Underscoring the role of the military in the control system is likely to 
improve the understanding of the character of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan as a state 
initiative. 
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 Introduction 
1. Background: The Issue of Nuclear Proliferation from Pakistan 
The prime objective of this thesis is to offer structural and conceptual explanations for 
Pakistan’s aid to other countries’ nuclear programmes. It focuses on analysing Pakistan’s 
control system from three perspectives: the influence of the organisational culture of the 
Pakistani state apparatus on this system, the strategic environment surrounding national 
security policies, and interlinks between the different entities in the control system and state 
apparatus. 
The justification for focussing on Pakistan out of the group of nuclear weapons states is 
fundamental. The nuclear weapons element is most critical when Pakistan is concerned and it 
casts a shadow over Pakistan’s other spheres of significance. Pakistan’s role as a source of 
nuclear proliferation is a constant reminder of the possibility of wide-scale nuclear assistance 
from Pakistan to foreign countries and terror organisations. Its nuclear rivalry with India 
constitutes an active conflict between two nuclear countries that could turn into a full scale 
war.  
Furthermore, Pakistan received international attention as a result of its being an important 
variable in the efforts to preserve global security. Since the terror attacks of September 11
th 
2001 (known as the ‘9/11 Terror Attacks’), Pakistan has become a key player in the final 
outcome of US efforts, along with its NATO allies, to dismantle Al Qaeda infrastructure in 
Afghanistan and to bring stability to that region. Pakistan is a hub of terror networks which 
are the source of terror threats against Western countries. Moreover, this terror infrastructure 
plays a factor in the instability of Afghanistan, in the Indian controlled part of Kashmir, and in 
Pakistan itself. In turn, the Pakistani combination of terrorism and Islamic extremism together 
with nuclear proliferation raises the possibility of a terror organisation’s access to Pakistan’s 
nuclear assets. According to an extreme scenario, Pakistan’s regime is being changed into a 
radical Islamic one which threatens to use nuclear capabilities as an ‘Islamic Bomb’ - in the 
service of the Muslim Ummah against its alleged enemies.    
Between 1987 and 2003 Pakistan was a source of significant nuclear assistance to Iran, Libya, 
and North Korea, delivered through ‘Abdul Qadeer Khan’s (AQ Khan) nuclear proliferation 
network’. Furthermore, AQ Khan, who was a senior official in Pakistan’s nuclear 
programmes, negotiated with several other countries (such as Saudi-Arabia, Iraq, and Syria) 
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regarding the initiation of military nuclear projects. Nowadays, Pakistan could still be 
considered as one of the main potential sources of nuclear proliferation, second only to North 
Korea which has a brazen policy of proliferation (and as part of it developed a clandestine 
nuclear programme in Syria). 
♦♦♦ 
In order to examine Pakistan’s ability to control its nuclear assets, the most critical aspect of 
nuclear proliferation from Pakistan is the extent of the government’s complicity in this 
activity. If Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation is an outcome of government policy to assist other 
countries with their nuclear weapons programmes, it projects negatively on Pakistan as a 
responsible nuclear weapons state and could label Pakistan as a threat to international security 
and to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. On the other hand, if nuclear 
proliferation was the action of private individuals who exploited the weaknesses of Pakistan’s 
export control system, it might reflect badly on Pakistan’s ability to prevent unauthorised 
nuclear exports. Pakistan’s failure to counter private nuclear assistance could also raise 
questions about its ability to block the external influence of radical Islamic organisations on 
the agencies which are responsible for the development of nuclear programmes. Pakistan’s 
poor performance of non-proliferation might also raise questions regarding its control over its 
operational nuclear weapons during a military conflict with India. 
♦♦♦ 
2. The Academic Debate on Nuclear Proliferation from Pakistan   
The official line of the Pakistani government, which receives support mostly from Pakistani 
scholars, argues that the nuclear export was initiated by a group of dissident scientists headed 
by AQ Khan, and the assistance was conducted by a global network which included non-
Pakistani individuals around the world (mainly in Europe and in Asia). On the other hand, 
most scholars outside Pakistan argue that in light of the magnitude and extended proliferation 
activity, it could not have occurred without some sort of involvement of the Pakistani 
authorities - from complicity to full knowledge and approval. Both schools of thought on this 
issue are in agreement about the turbulent nature of Pakistan as a dysfunctional state, which 
may have negatively affected its control system over its nuclear organisations. 
The most comprehensive academic analysis on Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation was conducted 
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) which published a ‘dossier’ on AQ 
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Khan’s network and the implications of its activities1. Another prominent analysis of 
Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation and its ramifications can be found in ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Future’ by Henry D. Sokolski (ed.)2. Other academic publications which deal with the 
consequences of the nuclear network proliferation also surfaced following the public exposure 
of the network (in January 2004). Furthermore, public curiosity about the image of AQ Khan 
as a ‘nuclear smuggler’ and his global operation encouraged widespread coverage of the 
network in leading newspapers both in the US and Europe. The extensive media coverage of 
the network’s exposure led to several journalists researching this saga with particular 
emphasis on the policies and reactions of western governments and intelligence services vis-
a-vis the threat of nuclear proliferation emanating from Pakistan. Three comprehensive 
investigations which include a  full account of the deeds of AQ Khan and his associates  with 
regard to the proliferation network can be found in ‘Deception’ by Adrian Levi and Catherine 
Scott-Clark, in ‘Shopping for Bombs’ by Gordon Corera, and in ‘The Man from Pakistan’  by 
Douglas France and Catherine Collins
3
. 
Regarding the issue of the paradigm behind nuclear proliferation from Pakistan, the above 
publications include broad information on Pakistan’s involvement in the nuclear proliferation 
project and discuss the possibility of state complicity in this operation, but most of them avoid 
a clear-cut conclusion on the issue. ‘Deception’ faces the challenge and goes further by 
presenting a strong case that Pakistan’s proliferation was part of an official policy, mainly 
promoted by the Army high command and supports its case with wide-ranging evidence from 
diverse sources. Bruno Tertrais in his article ‘Khan’s Nuclear Exports: Was There a State 
Strategy?’ from his book ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Future4’ examines the Pakistani state rationale 
for nuclear assistance to different countries in different periods and tries to determine the 
extent of official involvement in proliferation. This thesis will provide a broader context for 
the understanding of Pakistani sponsored nuclear proliferation by an analysis of the 
institutional structure of control over Pakistan's nuclear agencies. 
                                                 
1 Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan, and the Rise of Nuclear Proliferation 
Networks, a Net Assessment (London: The International institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). 
2 Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute of the US Army War College, January 2008). 
3 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secrete Trade in 
Nuclear Weapons (London: Atlantic Books, 2007); Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear 
Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of AQ Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Douglas France and Catherine Collins, The Man from Pakistan: The True Story of the World’s Most 
Dangerous Nuclear Smuggler (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2008). 
4 Bruno Tertrais, Khan’s Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy? In Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries 
beyond War, pp. 13-58. 
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3. The Main Objective of this Research on Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation   
This thesis will test the hypothesis that Pakistan’s support for nuclear proliferation might well 
involve a number of actors than merely the AQ Khan network. The thesis will provide a 
structural analysis demonstrating that in the Pakistani institutional context it is most unlikely 
that at least some Army officers were not involved in these initiatives. 
The contribution of this thesis into the episode of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan aspires 
to offer a systematic explanation for the proliferation phenomenon from the institutional point 
of view. The actual methods, procedures and decision making which might explain the 
organisational culture of Pakistan’s control system over its nuclear programmes and the 
degree of efficiency of the control system are apparently absent in academic discourse about 
nuclear exports from Pakistan. This void is mainly a result of the intense secrecy that 
naturally shrouds Pakistan’s control over its nuclear programmes, so the resources are limited 
on this important aspect of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. Most of the direct information on 
the control system originates from Pakistan’s official and unofficial sources, occasionally 
through academic channels in the US and the UK. The information available is even more 
limited when it comes to the main issue of this thesis: the full extent of the military 
involvement in the nuclear exports. 
An institutional and organisational explanation of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan’s  
should surface from examining Pakistan’s administrative arrangements and the perceptions of 
those involved in it. Through analysing Pakistan’s relevant bureaucracy the thesis will suggest 
that Pakistan’s proliferation activity is a by product of its organisational culture and the nature 
of the control system. For the purposes of this thesis a ‘control system’ is ‘the system put in 
place to control Pakistan’s agencies involved in the development and production of nuclear 
weapons’. The hypothesis to be tested is that such was the nature and extent of this control 
system that it is highly unlikely that elements in the Army, that came to dominate this system 
were not complicit in proliferation activities from Pakistan; and that such was the influence of 
key military officers in it, the system was powerless to prevent proliferation activity that took 
place.    
♦♦♦ 
As a consequence, Pakistan’s military will be the main state organisation under analysis in 
this thesis. The military (and particularly the Pakistan Army) is the most dominant player in 
decision making on Pakistan’s national security issues and in the control mechanisms over 
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nuclear organisations. The main objective of evaluating the military’s role is to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of Pakistan’s ‘militarised’ control system, which is unique 
among nuclear weapons countries and specifically alien to the civilian nature of export 
control systems in western countries. Underscoring the role of the military in the control 
system is expected to reveal a better understanding of the character of nuclear proliferation 
from Pakistan and to what extent it was a state initiative. 
♦♦♦ 
4. The Analytical Framework   
This thesis into Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation will make an attempt to deal with the 
following central research question:  
How have the institutional arrangements and the perceptions inherent in 
Pakistan’s Control System influenced its ability to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear weapons? 
The most plausible answer to the above question which should be established at the end of the 
analytical process is as follows: 
The militarised nature of Pakistan’s control system deprived it from crucial 
elements which are necessary for its efficiency in curbing proliferation. 
Contrary to its main purpose, the control system was unable to prevent part of 
the nuclear development and production apparatus from providing assistance to 
the nuclear programmes of foreign countries. 
The proposed explanations for the response to the research question will be based upon 
several working assumptions that are methodologically essential to this thesis. These 
assumptions will be discussed and reaffirmed in the analytical process and are as follows:  
1) Pakistan’s military is the main operator in internationally unique militarised control 
mechanisms over nuclear programmes. The dominant position of the Army in Pakistan’s 
national security decision making and policy formulating elevate it to the status of 
arbitrator in all matters concerned with the issue of non-proliferation. 
2) The existence of a similarity between military procedures and decision making in the 
control system and military involvement in other fields of its responsibility. This 
assumption is mainly based on the fact that the same military headquarters (HQ) deal with 
subjects pertaining to Pakistan’s national security, including the non-proliferation issue. 
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3) The character of the military’s administrative and staff work is distinctive from civilian 
bureaucracy. The military bureaucracy is more attentive to the desires of its masters for 
centralisation and for a quick transformation of policy from formulation to 
implementation. On the other hand, when national security issues are involved, civilian 
agencies must normally adhere to inter-agency processes which in turn encourage a 
balanced policy that incorporates the input of all concerned.    
4) There is a similarity between Pakistan’s export control mechanism and the experience in 
the export control mechanism of other countries. 
As detailed, the performance of Pakistan’s control system, which lies at the heart of this 
thesis, is closely connected to the nature of Pakistan’s military and its organisational culture 
and thinking. This thesis will try to establish the following arguments based on reliable 
evidence in order to propose explanations for the performance of the control system: 
1) The main deficiencies in Pakistan’s control over its nuclear programmes are those 
connected to Pakistan’s military procedures and to the decision-making processes inside 
and between relevant military directorates and HQs, and between the Army and civilian 
agencies. These problems are connected to the overall approach and organisational culture 
of the Army.  
2) Pakistan’s control mechanisms over its nuclear programmes are significantly more 
centralised than in other countries because of their military character. As a consequence 
(and in addition to the administrative problems in the control mechanism), nuclear 
proliferation from Pakistan was the outcome of incompetence or a lack of inclination to 
prevent it on the part of high-ranking officers in Pakistan’s military. A significant part of 
the proliferation activities could not have taken place without some sort of awareness of 
Pakistan’s defence establishment. 
3) Following the nuclear tests of May 1998 and the official ending of Pakistan’s policy of 
nuclear ambiguity, the defence establishment’s attempt to consolidate the stance of the 
country as a responsible nuclear weapons state was through high profile reforms of 
Pakistan’s control mechanisms. A major part of these reforms attributed a significant role 
to civilian agencies and cabinet ministries in decision making on issues related to nuclear 
programmes. However, these reforms did not significantly influence the military role and 
responsibilities in the non-proliferation field; the reforms only strengthened its position as 
an official arrangement. 
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5. The Analytical Process 
This thesis will include five different analytical methods in order to characterise Pakistan’s 
control system and evaluate its political commitment and ability to prevent assistance to 
nuclear weapons programmes of foreign countries. The accumulative result of these methods 
should enable this analysis to confront the acute shortage of information on Pakistan’s control 
system: it should suggest explanations for the operating methods of the control system and 
clarify the reasoning behind the existence of AQ Khan’s network and its unprecedented 
record in the non-proliferation sphere.  
Chapter One will try to establish that to a high degree of probability nuclear export from 
Pakistan was sanctioned by the state: the operation of the nuclear proliferation network, 
directed by AQ Khan and his associates in Khan’s Research Laboratories (KRL), was at least 
principally known to the authorities and particularly to the military agencies as part of the 
control system over the nuclear organisations. This assertion will be based on analysing the 
military’s dominant role in the control system since the inception of Pakistan’s military 
nuclear programmes in the 1970’s. As will be presented, Pakistan’s nuclear programmes, 
including their facilities, equipment and personnel were under the tight administrative and 
physical control of the military, and it seems almost impossible that a nuclear export project 
would have continued for fifteen years without the knowledge of the military. In addition, 
information about nuclear exports will also be analysed, and the role of the nuclear 
organisations and the main security agency, the ISI. The main objective in offering a clear 
explanation for Pakistan’s nuclear exports and in ascertaining the military involvement is to 
establish the conceptual foundation and the immediate relevance of the conclusions of this 
analysis into the military role and influence on the control system. 
After establishing the indispensible role of the military in the control system over the nuclear 
organisations Chapter Two will examine Pakistan’s control system as part of the defence 
establishment. This chapter will include an attempt to illustrate the organisational nature of 
Pakistan’s defence establishment and in turn identify the main elements in its character that 
might determine the ability of the control system to prevent proliferation from Pakistan. In 
this regard, the chapter explores the civil-military relations both with the civilian national 
leadership and the different civilian agencies, the strong centralisation tendency within the 
armed forces, and the influence of the security and intelligence agencies on national security 
policies. 
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Chapter Three deals with the strategic thinking of the military, and it places nuclear 
assistance in this conceptual framework. At the focus of the analysis is the discussion about 
the military tendency to use proxies in order to promote what the military perceive as national 
security objectives. This chapter will examine the possible role of AQ Khan’s nuclear 
proliferation network as a proxy aimed to promote Pakistan’s national objectives by 
comparing the operational framework of the proliferation network and the military 
organisational arrangements for using terror organisations operating against India and in 
Afghanistan. 
Chapter Four is a comprehensive examination of Pakistan’s export control mechanisms 
compared with those of export controls of other countries. Export controls are a central 
function of a national control system over the nuclear organisations (and other WMD 
programmes), and are the main indicators for the efficiency of the control system in 
preventing proliferation. This chapter uses the ‘structural approach’ as a method for analysing 
control systems over nuclear programmes according to organisational and structural 
parameters. Pakistan’s export controls will be compared to equivalent national export control 
mechanisms in western countries (the US, Britain, and Germany), and non-western countries 
(Russia and India). Like Pakistan, all of these countries installed export control mechanisms 
designated to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
The final chapter, Chapter Five, will focus on the test case of China’s control system and its 
proximity to Pakistan’s control system. This chapter will exemplify the reforms China has 
conducted since the late 1990’s in its control system which changed its character from a 
military dominated system, similar to the Pakistani system, to one directed by several state 
agencies, mainly civilian. The comparison between these two national export control systems 
is expected to emphasise that the extent of military involvement in the control over nuclear 
agencies is a major factor governing the possibility of nuclear assistance to foreign countries 
due to the relatively minor consideration the military attributes to international considerations. 
In the Conclusion, the main insights into Pakistan’s control system and Pakistan’s nuclear 
proliferation phenomenon will be summarised. The consequences of all the five methods are 
presented together in order to analyse the causes of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation and why 
the control system has been incompetent in performing one of its central official tasks - 
preventing proliferation from Pakistan.  
The Role of Pakistan’s Military in the Control System over Nuclear Programmes 
 
19 
 
6. Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation and its Potential for Academic Knowledge  
This thesis will try to explain several crucial aspects of Pakistan’s nature that could contribute 
to the understanding of its policies and actions which influence contemporary issues vital to 
international security: nuclear proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terror 
organisations; and the future course of radical Muslim terrorism. 
Pakistan’s control system over its nuclear organisations was mainly directed by Pakistani 
officials who were invited to participate in academic events. They presented their country’s 
export control arrangements as part of their interest to portray Pakistan as a responsible 
nuclear weapons country. The Pakistani officials mainly emphasised the adaptation of their 
country’s export control practices and tools in accordance with international standards, but for 
obvious reasons did not provide substantial details on its operating methods. This thesis will 
endeavour to present an original contribution to the understanding of Pakistan’s control 
system that has never been thoroughly considered from a bureaucratic perspective. A few 
scholars have tried to explain Pakistan’s control system over its nuclear organisations, but 
again from a limited perspective about its efficiency and its administrative procedures while 
ignoring the broader contexts which shape the functioning of the system: Pakistan’s thinking 
on national security and the nature of its defence establishment. 
The structure of Pakistan’s defence establishment and its entities will be analysed in this 
thesis for the first time in a comprehensive way. Various academic publications have dealt 
with Pakistan’s military and its dominant position, but most of them concentrated on 
illustrating the historic development of the military and examined its part in several issues 
such as the regime’s stability, relations with the US, and the growth of radical Islam in 
Pakistan. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha provided insightful but brief explanations on Pakistan’s 
defence establishment in her book on Pakistan’s arms procurement5 which largely focus on 
the aspects important for understanding Pakistan’s internal deliberations for acquiring 
weaponry and military technological systems. Siddiqa-Agha again briefly explained decision 
making in Pakistan’s defence establishment in ‘Military Inc.’6, her groundbreaking research 
on the financial ventures of Pakistan’s military. Other brief explanations on the organisation 
of the military can be found in the ‘Armed Forces of Pakistan’7 which reviews the history of 
                                                 
5
 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup 1979-1999: In Search of a Policy 
(New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001). 
6 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
7 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (London: Orion, 2003). 
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the military. An understanding of the institutional arrangements of the defence establishment 
is expected to contribute to the realisation of its decisive role in Pakistan’s historical 
development and to determine the country’s national security policies and strategic thinking.      
Furthermore, one can hardly underestimate the importance of the structure and responsibilities 
of Pakistan’s intelligence community, and most of all the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), and 
its influence on decision making. The ISI and other intelligence agencies are deeply involved 
in formulating national security policies and are used as the operational arm for executing 
important parts of the above policies, particularly in connection with militant activity in India 
and Afghanistan. This critical role of the ISI is discussed for the first time in this thesis in a 
consistent way and adds to the knowledge about Pakistan’s intelligence which was 
extensively examined mainly in popular and non-academic literature
8
. 
Moreover, analysing Pakistan’s control over its nuclear programmes has the potential for a 
wider contribution to academic research and scholarly discourse about security studies. On 
the subject of non-proliferation, analysing Pakistan’s decision making on nuclear proliferation 
could also contribute to limited discourse about the factors behind the nuclear assistance of a 
nuclear weapons state to a non-nuclear weapons state. The phenomenon of assistance of a 
nuclear weapons state to foreign countries in order to develop a nuclear weapons programme 
is not exclusive to Pakistan. Critical nuclear assistance was delivered in the past in several 
instances (for example, between Russia and China and between France and Israel in the late 
1950’s), and is a main factor behind the success of several countries to become nuclear 
powers (such as India). However, academic debate on nuclear non-proliferation sidelined the 
issue of nuclear assistance as one of the main explanations for the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons
9
. 
Evaluating Pakistan’s export control system in comparison with the experience of various 
countries contributes to academic research into these critical administrative arrangements. 
Most academic discussion on export controls is focused on the level of efficiency of the 
export control system through evaluating the nominal bureaucratic measures that are in place 
to prevent the illicit export of WMD-related items. This thesis will discuss the institutional 
                                                 
8 An updated analysis on the ISI which summarises most of the known information about this intelligence 
agency can be found in: Rana Banerji, Pakistan: Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) An Analytical 
Overview, Journal of Defence Studies 5:4 (October 2011), pp. 1-27. 
9 The main attempt to confront the issue of nuclear assistance was made by Mathew Kroening in his book: 
Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2010).  
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arrangements for decision-making processes and the division of responsibility between the 
different agencies of the export control apparatus. It should be noted that this thesis is the first 
to deal with Russia’s export control system and its modifications which have followed 
national political swings since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Finally, through comparative analysis between different national export controls there will be 
a suggestion for a framework for the organisational structure and working connections in any 
viable export control apparatus. This original paradigm aims to contribute to the 
comprehension of the organisational dimension of control mechanisms over non-conventional 
assets. One of the main subjects of the analysis will be to evaluate the repercussions of 
military involvement in the control apparatus over nuclear programmes which might be 
relevant to other countries.  
It should be emphasised that this thesis draws a distinction between two different mechanisms 
and will deal with the former and not the latter: controlling R&D programmes for the 
development of non-conventional capabilities and command and control over operational 
WMD. Although there is an overlap between these two mechanisms, particularly in the 
agencies that are part of them, these control systems have different functions for different 
purposes. Although the conclusions of this thesis could also be relevant to understanding 
command and control of operational capabilities, this thesis will analyse the control system 
solely from the aspect of non-proliferation.           
In addition, assessing Pakistan’s military involvement in export control would make some 
contribution to the understanding of the operation of military headquarters during times of 
peace and their organisational culture. Very few research articles were published about staff 
work in HQs and how military institutions conduct their routine assignments, and not just 
during wartime or emergency situations. The subject of military involvement and influence 
through its bureaucracy on decision making on broader national security issues still needs to 
be explored. 
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 Chapter One: Pakistan’s Military Involvement in the Evolution of the 
National Control System and in the Nuclear Proliferation of AQ Khan’s 
Network 
1. Introduction 
Between the 1980’s and 2003 Pakistan was a source of assistance for the development of 
nuclear weapons programmes for at least three countries: Iran, Libya, and North Korea. 
Pakistan also cooperated with China in developing the nuclear weapons programmes of both 
countries, and in addition there is substantial evidence of offers of nuclear assistance to other 
countries: Iraq (during Saddam’s regime), Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Syria and 
Egypt
10
. Most of the nuclear assistance was orchestrated by a proliferation network of 
businessmen and middlemen and headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan), one of the most 
senior officials in Pakistan’s nuclear programmes. On what seemed a separate incident, only a 
few weeks prior to the 9/11 terror attacks, retired Pakistani nuclear scientists offered their 
services to Al-Qaeda in developing a non-conventional capability.       
The above extensive proliferation activity occurred parallel to the power consolidation of 
Pakistan’s military. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, the military, and especially the 
Army, was always the dominant force in national security issues and superseded any other 
domestic institution, particularly during periods under martial regime. Under civilian regimes 
the Army usually secured its autonomy on national security issues. Hence, the entire decision-
making process and the control system over the nuclear programmes were directed by the 
military. 
♦♦♦ 
The main goal of this chapter is to support the argument that Pakistan’s nuclear export 
phenomenon occurred at least with the knowledge of the military and most probably with its 
consent. Explaining why Pakistan’s nuclear export could only succeed with military 
involvement is necessary in order to support the analytical process  and explain the focus of 
this thesis on Pakistan’s military role in the control system. However, similar to other national 
control systems over nuclear organisations, Pakistan’s system is also opaque in its nature and 
thus there is a lack of solid information which supports the argument about military 
involvement in nuclear proliferation from Pakistan. As for nuclear proliferation from 
                                                 
10 Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute of the US Army War College, January 2008), pp. 13, 29-30. 
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Pakistan, there are contradictory versions of the parties and individuals allegedly connected to 
the operation and an intent to disseminate misinformation.   
In order to confront the shortage of hard evidence on Pakistan’s military involvement in 
nuclear proliferation this chapter includes an examination of Pakistan’s control system from a 
historical perspective: the central function of the military in the supervision over the nuclear 
organisations will be demonstrated in every period since the beginning of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons programme, even in periods when the programme was under direct civilian control. 
The discussion will include a less observed aspect of the control system: the role of Pakistan’s 
main security agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and its strong 
connection to the nuclear organisations. The next part of the chapter will analyse the extent of 
military involvement in nuclear exports, and will try to evaluate the most reliable information 
pointing to one of three plausible options: AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network was a 
private initiative; the military was aware of the nuclear exports; and the nuclear proliferation 
was a result of military initiative. 
♦♦♦ 
2. Pakistan’s Military Involvement in the Control System over the Nuclear 
Organisations 
2.1. The Civilian Control System over the Nuclear Programmes between 1972 and 
1977, and the Military Involvement 
It appears that until the 1970’s Pakistan refrained from any serious effort to develop a nuclear 
capability. Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme was initiated in the 1950’s when the US 
decided as part of its ‘Atom for Peace’ initiative to assist Pakistan (and other non-nuclear 
countries) in developing a nuclear infrastructure for civilian purposes
11
. As a consequence, in 
1957 Pakistan established its first nuclear agency, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC), and it was designated to be responsible for the nuclear programme. In 1965, Canada 
too supplied Pakistan with a nuclear reactor (called KANUPP
12
) for its growing energy 
needs
13
.  
                                                 
11 Leonard Weiss, Atoms for Peace, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 59:6 (November-December, 2003), p. 44. 
12 Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. 
13 For more details about Pakistan’s nuclear programme until the official decision in 1972 to develop a military 
nuclear programme, see: Samina Ahemd, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Turning Points and 
Nuclear Choices, International Security, 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 178-204. 
Chapter One 
34 
 
Pakistan decided to develop military nuclear capabilities in the 1970’s soon after its defeat in 
the 1971 War. In this war Pakistan lost half of the country with the creation of Bangladesh, 
and the war is considered a national trauma. Before 1971, the military regime (which ruled 
between 1958 and 1971) was less interested in developing nuclear capabilities under the 
perception that the country lacked the scientific and industrial base for producing advanced 
technologies for military purposes
14
. The military concentrated its efforts on the production of 
conventional weaponry
15
.  
                                                 
14
 Former Head of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Munir Ahmed Khan, tried in 1965 to convince 
the President and former Army chief Ayub Khan about the necessity of developing a nuclear weapons   
programme, but his arguments were rejected by Ayub Khan who claimed that Pakistan was too poor to develop 
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In the first period of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, between 1972 (after the end of 
the 1971 War) and the coup d'état of 1977, it was under direct civilian authority, partly as a 
result of the crucial role of senior cabinet members in its establishment. The clandestine 
nuclear programme was controlled by the civilian government of President and later Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who also initiated the nuclear project. Since he became a cabinet 
minister in 1958 Bhutto had harboured a conviction that Pakistan had to become a nuclear 
weapons state
16
. He was known for saying that “if India builds the bomb we will eat grass or 
leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own”17.  
During this period in the 1970’s, decision making on the nuclear programmes was dominated 
by civilian officials and agencies. The decision making process was centralised in the Prime 
Minister’s Secretariat with the close involvement of Prime Minister Bhutto. Bhutto was 
personally the driving force who tried to convince PAEC and its scientific cadre about the 
vision of Pakistan as a nuclear weapons country. In January 1972 Bhutto convened a key 
meeting (known as ‘the Multan Conference’) which resulted in the decision to develop 
nuclear weapons
18
, and many of the scientists present at the meeting played a vital role in the 
development of the nuclear programme
19
.  
Prime Minister Bhutto was also the main creator of the organisational structure of the nuclear 
programmes and some of his arrangements are still pertinent. In 1975 Bhutto decided to 
establish another designated nuclear agency for the nuclear weapons programme, called the 
Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL, later renamed AQ Khan Research Laboratories - 
KRL), and it received responsibility for developing uranium enrichment capabilities
20
. AQ 
Khan was its first director general and the one who persuaded Bhutto about the necessity of 
                                                                                                                                                         
nuclear weapons. Ayub Khan’s successor, General Yahya Khan, also rejected the idea. See: Mr. Munir Ahmad 
Khan's Speech delivered on March 20, 1999, at PINSTECH Auditorium, Chaghi Medal Award   
 Ceremony. <http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/speech_munirahmed.html> Accessed on January 22
nd
  
 2012. The meeting between Ayub Khan and Munir Ahmed Khan and its consequences was also mentioned in:  
 Feroz Hassan Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan, Nonproliferation Review, 13:3  
 (November 2006), p. 514 (no. 25). 
15
 Peter R. Lavoy, Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Political Responses, 
Nonproliferation Review, 13:3 (November 2006), pp. 438, 441, 443.   
16 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secrete Trade in 
Nuclear Weapons (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), p. 17. 
17 George Percovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1999), p. 68. 
18 Deception, pp. 18-20, 52; Douglas France and Catherine Collins, The Man from Pakistan: The True Story of 
the World’s Most Dangerous Nuclear Smuggler (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2008), pp. 18-21. 
19 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 339. 
20 Deception, p. 34; The Man from Pakistan, p. 68-69. PAEC remained responsible for producing nuclear 
materials for uranium enrichment, namely uranium hexafluoride (UF6).  
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another nuclear agency
21
: Bhutto decided to create ERL as a result of severe political and 
technological complications in developing the nuclear plutonium programme
22
. Both nuclear 
organisations - PAEC and ERL - were under the direct control of the Prime Minister
23
. 
♦♦♦ 
Bhutto also set the working relations between the competent authorities and the nuclear 
organisations, and particularly ERL/KRL at least until the reform of the control system at the 
end of the 1990’s: although Prime Minister Bhutto had a strong tendency towards 
centralisation, he gave AQ Khan a free hand in managing his organisation and deciding upon 
the best route for the technological success of the project. Khan enjoyed full authority in 
acquiring technologies and materials for the clandestine nuclear programme under his 
control
24
. In the coming years, both under military and civilian regimes, the exceptional 
independent position of Khan would be consolidate and would enabled him to organise the 
nuclear export venture. 
♦♦♦ 
As part of Bhutto’s efforts to keep the nuclear programme under his tight grip and with 
limited involvement of the military he established another organisational precedent which is 
still relevant: Bhutto created an informal senior civilian committee at ministerial level to 
advise him on nuclear issues
25
. Two of the prominent members of the committee were the 
Defence Secretary (equivalent to the managerial level of a Director General), Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan (who later became the President), and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Agha Shai
26
. 
These two civilian ministers were deeply involved in the decision making on initiating a 
                                                 
21 The Man from Pakistan, pp. 32, 67-68. AQ Khan’s main advantage in being in charge of the uranium 
enrichment programme was his knowledge and information regarding the assembly and operation of gas 
centrifuges. Khan gained access to this information during his work in the Netherlands for the European 
consortium, URENCO, which developed these nuclear technologies. Khan also brought with him vital 
information about supply companies in Europe which could deliver the components for the uranium 
enrichment programme. 
22 Deception, p. 20; Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan, and the Rise of 
Nuclear Proliferation Networks, a Net Assessment (London: The International institute for Strategic Studies, 
2007), p. 16-17. 
23 Deception, p. 35; Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup 1979-1999: In 
Search for a Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 186; Crossed Swords, p. 342. 
24 Deception, pp. 34-35; Nuclear Black Markets, p. 65. 
25 Deception, p. 52; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise 
and Fall of AQ Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 17-18. 
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nuclear weapons programme, and for example were behind the motion to grant ERL a 
position independent of PAEC
27
.  
In addition, at this early stage of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme civilian agencies 
played a considerable role in state supervision. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) was the 
administrative umbrella for ERL in its first period of operation in light of the limited 
bureaucratic resources of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Through MOD, ERL received its 
financial and logistical support, and MOD served as a bureaucratic liaison between ERL and 
external government agencies from which it needed various services
28
. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was also deeply involved in the nuclear programmes. Following 
India’s nuclear test in 1974 the Foreign Minister in Bhutto’s government Agha Shai was one 
of the keen advocates for developing nuclear weapons and later facilitated China’s extensive 
assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programmes: China supplied Pakistan with critical materials 
and knowledge for developing nuclear weapons, and enabled Pakistan to develop its nuclear 
capabilities significantly earlier than expected
29
. 
As part of Prime Minister Bhutto’s efforts to keep the nuclear programmes under his tight 
control he was particularly anxious about the Army’s dominant position in the internal arena 
and tried to limit its influence by orchestrating a civilian control system over the nuclear 
development
30
. As a result, no representative of the military was officially involved in the 
decision-making process at the Multan Conference in 1972, and Bhutto kept the generals out 
of the policy making on the nuclear issue
31
. However, it seems that the shift of efforts from 
PAEC to KRL to acquire nuclear capability though uranium enrichment led Bhutto to realise 
that he needed the Army’s proficiency and capabilities in order to guarantee the success of the 
clandestine nuclear weapons project. The Army and the ISI were recruited for several 
missions:  
1) Procurement campaign of materials and components for the nuclear programme. An Army 
Brigadier-General was appointed in 1976 as the head of the Special Works Organisation 
                                                 
27 Abdul Majid Chaudhri, Pakistan’s Nuclear History: Separating Myth from Reality, Defence Journal, 9:10 
(May 2006) <http://www.defencejournal.com/2006-5/index.asp> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012; Nuclear Black 
Markets, p. 18. 
28 Deception, p. 35. 
29 Ibid, pp. 61-62. 
30 For example, Bhutto created a civilian intelligence agency called the Intelligence Bureau (IB). IB was 
supposed to become the dominant intelligence organisation responsible for internal threats at the expense of the 
Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) and the Military Intelligence (MI), which were an integral part of the military 
establishment.  
31 Deception, pp. 18-20, 52. 
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(SWO), a military unit created to supervise the construction of ERL nuclear complex and 
to procure equipment for the nuclear project. Another Army colonel was responsible for 
procurement abroad. In addition, the ISI guided AQ Khan in the formation of his 
procurement network (which later developed into a nuclear proliferation network)
32
. 
2) Organising the security apparatus around the clandestine nuclear facilities. An Army 
brigadier-general (one star) was appointed as head of security of ERL and made 
responsible for monitoring all activities in ERL
33
.  
3) Constructing the ERL nuclear complex. SWO was also responsible for supervising the 
construction of the facilities of ERL in Kahuta. Until the construction of the nuclear 
complex AQ Khan directed ERL from the Army HQ in Rawalpindi
34
. 
2.2. Military Control over the Nuclear Organisations after the Coup of July 1977 
Pakistan’s control system over the nuclear organisations changed dramatically with the 
military coup of 1977, and the take-over of the government by the Chief of Army Staff 
(COAS) General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. The nuclear programmes were transferred from 
civilian supervision to the military, and they have remained under considerable degree of 
military control until today.  
♦♦♦ 
Like Prime Minister Bhutto Zia too had a tendency for micromanagement: under his direct 
control he centralised the responsibility for most of the significant issues which could be 
considered as the affairs of the nation
35
. Zia connected the nuclear organisation to the military 
and he laid significant future stumbling blocks for any change in the control mechanism. In 
this regard, Zia shaped the military character of the control apparatus over the nuclear 
programmes and made the military, and particularly the Army, the sole organisation in 
Pakistan that could be considered professional in managing nuclear programmes. Even 
                                                 
32 Deception, pp. 4, 16, 32, 35, 40, 43; The Man from Pakistan, pp. 67, 69,72, 119; John Wilson, Pakistan's 
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nowadays, the military is the only establishment which has overall experience in command 
and control over the development and deployment of nuclear capabilities. 
♦♦♦ 
Zia created several layers of control over the nuclear programmes. At the highest level of 
decision making Zia formed a policy oriented forum, the National Command Authority 
(NCA
36
). Zia presided as its chairman, and his deputy (the Army Chief of Staff - COS) 
became his deputy on the committee
37
. Most of the members of NCA were military generals, 
                                                 
36 In some places NCA was also called the National Nuclear Command Committee (NNCC). See: Ian Bremmer 
and Maria Kuusisto, Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters (London: South Asian 
Strategic Stability Institute, 2008), p. 8. Not to be confused with NCA established in February 2000 by the 
Chief Executive and COAS General Pervez Musharraf. For more details, see this chapter and Chapter Four. 
37 COS was a position created by Zia followung the military coup in order to command the Army after he 
became the head of state. COS was replaced later by the position of Vice COAS (VCOAS). 
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and almost none of the members were civilians outside the scientific cadre of the nuclear 
programmes. 
The military quickly built a control mechanism as a main tool for consolidating its connection 
to the nuclear weapons programme and in order to assimilate it in the military establishment. 
In this regard, COS (and later Vice COAS) was responsible for the daily supervision of the 
clandestine nuclear weapons project
38
. Furthermore, a designated directorate for strategic 
development was established in the Army HQ (the General Headquarters - GHQ) that carried 
out most of the nuclear operational planning. The HQs of the Air Force and Navy (AHQ and 
NHQ, respectively) did not participate in the control mechanisms
39
. 
One of the main shifts in the control system in its re-organisation under the military regime 
was the marginalisation of civilian agencies from control over the nuclear programmes. In this 
regard, the Foreign Ministry was removed from supervision over nuclear organisations and 
was absent from the decision-making process of their operation. The only exception was the 
former Defence Secretary, Ishaq Khan: as the appointed Finance Minister he was responsible 
for allocating funds for the clandestine nuclear programmes, and particularly for the nuclear 
uranium enrichment project
40
. 
Parallel to the Army taking control over decision making on nuclear issues, and similar to 
Bhutto’s approach, the martial regime maintained autonomy of the nuclear organisations over 
technical and operational management
41
. The heads of the clandestine nuclear programme 
enjoyed total control over technical matters. They were given free access to the core of the 
military establishment
42
, and had direct contact with the military command and the national 
leadership
43
. 
The military was more involved in the nuclear programmes than the former civilian regime, 
and more Army officers were posted to KRL to take responsibility for supervising all the 
agency’s operations and administration work44. In this regard, contacts between the nuclear 
organisations and entities outside the military establishment and state bureaucracy were 
carefully monitored: the Army restricted scientists’ movements and from time to time 
                                                 
38 Deception, p. 52. 
39 Nuclear Black Markets, p. 65; Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 69. 
40 Deception, pp. 170-172; The Man from Pakistan, pp. 68-69. 
41 Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 67. 
42 Deception, 102-103; Shopping for Bombs, p. 17. 
43 Deception, pp. 53, 58, 84-85, 90, 146; Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 67. 
44 Deception, p. 102; Pakistan’s Nuclear Underworld, p. 43. 
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scientists were accompanied by Army officers. Every overlap between KRL personnel and 
foreigners and travel abroad could only be realised with Army approval
45
. However, AQ 
Khan’s special position in the nuclear establishment was preserved and he maintained the 
overall responsibility for his nuclear agency and continued to enjoy a relaxed military 
supervision as long as KRL continued forwarding the nuclear weapons programme. AQ 
Khan’s influential position was also a result of his leading role in two ventures which secured 
Pakistan’s success in developing nuclear weapons by the middle of the 1980’s: the 
clandestine nuclear procurement network and China’s transfer of crucial nuclear assistance.   
From the early stages of the nuclear weapons programme the main objective of the control 
system was to protect the programme from outside attacks - military strikes, sabotage and 
espionage
46
. As a consequence, after the military coup of 1977, the military reinforced its 
responsibility for the security of the nuclear programmes (which had already been delegated 
to the Army during Bhutto’s civilian regime). There were three to four tiers of security around 
the nuclear facilities. Two army brigades and other military units were stationed there to 
guard the nuclear facilities. In addition, intelligence agencies directed the security apparatus: 
the ISI assumed responsibility for the information security of the nuclear organisations and 
for the safety of the top scientists
47
. 
2.3. Military Control over Nuclear Organisations under the Civilian Regime (1988-
1999) 
♦♦♦ 
Following Zia’s death in a mysterious plane crash in August 1988 the country returned to a 
parliamentary system of government. Although the new political circumstances forced the 
Army to allow the restoration of a civilian government, the Army strove to preserve its power 
within the internal arena and refused to share its responsibility for the nuclear weapon 
programmes which consolidated its prestige as the ‘defender of the nation’. The Army 
authority over the nuclear organisations strengthened its prominent position under a civilian 
government in any decision making on national security strategy. As will be presented in this 
section, in the decade of civilian regime, the control system over nuclear organisations 
remained militarised. 
                                                 
45 Deception, pp. 154, 296, 516 (no. 70); Shopping for Bombs, pp. 95-96. 
46 Shaun Gregory, The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan, Brief No. 22 (November 18th 2007), Pakistan 
Security Research Unit (PSRU), pp. 6, 10. 
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♦♦♦ 
In the general elections of November 1988 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won and its leader, 
Benazir Bhutto, became Prime Minister. The military feared her elevation to head of 
government: Bhutto was the daughter of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was toppled 
and executed by the military, and she led the main opposition to Zia’s martial regime. As a 
result, she was perceived by the military establishment as a threat to its national dominant 
position. The military was concerned that if Bhutto controlled the nuclear capabilities, she 
would be more amenable to American pressure to limit the development of the nuclear 
programmes
48
.  
                                                 
48 The Man from Pakistan, p. 164. 
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As a consequence, soon after Bhutto’s electoral victory, the military pressurised her into 
conceding to a framework that would limit her influence on the nuclear programmes to a 
minimum. Officially, as in the days of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the nuclear organisations were 
positioned administratively under the Prime Minister’s Secretariat49. However, several 
institutional arrangements were made in order to preserve the military’s control over the 
nuclear organisations. Zia’s successors to the presidency and to the Army command formed a 
decision-making forum also named NCA for the nuclear programmes and for other strategic 
issues which included President Ishaq Khan, COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg, and Prime 
Minister Bhutto. The military created NCA in order to demonstrate its accountability to the 
government, and in turn for the latter to be held responsible amid international and American 
criticism. 
Furthermore, despite being a civilian politician the President, Ishaq Khan, was a traditional 
supporter of the military and served in Zia’s military regime. As a result, NCA was controlled 
by two senior officials who perceived this forum as a means for protecting the military 
interests in the nuclear programmes. Bhutto was neutralised in the forum and excluded from 
any actual supervision over the nuclear capabilities. President Ishaq Khan and the chiefs of 
the Army and the ISI cautioned Bhutto to refrain from any involvement in the nuclear 
programmes. COAS Beg admitted that Bhutto’s participation in NCA was only a result of 
American pressure
50
. 
Bhutto was without any authority over the nuclear organisations that were nominally under 
the direct control of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. According to Bhutto’s own accounts, 
the Army chief, General Beg, refused to brief her on the development of the nuclear 
programmes and the first time she learned about her country’s own nuclear programmes was 
from US Intelligence officials during her state visit to Washington in June 1989. The heads of 
KRL and PAEC declined Bhutto’s summons, and in 1990 KRL returned to operation after a 
short interval without Bhutto’s knowledge. Bhutto also failed to exercise her authority and to 
lay down nuclear policy. Finally, Bhutto’s effort to intervene in the nuclear issue was 
probably one of the reasons for her dismissal
51
. 
                                                 
49 Ibid, p. 181. 
50 Deception, pp. 188-189, 191. 
51 Crossed Swords, p. 422; Deception, pp. 190-191, 200, 210-212; The Man from Pakistan, pp. 164, 169-171, 
185; Pakistan’s Nuclear Underworld, p. 45.  
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The military was less passionate towards Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Bhutto’s successor 
(November 1990 - July 1993, and February 1997 - October 1999). In light of his cooperation 
with Zia’s military regime (during his term as Chief Minister of the Punjab Province in the 
1980’s, and later as one of the main adversaries of Bhutto and her political party), Sharif was 
considered more accommodating towards the military’s interests52. Nevertheless, under NCA 
framework, Sharif played a limited role like Bhutto on the nuclear issue, and was outside the 
decision-making process on nuclear capabilities
53
. Similar to Bhutto, Sharif objected to the 
military’s dominance and strove to challenge it and refused to extend General Beg’s tenure as 
COAS
54
. Sharif applied similar drive to the nuclear issue, and he tried to exercise his 
influence, However Sharif was constantly sidelined by the Army
55
.  
During Sharif’s first term, President Ishaq Khan remained the main non-military official 
involved in the nuclear issue. The influence of the President through NCA on decision 
making on nuclear capabilities lasted until Ishaq Khan’s resignation from the Presidency in 
July 1993. However, the strong position of the President in the control system was only a 
result of the Army’s admiration for Ishaq Khan. Ishaq Khan’s successors to the Presidency 
did not enjoy their predecessor’s strong affiliation to the military and his knowledge about the 
nuclear programmes. As a result, the NCA organisational arrangement was disregarded.  
Following the marginalisation of NCA, the civilian Prime Minister could have enjoyed more 
influence over the nuclear issue. Without the constitutional support of the President, COAS 
could be coerced from time to time by an elected Prime Minister with strong opinions. 
Consequently, the civilian Prime Ministers had the possibility of being more involved in the 
nuclear programme. It should be emphasised that the Prime Minister was only able to 
pressurise for a broad directive or policy and intervene on specific issues. The military 
continued to carry out the daily supervision of the nuclear organisations.   
Nevertheless, the Army maintained its dominant position in the supervision of the nuclear 
organisations. The military’s main political opponent, Benazir Bhutto, missed the opportunity 
to challenge the Army’s influence during her second term as Prime Minister (October 1993 - 
November 1996). Bhutto admitted that she had decided to maintain cordial relations with the 
military and to avoid clashes on issues that were under military responsibility, including the 
                                                 
52 Deception, p. 227-228; The Man from Pakistan, pp. 226-227. 
53 Deception, pp. 182, 191. 
54
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nuclear programmes. Similar to her first term as Prime Minister, Bhutto remained in the dark 
about defence issues, and especially about control over the nuclear programmes and their 
technological progress
56
. Sharif in his second term as Prime Minister (February 1997 - 
October 1999) did not question military control over the nuclear programmes either, but he 
flexed his muscles more often. In this regard Sharif was in a position to steer nuclear policy 
following India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 and chaired a secret meeting of the Cabinet 
Committee for Defence (DCC) with the participation of the chiefs of the military services, 
and the heads of the nuclear organisations. Sharif decided on conducting nuclear tests and on 
PAEC (and not KRL) being in charge of this operation
57
. 
♦♦♦ 
Regarding the routine control over the nuclear organisations, the Army was completely on top 
of it during the civilian regime. Since Zia’s days, the Army has maintained the only 
administrative agency that supervised the nuclear organisations. In 1993 COAS Abdul Kakar 
created in GHQ a designated directorate, the Combat Development Directorate (CDD). The 
main responsibility of CDD was operating the security apparatus of the nuclear programmes, 
including supervising KRL and PAEC, and monitoring personnel reliability and security 
information
58
. Nevertheless, the inherited rivalry between the military and the civilian 
government attracted most of the attention of both of rivalling sides and probably less 
consideration by the senior officials was given to the actual supervision on KRL and other 
nuclear agencies. This situation enabled AQ Khan to strengthen his internal position and his 
room to manoeuvre between the different political forces.  
♦♦♦ 
In addition to the Army’s involvement in the nuclear programmes during the civilian regime 
through a designated directorate, several senior officers also participated in its coordination. 
COAS himself was the main figure responsible for the supervision of the nuclear 
organisations, both by being a prominent member of NCA and by being responsible for CDD. 
Furthermore, COAS was involved in the daily running of the nuclear programmes. For 
example, COAS General Kakar allowed the North Korean Minister of the People’s Armed 
Forces to visit KRL complex in Kahuta, and PAEC’s missile production facility. In addition, 
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COAS General Beg was the one who decided to publicise Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
capabilities, and COAS General Karamat authorised KRL passive participation in the nuclear 
tests of May 1998
59
. The other senior general who was involved in the nuclear programmes 
was the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) in the GHQ. Apparently, DGMO 
supervised the operational adjustment of the nuclear capabilities for military use. 
Furthermore, updated information points to the participation of DGMO in decision making 
concerning the nuclear programmes
60
. 
2.4. Military Involvement in the Current Control Mechanism (Since 1999) 
♦♦♦ 
The return of the Army to direct control of the country following the coup of October 1999 
consolidated the Army’s dominant position in the command and control system over the 
nuclear organisations. The new military ruler, COAS General Pervez Musharraf, had already 
begun, after the nuclear tests of May 1998 (and before the coup), to implement a 
comprehensive plan for a national control mechanism. The reorganisation officially declared 
in February 2000 granted the military a leading position on issues related to nuclear 
programmes under any future regime. Nowadays, the military semi-constitutionally enjoys a 
critical position both in the decision-making process and in the administrative control of the 
nuclear programmes. 
♦♦♦ 
A major part of the reforms was the establishment of another NCA in a new structure as the 
highest national decision-making forum on nuclear issues. NCA contains two committees: an 
Employment Control Committee (ECC) for supervising the operational and the decision-
making aspects regarding the use of nuclear weapons
61
, and a Development Control 
Committee (DCC) for monitoring the technical and administrative matters of the nuclear 
programmes
62
. DCC was probably also responsible for authorising the export of nuclear-
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related equipment
63
. The legal framework of NCA was later strengthened in a legislative act 
which lays down its responsibilities
64
. 
 
Although NCA is headed by a civilian Prime Minister
70
 almost half of its ten members are 
military officers: COAS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chief of 
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Air Staff (CAS), and the Chief of Navy Staff (CNS). Furthermore, DCC is responsible for the 
entire operation of the nuclear organisations, and has a majority of members who are military 
generals and the heads of the agencies responsible for nuclear development
71
. 
Moreover, although NCA has far reaching authority over nuclear programmes, it is a nominal 
forum that provides a public posture for the national nuclear command, and consolidates the 
military share of responsibility for the nuclear issue. The founder of the new command and 
control system, COAS General Musharraf, preferred to consult with his colleagues in the 
Army command than convene NCA for decision making on issues concerning the nuclear 
organisations
72. Musharraf’s successor as COAS, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, admitted to 
his American counterparts that he had upheld the decision about conducting additional missile 
tests and thus hinted that he had actual control over the development of Pakistan’s nuclear 
programmes
73
. 
The new administrative unit which replaced CDD shortly after the nuclear tests of May 1998 
was the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Since its inception, SPD has been a military entity, 
and is defined as an inter-services organisation (like the ISI) with officers from all the armed 
forces, and is under the administrative responsibility of the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) 
which is in charge of military affairs relevant to all armed forces
74
. Within the military, the 
Army maintained its control over SPD. Although SPD was defined as a secretariat for NCA 
and since 2007 its Director General (DG) has been a civilian, it still operates from a military 
cantonment, and the current DG SPD is a retired Army General
75
. 
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♦♦♦ 
SPD became the main power in the new control system and it centralised the administrative 
responsibilities which are part of supervising the nuclear organisations
76
. SPD controls all 
matters related to the nuclear issue such as formulating nuclear policy and export control 
mechanisms. Furthermore, SPD is also in charge of the nuclear programmes development, 
security information, counter-proliferation and counter-intelligence
77. SPD’s overall 
responsibility for nuclear programmes was lately manifested in its authority over ambitious 
national planning for a nuclear programme based on plutonium production and the building of 
several nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities in the coming years
78
.  
♦♦♦ 
The nuclear organisations, which are civilian scientific agencies, were placed under the direct 
control of the military through SPD. A similarly arrangement was drawn up for the State 
Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), which is Pakistan’s space agency 
and is involved in developing missile systems for nuclear capabilities: SUPARCO was 
brought under NCA and SPD authority in 2000
79
. The new agency for military technological 
development (including developing missile systems), the National Engineering and Scientific 
Commission (NESCOM), was created in 2001 as part of the consolidation of the control 
mechanism, and was also placed under the supervision of SPD
80
.  
Another significant change that took place under the new control system was the decrease in 
responsibilities of the heads of the nuclear organisations. Under the new control system the 
director generals of PAEC and KRL were relieved of many of their responsibilities, including 
control over accounting and auditing, foreign travel, security and the screening of personnel
81
. 
These responsibilities were transferred to SPD which took charge of protecting the nuclear 
                                                 
76 Nuclear Black Markets, p. 109. 
77 Tariq Osman Hyder (a former Additional Secretary, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dimensions of 
Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets. Presentation at the Workshop on ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan's 
Nuclear Security’ (Washington DC, April 30th 2007). 
<http://www.ransac.org/Projects/Globalizing%20Threat%20Reduction%20Project/index.asp> Accessed on 
March 10
th
 2012. 
78
Pakistani Leaders Deny Intent to Release AQ Khan (cable code: 08ISLAMABAD1613, April 18
th
 2008). 
Wikileaks database of US diplomatic cables as published in ‘Dawn’ newspaper 
<http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/25/2008-zardari-says-would-have-given-iaea-access-to-a-q-khan-if-he-
could.html/print/> Accessed on May 26
th
 2011.   
79 SUPARCO’s website: <http://www.suparco.gov.pk/pages/intro.asp>. 
80 Nuclear Black Markets, p. 110. 
81 Deception, p. 295. 
Chapter One 
51 
 
programmes’ infrastructure and manpower. SPD includes a Security Division82 and the 
security directors within the nuclear organisations are under its supervision
83
. 
The result of the reorganisation process of the control system over the nuclear organisations 
was the diminish role of AQ Khan and eventually his removal from his position as DG KRL 
in March 2001. The internal position of Khan was weakened in parallel to the completion of 
the construction of a nuclear arsenal and its means of delivery until the end of the 1990’s. The 
success of these efforts was demonstrated in the nuclear tests of May 1998 when Pakistan 
declared itself as a nuclear weapons country. Furthermore, the return to military regime 
following the coup of October 1999 limited AQ Khan’s ability to manoeuvre between the 
different factions of the internal system. Khan seems to fail to realise the meaning of the 
above development, refused to abide SPD’s instructions, and finally was eased out from 
KRL
84
.    
Following Pakistan’s nuclear tests of May 1998, one of the main goals of reforming the 
control system was to convince the international community that Pakistan is a responsible 
country that can supervise its nuclear capabilities. Hence, the new control system was meant 
to resemble its equivalents in western countries, and includes civilian agencies in order to 
portray it as an efficient and professional apparatus. Consequently, the reforms included a role 
for the civilian bureaucracy and political leadership in the control system over nuclear 
organisations, but without challenging the dominant position of the military. Most of the 
perceived responsibilities of the civilian agencies have been in two spheres that received 
higher international attention: the operation of nuclear capabilities in emergency scenarios, 
and the exercising of export controls over WMD-related items (The role of the civilian 
agencies in the export control mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter Four).  
Regarding the possibility of employing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the most senior civilian 
authorities were part of NCA: the President was its chairman (until 2009), the Prime Minister 
served as vice-chairman (currently he is also the chairman), and the Ministers for Defence, 
Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Finance were members of NCA. Furthermore, all of the civilian 
members of NCA were in ECC which is responsible for discussing the operational dimension 
of the nuclear capabilities. As for export controls, civilian agencies received responsibilities 
but without direct supervision over the nuclear organisations. 
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According to the reforms which were announced in February 2000 and following the 
establishment of the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in 2006, under its preview 
MOFA became the main civilian agency which takes part in export control mechanisms. 
SECDIV is responsible for implementing the Export Control Act of 2004 for nuclear, 
biological, and missile-related materials
85
. However, the Export Control Act does not apply to 
nuclear organisations. MOFA’s role is restricted to the export licensing process for the private 
sector, and has only a consultancy position on export controls connected to nuclear 
organisations which are under SPD supervision
86
. Other civilian agencies also have some role 
in the control system: MOD is authorised to exempt government agencies from the export 
control process
87
; The Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is responsible for administrating the 
export control legislation; and the Ministry of Defence Production (MODP) is responsible for 
the defence industries and the licensing process of defence exports
88
.  
♦♦♦ 
In short, SPD has overall authority over export control issues which are connected to nuclear 
organisations and SPD answers only to the Army senior command. Moreover, under the new 
control system the military is institutionally more involved in the affairs of the nuclear 
organisations. According to American diplomats and Pakistani scholars, SPD has more 
influence than MOFA on policy related to non-proliferation and arms control
89
. 
♦♦♦ 
3. The ISI Role in the Control Mechanism as Additional Military Involvement 
One aspect of the military control over the nuclear organisations which was neglected is the 
involvement of the ISI in the control system and its influence over decision making on 
nuclear capabilities. The ISI position in the defence establishment will be part of the 
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discussion in Chapter Two, and the character of the agency’s operations will be examined in 
Chapter Three. This part of the chapter will be dedicated to the ISI direct involvement in the 
control system as an additional layer of the military grip on the nuclear organisations. The ISI 
plays a significant role in formulating and implementing national security policies.   
As described in the previous part of this chapter, the ISI does not have a formal position in the 
control mechanism. NCA, which is the senior decision-making forum for issues related to 
nuclear programmes, does not officially include the head of the ISI (DG ISI), and he is 
occasionally invited to NCA meetings. The ISI has responsibilities within the security 
apparatus guarding nuclear organisations. The ISI has constantly screened the activities of 
nuclear scientists, including AQ Khan, and travel abroad by delegations from the nuclear 
organisations is monitored by the ISI
90
. In addition, the ISI has collaborated with the Military 
Intelligence Directorate (MI) in GHQ and with the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in securing the 
nuclear programmes from external and hostile penetration. In the new control system over the 
nuclear organisations the ISI was designated as a collaborative agency with SPD’s Security 
Division in the fields of intelligence, security information and counter-intelligence
91
. As part 
of the above duties, in late 2003 and in 2004, the ISI assisted SPD in interrogating AQ Khan 
and his KRL’s associates in the nuclear proliferation network. In October 2001 the ISI also 
interrogated the two former senior nuclear scientists who met the Al Qaeda leader, Osama 
bin-Laden, shortly before the 9/11 terror attacks
92
. 
Nevertheless, even when the ISI is secondary to SPD in the control system the ISI still holds 
influence on the activity of the system and on its nature. The ISI is part of the military and DG 
ISI is normally a close confidant of the Army chief who is the most influential figure in 
Pakistan’s internal arena and also within the control system. As with other national security 
issues, the ISI probably aspires to a role in one of Pakistan’s most remarkable assets - its 
nuclear weapons programmes. 
Since the inception of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the 1970’s the ISI has 
played a role in promoting its development. At the level of national decision making, DG ISI 
utilised its proximity to COAS and was part of any consultations regarding the nuclear 
programmes. The ISI directorate was one of the main contributors to policy decisions, 
particularly when the country was under martial regime: during Zia’s military regime in the 
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1980’s the ISI collaborated with the Army in formulating national security policy, including 
the nuclear dimension and its consequences for the strategic situation
93
. 
The organisational culture of the ISI includes a clear perspective which will be discussed in 
Chapter Three. For the purpose of the current discussion it is sufficient to state that the ISI is 
much more than an intelligence agency equivalent to the intelligence services of western 
countries. The ISI is Pakistan’s military key operational arm and responsible for various 
covert operations: the ISI structure and character derives from this designation. As a result, 
the ISI directors are bound to have inherited an inclination towards a preference for 
employing intelligence operations in order to promote national security objectives, including 
in the nuclear sphere. 
Hence, the ISI assisted in the clandestine operation of procuring materials and technologies 
for the new nuclear weapons programme and collaborated with SWO
94
. The ISI had set up a 
division for equipment procurements which probably commenced immediately following 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s decision in 1972 to initiate a nuclear weapons 
programme. It seems that at least until 2001 this division was included in Joint Intelligence 
Miscellaneous (JIM), one of the ISI’s eight former organisational sections (today probably 
part of the ISI’s ‘S Wing’)95. JIM was responsible for intelligence activities in foreign 
countries, including offensive intelligence operations, so this section of the ISI was likely the 
most suitable for covert acquisitions of nuclear-related equipment
96
. JIM maintained close 
contacts with CDD in the Army HQ, and later with SPD, and assisted in their covert 
purchases and the shipments of missile systems and missile equipment from China and North 
Korea
97
.  
The organisational culture of the ISI which focused on covert operations encouraged close 
connections and organisational coordination with the nuclear organisations which were the 
main benefactors of the clandestine procurement venture. Furthermore, the heads of the 
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nuclear organisations enjoyed direct access to DG ISI
98
. The personal involvement of DG ISI 
in the nuclear programmes was so intense that occasionally he represented the interests of the 
nuclear organisations, and particularly those of KRL, in decision-making forums
99
.  
♦♦♦ 
Furthermore, the ISI did not halt AQ Khan’s covert operations when it was still possible. In 
this regard, the ISI was instructed several times to investigate AQ Khan’s actions, but 
remained elusive about its findings
100
. The ISI warned KRL about some of its investigations 
and it strongly indicated the option that the ISI supported the continuation of the nuclear 
export project
101
. 
♦♦♦ 
4. The Military Involvement in Nuclear Proliferation  
As mentioned in the Preface of this thesis, since the beginning of nuclear weapons 
development in the 1940’s the phenomenon of nuclear assistance from Pakistan has been the 
most extensive and prolonged. After illustrating the dominant role of Pakistan’s military in 
the control system under various regimes the following section will present the main evidence 
of the involvement of the military (mainly the Army and the ISI) in the nuclear export project 
which was implemented by AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. It is vital for this thesis 
to determine the extent of the military involvement in nuclear assistance as the factual basis 
for analysing the nature of the military role in the control system, the efficiency of the control 
system, and how the character of the military involvement contributed to the occurrence of 
nuclear export: in other words, once the extent of the military involvement is established it 
will facilitate the discussion on the nature of the military supervision over the nuclear 
organisations. First, the discussion will elaborate on the indications which support Pakistan’s 
official line that it was only a private initiative behind the nuclear proliferation without any 
military involvement; then, the information which suggests military involvement (awareness 
and complicity) will be presented.     
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4.1. Evidence Suggesting that Pakistan’s Nuclear Exports Occurred without Military 
Involvement  
It should be emphasised that the nature of the information implicating Pakistan’s government 
and military in nuclear exports is largely circumstantial. Even subsequent to the public 
exposure of the proliferation network and the interrogation of its prominent members, in 
Pakistan and in other countries, no direct evidence surfaced that any military general, minister 
or senior official in Pakistan was directly involved in the nuclear exports of the AQ Khan 
network: for example, no official document was exposed which included an instruction to 
export nuclear goods or conclusive evidence which connects the shipment of nuclear 
equipment with government and military officials. 
As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, Pakistan’s official stance attributes nuclear 
exports to a private initiative of AQ Khan, the former DG KRL, and his associates in this 
agency. Pakistani officials emphasised that AQ Khan and KRL enjoyed autonomy over their 
affairs with minimal external scrutiny. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it seems that this 
argument has substantial support both in the rationale and in the practices which guided the 
control system over the nuclear organisations at least until the formal completion of the 
nuclear weapons development in the nuclear tests of May 1998. 
In the initial period of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development (which lasted until the 
nuclear tests of 1998) the rationale behind the limited supervision of KRL and AQ Khan was 
a result of the following aspects: 
1) AQ Khan’s indispensible personal contribution to Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. AQ Khan 
was able to promote Pakistan’s nuclear programme and in the middle of the 1970’s 
released this national project from deadlock
102
: he offered the alternative of uranium 
enrichment with gas centrifuges for developing nuclear capabilities and provided the 
means to achieve this national objective. Khan had two essential assets for Pakistan’s 
nuclear ambitions: a comprehensive technical knowledge of constructing a uranium 
enrichment programme (which he obtained during his professional work in Europe); and 
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contacts with private suppliers who could provide key components for a uranium 
enrichment project. 
2) Unusually strong admiration of the Pakistani people for AQ Khan. Since the 1980’s AQ 
Khan has enjoyed the image of ‘national hero’ in Pakistan, and was internationally known 
as “the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb”. Khan cultivated this representation in several 
media interviews, and by aligning journalists with KRL
103
. Even when AQ Khan was 
eventually arrested in January 2004 and interrogated about the activities of the nuclear 
proliferation network he was quickly pardoned by President Musharraf who explicitly 
declared that “he (Khan) is still my hero”104. The militarised control system aspired to 
avoid a confrontation with the most admired Pakistani and risk the loss of public 
confidence in the regime. 
3) ‘Customer-client’ approach of the control system towards AQ Khan and KRL. According 
to a former SPD senior officer: “As long as Khan’s group delivered the goods, no state 
authority questioned his tactics”105: The control system showed reluctance to jeopardise 
AQ Khan’s contribution to the national nuclear efforts. 
4) Disregard for the prevention of proliferation by the control system. Pakistani officials 
argued that the control apparatus over the nuclear organisations was primarily designated 
to prevent external attacks and sabotage in the nuclear programmes
106
. Thus, the control 
system was inadequate to deal with internal loopholes such as nuclear exports directed by 
scientists which are part of the nuclear programmes. The approach of Pakistan’s civilian 
and military authorities towards AQ Khan as indispensible to the nuclear efforts and their 
admiration for Khan probably influenced the character of the control mechanisms over 
KRL. Moreover, to some extent, the control system adopted a similar lenient approach 
towards PAEC and other military R&D organisations
107
. 
5) Overlaps in the responsibilities of different nuclear organisations. The authorities of the 
control system intentionally arranged the R&D apparatus of nuclear programmes with 
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similar projects in order to encourage competition within the scientific cadre as a driving 
force for the development of non-conventional capabilities
108
. A similar rationale was 
applied to the nuclear programmes with the establishment of ERL (later KRL) in 1976 as 
a nuclear agency in charge of developing a uranium enrichment programme and the 
dismissal of suggestions about creating a unified nuclear agency
109
. In parallel, PAEC 
remained the prominent nuclear organisation responsible for the bulk of scientific 
resources for the development of nuclear capabilities: for most of the nuclear scientific 
cadre and for the long technical experience (since the late 1950’s) in directing nuclear 
installations. Thus, PAEC has been responsible for almost all stages of the construction of 
the nuclear weapons programme, including the development of the nuclear weapons 
group, and for all the civilian nuclear facilities (nuclear reactors and other scientific 
facilities). Fierce competition and personal rivalry accelerated between KRL and PAEC as 
KRL aspired to take part in developing the nuclear weapons group and their means of 
delivery
110
. 
According to Pakistan’s official explanation for AQ Khan’s nuclear exports, the above 
elements which comprised the rationale behind the control system inevitably influenced the 
practices of supervising KRL: 
1) AQ Khan was an invaluable point of contact between the suppliers and Pakistan’s control 
system over the nuclear organisations. In turn, Khan’s pivotal role enabled him to 
transform the procurement network for the export of nuclear equipment without the need 
for official approval. For example, KRL was the leading agency which served as the point 
of contact for cooperation with Iran, North Korea and Libya. It appears that KRL, through 
the proliferation network, was the first agency to provide Iran with components and 
materials of gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in the late 1990’s 
KRL imported large quantities of nuclear materials which were shipped to Libya
111
. AQ 
Khan also used the cooperation with North Korea on missile development in order to visit 
Pyongyang and discuss with his hosts the possibility of nuclear cooperation
112
. Moreover, 
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AQ Khan’s continued to play a key role in Pakistan’s nuclear procurement efforts after his 
retirement from KRL in March 2001, and thus continued to enjoy his freedom of 
operation
113
. 
2) Strong influence and close connections between the senior management of the nuclear 
organisations and the national leadership. Civilian and military heads of state maintained 
direct contact with the heads of the nuclear organisations, including AQ Khan: Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was behind the elevation of AQ Khan in the nuclear 
apparatus and approved his request for the creation of ERL/KRL. Following the coup 
d'état of July 1977 AQ Khan strengthened his working connections with the senior Army 
command: senior generals protected AQ Khan while being perhaps not fully aware of 
Khan’s proliferation activities114. The close connections between AQ Khan and the most 
senior figures and Khan’s responsibility for a crucial part of the nuclear weapons 
development process elevated KRL to a special status and the supervision over its internal 
affairs appeared to be in shambles. A retired Army general who served in the control 
system admitted that “his (AQ Khan) status and that of his organisation is so sacrosanct 
that if I point out anything, my own credibility and patriotism will be in doubt... 
Everybody knows Khan is walking in to see the Army chief and he doesn’t meet anybody 
below that. Who dares question these things?
115”. 
3) Lack of scrutiny over KRL internal affairs, including its financial, technical, and security 
aspects. The designated directorate for supervising the nuclear organisations, CDD in 
GHQ (and later SPD under JSHQ) exercised limited scrutiny of KRL
116
. Even more than 
other nuclear organisations, KRL and AQ Khan received full independence to run its 
internal affairs managing its complex. Consequently, KRL and AQ Khan were not subject 
to external audit which could trace financial transactions for the nuclear exports: KRL 
included an independent department for importing nuclear equipment (the Foreign 
Procurement Division - FPD), and AQ Khan could mobilise institutional resources in 
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favour of the proliferation network
117
. In addition, according to the official line, although 
a senior Army officer served as KRL’s security director he was administratively seconded 
to KRL, received his salary from the nuclear organisation and was directly subordinate to 
AQ Khan
118
. 
4) Lack of adequate financial resources to sustain the nuclear apparatus and indirect 
encouragement to KRL to fulfil its requirements independently. Military officials argued 
that the rivalry with PAEC was one of the main factors behind KRL’s inclination to 
conduct private initiatives, and trade nuclear-related equipment with foreign countries in 
return for funds and technical assistance. For example, according to the official line, 
nuclear cooperation between KRL and North Korea was a result of AQ Khan’s eagerness 
for the development of a long-range missile programme that would compete with PAEC’s 
equivalent technological project
119
. 
According to Pakistan’s official position supervision over the nuclear organisations was 
significantly improved following reforms in the control system after the nuclear tests of May 
1998. President and COAS General Musharraf explained in his memoirs that the reforms were 
also aimed at ending the independent position of AQ Khan, but this goal was only achieved in 
March 2001 when Khan was removed as head of KRL. Strong support for the official 
argument that proliferation was a direct result of private motivation signalled the end of the 
use of KRL’s facilities and equipment by the proliferation network as a source for nuclear 
exports following AQ Khan’s dismissal120. Additional evidence regarding the divergence 
between AQ Khan and the control system is the several investigations by the ISI into his 
activities. Although the investigations did not result in any punitive action they could still 
indicate that Khan was suspected of unauthorised activities and at least part of the nuclear 
proliferation activities were indeed without the involvement of the military or the civilian 
government
121
. 
Furthermore, Bruno Tertrais argues that if nuclear exports were indeed sanctioned by the 
military and were part of a state policy then it would be only logical that PAEC was also 
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involved in the nuclear proliferation activity. Unlike KRL, PAEC was under wider 
institutional control and its involvement in the nuclear export project was more limited than 
that of KRL. PAEC activities in this connection would normally be followed by the Army or 
the ISI
122
. A former senior official in Pakistan’s control system highlighted that flawed 
supervision over KRL was the main reason for its proliferation activities: unlike the 
problematic supervision over KRL, PAEC was ultimately answerable to the authorities
123
.  
One striking case which appears to demonstrate the incompetence of Pakistan’s control 
system after it was reorganised is the contacts between former senior nuclear scientists and Al 
Qaeda about developing a non-conventional capability, which took place in August 2001, just 
a few weeks before the 9/11 terror attacks. One of these scientists was a former manager of a 
nuclear reactor project (he was also one of the members of the founding scientific cadre of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme124), and the other scientist was a former head of 
division in KRL. The two scientists met with Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin-Laden, in 
Afghanistan in August 2001, and discussed with him the possibility of assistance in 
developing a non-conventional capability. They told bin-Laden that they would be able to 
export sensitive technologies from Pakistan by evading the formal export control mechanism. 
It seems that there was no connection between these scientists and AQ Khan or his 
proliferation network: Khan rejected Al-Qaeda’s requests for assistance on several 
occasions
125
.  
Although these two retired nuclear scientists probably acted on their own initiative without 
authorisation, according to intelligence information which was obtained by US government, 
the idea of selling radioactive materials to Al-Qaeda had already been discussed during the 
year 2000 between senior Army generals, KRL officials, and Al-Qaeda representatives
126
. In 
addition, Pakistan’s security agencies received information about the two retired scientists and 
they were warned by the ISI
127
. The ISI probably knew in advance about the meeting between 
the nuclear scientists and bin-Laden through retired ISI officers who were close to the 
                                                 
122 Deception, p. 173; The Man from Pakistan, pp.40-41, 113, 117, 120, 138; Nuclear Black Markets, p. 26. 
123
 Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, p. 30; Shopping for Bombs, p. 147. 
124 The nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmud, was also the head of ERL for a short time in 1974 before 
AQ Khan took his position. 
125 Deception, p. 320; The Man from Pakistan, pp. 263-264, 270-271. 
126 Deception, p. 293; Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda Leader (New 
York, NY: Free Press, 2006), p. 345. 
127 Daniel Pearl and Steve Levine, Pakistan has Ties to Group it Vowed to Curb, Wall Street Journal (December 
24
th
 2001). Accessed via Factiva Database. 
The Role of Pakistan’s Military in the Control System over Nuclear Programmes 
 
60 
 
scientists, including former DG ISI, Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul
128
. Yet, it appears that the 
ISI did not interrogate these scientists: until the US insisted on their arrest, the ISI only 
warned them not to discuss any WMD issues with Al-Qaeda representatives
129
. Following the 
scientists’ meeting with bin-Laden, several nuclear scientists from KRL and PAEC also had 
meetings with Al Qaeda operatives
130
. 
4.2. The Extent of the Involvement of Pakistan’s Military in Nuclear Exports       
♦♦♦ 
Pakistan’s official line strongly suggests a collateral malfunction of the control system, 
directed by the military, in fulfilling its non-proliferation objectives. Pakistan’s officials claim 
that the control system was unaware of the nuclear proliferation activities of AQ Khan’s 
network. Hence, if the official explanation is accepted, it is evident that Pakistan’s control 
system was inefficient and presented appalling standards in fulfilling its mission to secure 
Pakistan’s nuclear programmes. This mission also includes export controls over sensitive 
knowledge and sophisticated equipment. 
♦♦♦ 
Without undermining the grave implications of the performance of the control system, this 
part of the chapter will discuss an even more disturbing scenario of collusion between 
Pakistan’s military and AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network: this option is plausible as 
an explanation for the incompetence of the control system. According to the reasoning behind 
the complicity, AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network was backed by the military which 
was not only well aware of the nuclear exports, but encouraged this activity.  
In light of AQ Khan’s and KRL’s tangible autonomy over their affairs and the limited official 
supervision it is possible that a certain part of the nuclear assistance was indeed provided 
without specific official approval, and was a result of the profiteering of AQ Khan and his 
associates in the network. However, there is circumstantial evidence which strongly points to 
the possibility that Pakistan’s military was generally aware of the nuclear exports: 
1) The wide scale of the nuclear export phenomenon and its intensive operation. AQ Khan’s 
proliferation network was able to supply advanced technologies from Pakistan’s nuclear 
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programme and KRL’s inventory: centrifuges prototype and parts, nuclear materials such 
as uranium hexafluoride, and highly sensitive data about nuclear weapon design
131
. 
Furthermore, the nuclear supply from Pakistan was usually delivered through numerous 
air shipments. The KRL complex and the senior nuclear scientists were guarded and 
monitored for their own protection against external threats; thus any shipment of nuclear 
equipment from KRL was bound to be noticed by the military security rings which 
fortified the nuclear complex. The visits abroad of nuclear scientists were probably known 
to the ISI and the Army senior command, and it is unlikely that routine nuclear shipments 
from KRL could have occurred without the knowledge of the ISI and other security 
agencies. 
2) The proliferation network was able to offer and provide wide-scale nuclear assistance to 
foreign countries during a significant period of time (1987-2003). During the history of 
nuclear proliferation unauthorised export of nuclear-related equipment and dual-use items 
occurred from various countries including nuclear weapons countries and countries with 
advanced control systems. However, nuclear proliferation from Pakistan stands out for in 
its consistency and for its multiple parallel destinations.   
3) The military admitted that it had strong suspicions about AQ Khan’s clandestine 
activities. The ISI conducted several investigations regarding Khan from the late 1980’s132 
until the beginning of the millennium. Apart from numerous indications of Khan’s 
embezzlements and personal corruption with KRL financial assets, the investigations also 
revealed that KRL procured surplus nuclear equipment and that AQ Khan promoted deals 
on the nuclear black market and operated through front companies
133
. Furthermore, US 
officials warned Pakistan’s authorities several times that KRL and AQ Khan might be 
involved in nuclear proliferation: for example, US officials raised their suspicions about 
nuclear exports to Libya
134
. US warnings lacked specific information due to the sensitivity 
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of the intelligence resources and were largely ignored by Pakistan’s authorities while AQ 
Khan’s proliferation network continued to operate135. 
♦♦♦ 
Moreover, there is strong substantiation to support the possibility that the military not only 
knew about the nuclear exports but was their main patron and this activity was sanctioned as a 
government project. In this regard, the published ISI report on AQ Khan’s interrogation in 
2004 clearly states that a measure of the nuclear assistance to Iran and Libya was part of an 
effort to maintain “friendly relations” between Pakistan and both countries, and as a result of 
several commitments given by Pakistan’s governments’ to these countries136. Furthermore, a 
significant proportion of the nuclear shipments from Pakistan were handled by an air 
company affiliated to Pakistan Air Force
137
. 
♦♦♦ 
An outstanding case of nuclear assistance which was obviously sanctioned by Pakistan’s 
military was the cooperation with China in developing the nuclear weapons programme. 
Unlike the strong denials of Pakistan’s governments for any official authorisation to the 
nuclear exports to Iran, Libya, and North Korea it avoided a similar reaction to the reports 
about nuclear cooperation with China. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s nuclear assistance to China 
resembles the nuclear exports from Pakistan to other foreign countries. 
Pakistan’s nuclear exports to China were in return for China’s unprecedented and critical 
nuclear assistance which enabled Pakistan to develop its nuclear capabilities significantly 
earlier than expected: between the late 1970’s and the middle of the 1980’s China delivered 
weapons-grade enriched uranium which was sufficient for two nuclear weapons, the entire 
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technical manual for developing a nuclear device with the specific materials needed for the 
process, and a large amount of uranium hexafluoride for feeding KRL’s gas centrifuges138.  
In exchange, China received Pakistan’s assistance in developing its own nuclear programme 
through the uranium enrichment route by using gas centrifuges - as operated by KRL. Similar 
to the cases of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan, the nuclear cooperation with China was 
discussed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later by the military head of state 
General Zia ul-Haq. Furthermore, KRL was the main nuclear agency which cooperated with 
China in nuclear weapons development: as part of this cooperation KRL constructed a 
uranium enrichment facility in China, and Chinese scientists visited the KRL complex in 
Kahuta and received instruction on the operation of gas centrifuge cascades
139
. 
As for nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to other countries, at policy level, after the coup of 
1977 the military also seized control over the nuclear organisations, and in order to strengthen 
its international legitimacy the military regime provided guarantees to the US that it would 
refrain from nuclear exports and reaffirmed this position on several occasions
140
. However, 
according to information evaluated as reliable, in the first half of the 1980’s the military and 
the martial head of state, General Zia ul-Haq, adopted a contradictory approach regarding the 
utilisation of nuclear assets as Pakistan became the prominent US ally against the Soviet 
military presence in Afghanistan: most of the senior generals were of one mind that the US 
would avoid punishing Pakistan if it initiated nuclear assistance. As a result, General Zia 
steered highly secretive meetings to explore trading nuclear technologies and knowledge
141
. 
During the meetings it was decided to adopt a nuclear export policy which would serve three 
objectives: to increase the national financial reserves; to receive critical foreign assistance for 
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the military R&D programmes in return for nuclear technologies; and to support the nuclear 
ambitions of fellow Muslim countries
142
. 
The military regime took actual steps to facilitate nuclear export policy. General Zia initiated 
the first nuclear contacts with Iran, Libya, and North Korea all of which eventually received 
nuclear assistance through AQ Khan’s proliferation network. Regarding Iran, Zia signed, in 
1986, a confidential accord which included nuclear cooperation through PAEC. Zia even tried 
to interest Saudi Arabia in the supply of nuclear warheads that might fit the Saudi acquisition 
of long-range missiles from China in 1986
143
. 
Apart from an indication of a clear policy of nuclear proliferation, there is also information on 
the personal involvement of the Army chiefs in implementing this policy. General Zia’s 
personal involvement in the nuclear export project also surfaced when it was needed to 
determine the framework for nuclear assistance to Iran: Zia’s suspicions towards the Iranian 
regime and Zia’s affiliation to Saudi Arabia (Iran’s rival) led him to authorise limited 
cooperation and the supply of only nuclear technologies for an experimental uranium 
enrichment programme. As a result, the contacts between AQ Khan and Iran in 1987 
concluded with the supply of equipment and data for the construction of a pilot plant: spare 
parts for hundreds of outdated gas centrifuges and the drawings for the construction of an 
enrichment facility
144
. After Zia’s death in August 1988 AQ Khan began to negotiate a wider 
framework for nuclear assistance. 
General Mirza Aslam Beg who succeeded Zia as COAS also appeared to have substantial 
involvement in the nuclear export project. Beg made futile efforts to persuade the civilian 
national leadership (which succeeded Zia’s military regime in 1988) to sanction nuclear 
proliferation in return for financial gains. According to the ISI report of AQ Khan’s 
interrogation, General Beg supported “very close” nuclear cooperation with Iran in return for 
financial assistance
145
: the funds were designated to support an insurgency campaign against 
India’s control over Kashmir146. American officials also confirmed that COAS General Beg 
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threatened to initiate nuclear export if the US halted its military aid
147
. It was reported that 
General Beg planned to use a nuclear export project as a way to lower Pakistan’s dependency 
on the US: Beg opined that by offering nuclear assistance Pakistan would be able to forge 
alliances in the Muslim world; earn revenues for financing its nuclear programmes and for the 
insurgency campaign against India in Kashmir
148
. 
Contrary to the evidence regarding General’s Beg intentions to promote nuclear exports the 
information about his actual involvement in KRL’s nuclear exports is more circuitous, and 
Beg vehemently denies it. However, Beg himself admitted in 2001 that Pakistan clandestinely 
exported nuclear equipment
149
. Beg also acknowledged that he had negotiated with Iran on 
nuclear assistance: both Prime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif testified that they had been asked 
by their Iranian counterpart for their consent for nuclear assistance which was promised by 
General Beg
150
. Even assuming that the nuclear assistance of AQ Khan’s network to Iran took 
place without authorisation it seems highly plausible that Beg’s extensive dialogue with Iran 
on nuclear assistance facilitated from 1994 KRL’s supply of valuable technologies and 
knowledge which enabled Iran to build a full uranium enrichment programme: hundreds of 
unassembled gas centrifuges, the design of an advanced centrifuge model
151
, and data on the 
fabrication process of a nuclear weapons device
152
.  
There are also indications that COAS General Pervez Musharraf, who was behind the reforms 
to consolidate the control system and acted against AQ Khan’s network in late 2003, in 
parallel had some involvement in the nuclear proliferation. As discussed earlier, Musharraf’s 
motivation for reorganising the control system appears to have been connected with 
preserving the dominant position of the military, and the actions against AQ Khan and his 
KRL associates were conducted in response to international pressure and after the network 
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had already been exposed. Hence, Musharraf’s initiative to consolidate the control system is 
not sufficient to ignore indications of his complicity in nuclear proliferation.  
Between the years 1999 and 2003 during Musharraf’s rule, and parallel to the creation of the 
new control system, AQ Khan’s proliferation network was more involved in nuclear exports 
than ever before with Libya and North Korea as the prominent end-users of its assistance. 
There is no strong evidence to connect Pakistan’s military and Musharraf to nuclear exports. 
As mentioned earlier, after AQ Khan’s retirement from KRL in 2001 the proliferation 
network supplied nuclear equipment from outside Pakistan, so it is more likely that a certain 
part of the nuclear proliferation activity was not known to Musharraf and Pakistan’s military. 
Nevertheless, in the first years of Musharraf’s as COAS, and prior to his alliance with the US 
following the 9/11 events, there were also indications of more blatant attempts by KRL to 
promote of nuclear exports which were most likely to be authorised:  
1) In the late 1990’s KRL began to market its nuclear expertise commercially and openly. 
KRL was allowed to market its nuclear products and expertise to foreign participants at an 
international ammunition fair held in Karachi (IDEAS 2000) in November 2000. General 
Musharraf personally, along with other senior military generals, visited the fair and KRL’s 
stall
153
. 
2) KRL received exceptional authorisation in May 1999 to host, in its complex, a minister 
from United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to the Pakistani media AQ Khan agreed to 
train UAE scientists in the nuclear sphere
154
.   
3) The indirect involvement of Musharraf in nuclear transfers was noted following his 
signature, in May 2000, on a defence agreement with Libya: few months later the 
agreement was used to exempt nuclear shipments from KRL in military consignments 
from customs scrutiny
155
. 
In addition, COAS General Jehangir Karamat was also personally connected to nuclear 
exports. According to a document which is considered reliable, in 1998 Karamat received 
financial benefits in return for the air shipment of ‘document and components’ to North 
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Korea. It was revealed that this flight carried KRL’s nuclear equipment, materials and 
technical data
156
. 
Apart from the Army chief (COAS), the officer most connected to the nuclear export project 
was KRL’s security director, usually of the rank of Brigadier-General (one star). The Army 
generals who served as head of KRL security knew about the entire nuclear export project, 
including AQ Khan’s travel and shipments of nuclear equipment from KRL to foreign 
destinations: when KRL’s security director was arrested in January 2004 (parallel to the 
interrogations of other KRL senior officials) he was accused by the authorities of involvement 
in nuclear proliferation. This general indirectly admitted that during the 1990’s he had 
accompanied AQ Khan on his visits abroad and was involved in the negotiations with Iran 
and North Korea on nuclear assistance
157
. 
As mentioned earlier, KRL’s security director was always an Army officer; nevertheless, 
Pakistan’s military has always argued that the security director answered only to DG KRL, 
AQ Khan. This argument contradicts the military’s own statements which suggest that the 
head of KRL’s security was directly subordinate to CDD/SPD for many years and thus 
allowed the ongoing nuclear proliferation: as early as 1993, COAS Kakar established CDD as 
the first GHQ control over KRL in order to monitor its personnel in direct response to 
proliferation concerns
158
. Later, at the beginning of the reforms in the control system (after the 
nuclear tests of May 1998), all the security directors in the nuclear organisations were asked 
by the military to report directly to the new CDD/SPD
159
, and COAS General Musharraf 
confirmed that as late as February 2000 the heads of nuclear organisations (including DG 
KRL) were relieved of the responsibility for security
160
. Moreover, a close confidant of 
KRL’s head of security claimed that at least since the early 1980’s this general had been 
reporting to GHQ on any shipment to and from the KRL complex
161
. In short, since by most 
accounts the security director knew about the nuclear export project and was under the direct 
authority of the Army it seems plausible that the nuclear assistance was authorised.    
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As for the civilian leadership, the nuclear export project was well-entrenched in the policy of 
the civilian leadership which preceded the coup of 1977. President and Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto personally discussed with the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Libya the 
possibility of receiving financial support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme in 
exchange for the future access of these countries to Pakistan’s nuclear programmes162. 
However, actual nuclear exports apparently did not take place due mainly to the early stage of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme during Bhutto’s tenure. 
The civilian leadership between 1988 and 1999 seemed to have been aware of the nuclear 
export project, as it was approached on the issue at least by COAS Beg, but with little actual 
involvement. For example, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto tried to learn about nuclear 
assistance during her official visits to Iran in 1989 and 1996 when she met the Iranian 
President Rafsanjani
163
. According to the structure of the control system the military had the 
dominant control over KRL during the operation of AQ Khan’s network leaving the 
secondary role for the civilian heads of state: Hence, the civilian governments had limited 
power to initiate or to cease nuclear proliferation without the consent of Pakistan’s military. 
One exceptional incident is a report about the involvement of Prime Minister Bhutto in 
delivering nuclear data to North Korea on her visit to Pyongyang in December 1993
164
. 
5. Conclusion 
♦♦♦ 
As demonstrated in this chapter, there is a strong connection between the phenomenon of 
nuclear proliferation from Pakistan and the dominant role of Pakistan’s military in the control 
system over the nuclear organisations. The Army and the ISI were deeply involved in all 
aspects of the nuclear weapons programme: almost since the beginning of this programme, 
Pakistan’s control system has been heavily militarised and controlled by Army bureaucracy, 
even during civilian regimes. On the national decision-making level military generals and 
specifically COAS control the decision-making forums and the administrative apparatus 
which supervised the nuclear programmes. The designated agencies responsible for the 
nuclear organisations, such as CDD and SPD, were military directorates, part of military HQs. 
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The military senior command and the designated agencies received support from the 
intelligence apparatus and the ISI in scrutinising the activity of the nuclear organisations and 
in securing their activities from external threats. Hence, the occurrence of nuclear 
proliferation from Pakistan is linked to the efficiency of the military control over the nuclear 
organisations, and specifically KRL. 
♦♦♦ 
When analysing the different possible relations between the military control system and AQ 
Khan’s proliferation network (a private initiative, military awareness, and military 
authorisation) it is clear that in any interpretation of the nuclear export saga the military 
demonstrated collateral incompetence when securing sensitive nuclear equipment and 
knowledge. Furthermore, in view of the extent of the nuclear export project it is much more 
likely that it either operated with the full awareness of the military or with its approval. 
Although there is no specific information which implicates the military in nuclear exports, the 
warnings of US officials, the revelations encountered in internal investigations, and the 
knowledge of the civilian heads of state about nuclear assistance (although they were blocked 
from any significant role in the control system) strongly suggest that the military senior 
command was aware of the problematic situation, and decided to avoid taking any action. 
Moreover, the allocation of a senior Army officer to assume responsibility for KRL’s 
security, the air shipments of nuclear equipment by a company affiliated to the military, and 
KRL’s own open and aggressive marketing of its nuclear expertise seriously point to the 
possibility of Pakistan’s military involvement in nuclear exports.     
Despite the military control over the nuclear organisations it is not clear if the military indeed 
sanctioned all nuclear transfers: AQ Khan enjoyed an independent status and there were some 
private initiatives taken by him and his associates in the proliferation network. The private 
initiative of several nuclear scientists to help Al-Qaeda suggested that the notion of private 
nuclear assistance was at least considered within the nuclear agencies. Nuclear assistance to 
foreign countries could have been initiated without the consent of the control system or by 
ignoring its instructions, particularly in cases when the nuclear proliferation network supplied 
equipment from external sources outside Pakistan. 
As for the new control system over nuclear programmes which was announced in February 
2000 (and began to operate after the nuclear tests of 1998), it appears inefficient in fulfilling 
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the mission of counter-proliferation even after the exposure of the AQ Khan’s network. First, 
as elaborated, the main objective of creating the control system was to consolidate the 
dominant position of the military on nuclear issues (which is most unusual in today’s 
international community among nuclear weapons countries - see Chapter Four). Hence, the 
reforms only strengthened existing practices and arrangements which were already in place 
and gave the military the monopoly over the nuclear sphere. These organisational measures 
did not prevent nuclear exports from Pakistan during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Second, the 
reformed control system was powerless too: the first years after the reform were exemplified 
by extensive nuclear proliferation from Pakistan and higher volume: the turnkey nuclear 
project in Libya and the clandestine uranium enrichment programme in North Korea.   
After illustrating Pakistan’s control system and its performance in regard to nuclear 
proliferation the next chapters will be based on the working assumption promoted earlier that 
the Army and the ISI were deeply involved in the nuclear export project. The following 
chapters will utilise this working assumption in order to focus on the structural factors and 
organisational culture of the control system which facilitated the nuclear proliferation. These 
chapters will examine the control system both as part of Pakistan’s defence establishment and 
on a comparative basis with other national control systems. 
Chapter One 
71 
 
Chapter One: Glossary of Abbreviations 
AHQ - Air Force Headquarters 
AQ Khan - Abdul Qadeer Khan 
CAS - Chief of Air Force Staff 
CDD - Combat Development Directorate 
CENTCOM - United States Central Command 
CJCSC - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
CJCS - Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (of the United States) 
CNS - Chief of Navy Staff 
COAS - Chief of Army Staff 
COS - Chief of Staff 
DCC - Cabinet Committee for Defence 
- Development Control Committee 
DG ISI - Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence 
DG KRL - Director General, Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Research Laboratories 
DG SPD - Director General, Strategic Plans Division 
DGMO - Director General of Military Operations  
DPD - Defence Production Division 
ECC - Employment Control Committee 
ERL - Engineering Research Laboratories 
FBIS - Federal Broadcast Information Service 
FMCT - Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty  
FPD - Foreign Procurement Division  
GHQ - General Headquarters 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 
IB - Intelligence Bureau 
IDEAS 2000 - International Defence Exhibition and Seminar of the year 2000 
INFCIRC - Information Circular 
ISI - Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence 
ISPR - Inter-Services Public Relations 
JIM - Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous 
JSHQ - Joint Staff Headquarters 
KANUPP - Karachi Nuclear Power Plant 
KRL - Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Research Laboratories 
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MI - Military Intelligence Directorate 
MOC - Ministry of Commerce 
MOD - Ministry of Defence 
MODP - Ministry of Defence Production 
MOF - Ministry of Finance 
MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NCA - National Command Authority 
NESCOM - National Engineering and Scientific Commission 
NHQ - Navy Headquarters 
NNCC - National Nuclear Command Committee 
PAEC - Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
PINSTECH - Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology 
PPP - Pakistan People’s Party 
PRC - People’s Republic of China 
PSRU - Pakistan Security Research Unit 
S Wing - Security/External Wing 
SECDIV - Strategic Export Control Division 
SPD - Strategic Plans Division 
SRO - Statutory Regulatory Order 
SUPARCO - State Upper Atmosphere Research Commission 
SWO - Special Works Organisation 
UAE - United Arab Emirates 
UF6 - Uranium Hexafluoride 
US - United States of America 
USG - Untied States Government 
VCOAS - Vice Chief of Army Staff 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction  
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 Chapter Two: Pakistan’s Defence Establishment, its Influence on 
National Security Thinking, and on the Control System over the Nuclear 
Programmes  
1. Introduction 
After presenting the main data about the military role in the control system over the nuclear 
organisations and the extent of the military involvement in nuclear exports from Pakistan 
(conducted by AQ Khan’s proliferation network) this chapter will discuss the organisational 
dimension of the military and its effect on the efficiency of the control system. The objective 
of this chapter is to present the character of Pakistan’s defence establishment, and to explain 
how it affects the national control system over the country’s nuclear assets and its ability to 
prevent proliferation. This chapter suggests broader explanations for the paradox which is 
manifested in Pakistan’s control mechanism: because of its military character, the control 
system is naturally expected to be more efficient and disciplined than in other countries. A 
militarised control system is expected to function in a hierarchical and orderly manner, and to 
be less influenced by political considerations than a civilian bureaucracy. However, as 
illustrated in Chapter One, the empirical results strongly indicate the opposite: Pakistan was 
more involved in nuclear assistance than any other nuclear weapons country. 
This chapter will endeavour to explain the above anomaly by presenting and analysing the 
character and organisational culture of Pakistan’s defence establishment. Numerous examples 
of this character will be cited in the chapter and particularly the nature of the Army which 
elevated it to its pivotal position. As will be illustrated, Pakistan’s defence establishment has a 
strong inclination to preserve its traditional ways which allows a comparison between its past 
and current constitution. As a consequence, and in light of the prominent position of the 
defence establishment, its analysis could provide an explanation for Pakistan’s current 
national security policies on core issues: the War on Terror in Afghanistan, the Indo-Pakistani 
conflict, and the nuclear policy. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, the 
conclusion will be devoted to the subject of Pakistan’s control system over nuclear 
organisations.   
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♦♦♦ 
The sensitivity of the operational framework of the defence establishment, and particularly 
the establishment’s involvement in control mechanisms over nuclear organisations, makes it 
difficult in an academic platform to fully demonstrate the procedures and bureaucratic 
arrangements of this establishment. Furthermore, the information resources on the precise 
administrative processes and structures are scarce as a result of constant efforts to keep them 
under wraps, mainly those of the intelligence agencies. The working assumption behind this 
analysis is that the agency procedures, which are part of the defence establishment and 
particularly the staff work of the various headquarters and directorates, are similar. Hence, it 
is possible to offer some explanations to the role of the defence establishment in the control 
system by comparing its functioning on other issues which are under its responsibility: 
planning and conducting military campaigns, orchestrating covert operations, and 
guaranteeing its interests in Pakistan’s internal affairs. 
♦♦♦ 
This chapter is divided into two conceptual sections. In the first section the structure of 
Pakistan’s defence establishment will be presented, the division of responsibilities, the power 
centres, and the connections between its different agencies. A separate part will be dedicated 
to examining the functions and organisation of Pakistan’s prominent intelligence agency, the 
Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in light of its influence on national security 
decision making and policy implementation and its involvement in the nuclear issue (as 
demonstrated in Chapter One). The second section of this chapter will analyse the main 
elements of the organisational culture of the defence establishment with emphasis on the 
military. This section will manifest the relevance of these focal elements of the defence 
establishment to the military role in the control system over the nuclear organisations.            
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2. Pakistan’s Defence Establishment: Background, Structure and Working 
Procedures 
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Figure 5: Main Positions and Agencies in Pakistan’s Defence Establishment 
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2.1. The Heritage of the British Colonial Period, and the Historical Development of 
the Defence Establishment  
Pakistan’s defence establishment was shaped by the country’s British colonial heritage and 
the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947. The main characteristics of the defence 
establishment and of the military as determined in the de-colonial process and in the 
formative years after independence are still prominent. The partition of the Indian sub-
continent included the disassembly of the British-Indian military, and its division between the 
newly-born countries. During the first years of Pakistan’s independence the Army (and the 
other military services) continued to receive close guidance from British instructors who still 
held the position of Commander in Chief (C-in-C)
165
. Pakistan’s military was primarily 
constructed from the former Muslim units of the British Raj military. These units and 
particularly the officer corps was mainly based on ethnic Punjabis that the British used to 
refer to as ‘the martial race’: the Punjabis were considered more adaptable to the military way 
of life than other ethnic minorities. Until today, the elite of the military has mainly consisted 
of particular areas and social circles in the Punjab province. Furthermore, the Punjabis, along 
with the Muslim Urdu speakers who emigrated from northern India (known as ‘Muhajirs’) 
also became the backbone of the Pakistani civil service
166
. 
The partition process contributed to the dominant role of the Army in the new military over 
the other armed forces: the Navy and Air Force. Pakistan received scant portion of the 
original resources of the British Raj military, and its Navy and Air Force were established on 
a limited budget. Pakistan’s Army also suffered from insufficient resources, but it inherited 
important cantonments and instruction facilities that were located in Pakistan’s designated 
territory
167
. As a result, the Army became the dominant agency within the defence 
establishment and spearheaded the other military services. 
                                                 
165 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (London: Orion, 2003), pp. 49-50; Ayesha Siddiqa-
Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup 1979-1999: In Search of a Policy (New York, NY: 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 35. 
166 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 11-13; Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 
104; Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2005), p. 19. 
167 The British Indian military was heavily deployed along the Indian sub-continent frontiers near to the western 
border with Afghanistan in order to counter a Russian invasion or militant turbulence from Afghanistan. As a 
result, the British Raj maintained a large garrison in the city of Rawalpindi and several training and 
instruction facilities such as the military officer’s college in Kakul. These military infrastructures were used 
by the Pakistan Army after independence. 
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The British colonial experience also shaped the internal relations between the different 
organisations of Pakistan’s defence establishment. Under the British colonial principal of 
centralisation, the position of C-in-C
168
 of each of the armed forces was strengthened: his 
authority became crucial in every decision-making process on defence issues, and his role has 
been far more important than any other commander or senior staff officer in military 
headquarters
169
.  
Furthermore, Pakistan’s political system was in disarray in the first years of independence 
following the deaths of the country’s founder, Muhammad Ali-Jinnah, and his close partner, 
Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali-Khan170. The political system lacked prominent 
civilian figures that could be considered both by the masses and the elite as national leaders. 
As a result, the civilian bureaucracy approached the armed forces in order to consolidate its 
position in the newly-born nation. The apparent inferiority sentiments of the civil service 
regarding the military generated a Ministry of Defence (MOD) which was similarly defined to 
its British equivalent: an agency in charge of coordination between the armed forces and the 
civilian government. MOD surrendered its authority to the military chiefs when the Army C-
in-C (and the future President), General Ayub Khan, became Defence Minister in 1958
171
. 
Hence, MOD could not evolve as the main agency in charge of implementing defence policy 
and as the civilian supervisor of the military, and a few years after independence the role of 
the civilian bureaucracy on defence issues dwindled to administrative duties in the service of 
the armed forces. 
2.2. The Role of Civilian Agencies in the Defence Establishment and Bhutto’s 
Reforms in the High Defence Organisations 
The unchallenged dominant position of the Army in defence issues has been maintained for 
two and half decades since Pakistan’s independence. During this period the country 
experienced feeble civilian governments which were replaced in 1958 by martial regimes 
controlled by two consecutive Army chiefs: Ayub Khan (1958 - 1969) and Yahya Khan (1969 
- 1971). The most significant development in the position of the defence establishment 
                                                 
168 Until 1972 the heads of the Armed forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy) were called C-in-C, and since then 
they have been named Chief of Staff. See: Crossed Swords, p. 326. 
169 Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 35. 
170 Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on October 16th 1951, after four years in office. In the same location 
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was also assassinated on December 27
th
 2007. 
171 Crossed Swords, p. 252; Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 41; Pakistan: Between 
Mosque and Military, p. 15. 
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followed Pakistan’s military defeat in the War of 1971 and the loss of East Pakistan (which 
became Bangladesh). The new ruler, President (and later Prime Minister) Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 
introduced, through policy papers in 1973 and 1976, a new framework of command and 
control. The two objectives of the new policy were to reorganise civil-military relations by 
delegating broader authority to the government, and by strengthening the concept of joint 
defence planning. These two objectives were part of the effort to limit the influence of the 
Army on defence policy and decision making
172
. 
The influence of the new reforms was limited. The Pakistan Army maintained its dominance 
over the various agencies within the armed forces, the defence establishment, and even over 
the civilian government system. The result was a de-jure civilian command and control 
mechanism over the armed forces and a de-facto preservation of the Army’s dominance over 
the defence establishment and national security affairs. Nonetheless, the 1973 ongoing 
reforms created a structural framework and mechanism for civilian governments to introduce 
a comprehensive defence policy and supervision over the armed forces. This framework is 
still a potential instrument for use by civilian leaders. 
Regarding the reforms in the civilian section of the defence establishment (the reforms in the 
higher defence organisations of the armed forces are discussed later), the Cabinet Committee 
for Defence (DCC
173
) was re-established as the highest national forum for defence and 
military issues, and the Prime Minister chaired its meetings. DCC is responsible for policy 
planning and its execution. Its members include political representatives, while the chiefs of 
the three military services can only observe the meetings. DCC includes the ministers for 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Interior and their respective secretaries (equivalent to 
director generals). The Defence Council which is chaired by the Defence Minister works 
under DCC and its main objective is to monitor the implementation of DCC’s decisions 
regarding the armed forces, the inter-services organisations (i.e. agencies which employ 
manpower from all the armed forces and are not part of their HQ’s, such as the Inter-Services 
Intelligence - ISI), and the defence industries. The Defence Council is also responsible for 
coordination between the different security agencies in face of a threat which can be 
addressed by an inter-agency coordinated effort
174
. 
                                                 
172 Crossed Swords, p. 343; Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 38. 
173 Not to be confused with the Development Control Committee (DCC) of NCA, the highest national forum for 
discussions about the nuclear organisations. 
174 Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 35-38, 40; G. Balachandran and Shahid Hamid, 
Roles and Responsibilities of Ministries of Defence in India and Pakistan (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2010), p. 19. 
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However, the politicians in DCC usually lack the necessary knowledge regarding military 
affairs, necessary for the supervision of the military. DCC has no independent sources of 
information on national security, and its decisions are dependent on data transferred through 
the information channels of the military and intelligence agencies. Similarly, the Defence 
Council rarely convenes and its influence on decision making is negligible. As a result, the 
military seems to be able to easily promote its agenda and interests in the high defence 
forums
175
.  
Furthermore, when civilian regime was restored in Pakistan in November 1988 (after more 
than a decade of military regime - since July 1977) Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and 
Nawaz Sharif maintained their position as head of DCC. However, Bhutto’s and Sharif’s 
influence over the military was limited: the responsibility for the armed forces was transferred 
to the President. Since the military coup of 1977, the President has also appointed the chiefs 
of the armed forces (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Joint Staff)
176
. The result has been the lack 
of a consistent chain of command in the national leadership, and absence of a clear division of 
responsibilities between the two national leaders while the Prime Minister maintained his/her 
authority as Chief Executive. This complicated division of responsibilities served the 
purposes of the military senior command: this structure led to the absence of coherent civilian 
supervision over military affairs and controversies among the civilian leadership could be 
exploited by the military high command. 
The void of civilian authority in military affairs reflected on the feeble position of civilian 
agencies which have a role in defence issues and participate in national decision making. 
Branches of the civilian government serve as junior partners in the military bureaucracy. As 
mentioned earlier, MOD’s authority within the defence establishment was emasculated both 
by the Army and the civil service. Officially, MOD is the main organisation responsible for 
implementing the policies formulated by the top decision-making management. It serves as 
the top management’s channel of communication and control of the armed forces. MOD is a 
formal bureaucratic agency responsible for all matters pertaining to defence
177
.  
However, MOD is too ineffectual to enforce its instructions on the armed forces or to interfere 
in disagreements among the armed forces. Furthermore, although most of MOD’s personnel 
                                                 
175 Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 37, 50, 72; Roles and Responsibilities of Ministries 
of Defence in India and Pakistan, p. 19. 
176 Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 38, 73. 
177 Ibid, pp. 41-42, 69. 
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are civilian mandarins, it includes military officials in top positions in the ministry: the 
Defence Secretary and his under secretaries (equivalent to heads of departments) are usually 
military officers (or retired ones) who can control and monitor the work of the ministry’s 
sections according to the desire of the military services. Each of the under secretaries usually 
represents one of the three military services and is entrusted with their affairs in MOD. In 
addition, the culture of decision making has a military orientation thus enabling the military 
officers in MOD to control a large number of civilian administrators
178
. 
Other civilian agencies whose input is essential for formulating defence policy and planning 
are also marginalised by the military. The civilian agency which is systematically cast aside is 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) - its position vis-a-vis the defence establishment will 
be broadly discussed later in this chapter.
179
. Another marginalised government agency is the 
Ministry of Defence Production (MODP) which was established as a separate government 
ministry in 2004 and is responsible for the defence industry (but not the R&D organisations 
involved in nuclear programmes). MODP is controlled by acting and retired military officers, 
and the director generals of the different defence industries are acting military generals 
appointed by the Army chief. The military control over MODP enables him to ensure that the 
R&D of defence technologies will be in accordance with the needs of the three military 
services
180
. 
It should be mentioned that inter-services organisations are officially under the constitutional 
responsibility of MOD and handled by its Inter-Services Wing: it includes nuclear 
organisations under the supervision of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the ISI and the 
Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ). However, MOD only provides administrative services for 
these organisations in human resources, finance, and logistic issues
181
. 
 
                                                 
178 Ibid, pp. 41-42, 69-70. 
179 Ibid, p. 72. 
180 Crossed Swords, p. 445; Website of the Ministry of Defence Production <http://www.modp.gov.pk/>; 
Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 43-45.  
181
 Defence Division Yearbook 2004-2005. Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, pp. 37-39, 113. 
<http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/15025/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/51e0e5fa-
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2.3. The Command and Control of the Armed Forces  
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Figure 6: Organisational Mechanisms for Coordination in Pakistan’s Defence 
Establishment 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) is the only joint forum of the three services. All 
the heads of the military forces are members of JCSC, and also the Defence Secretary (the 
senior mandarin of MOD, usually a retired military officer)
182
. The forum of JCSC was 
created in 1976, as part of Prime Minister Bhutto’s reforms in the defence establishment, in 
order to curtail the Army’s influence on military policies and planning. Bhutto’s reforms were 
introduced in order to strengthen the standing of the committee by creating the position of 
Chairman of JCSC (CJCSC) in 1976 which is a full general (four stars), equivalent in rank to 
the other military chiefs. CJCSC is the nominal head of the armed forces and responsible for 
coordination between inter-services organisations and the different military HQs
183
.  
CJCSC is responsible for the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) which also acquiesces to the 
instructions of the JCSC forum. JSHQ is mainly responsible for coordination among the 
different military services. JSHQ is also in charge of formulating strategic plans for the entire 
military in accordance with the input of the three services. Furthermore, JSHQ has an 
administrative responsibility for inter-services organisations, including coordination and 
planning between the independent directorates of the ISI and SPD and the armed forces
184
. 
However, the main objective of the JCSC committee is to preserve the consensus between the 
military services. Each military service is responsible for its own planning and control and 
CJCSC is not authorised to interfere in the routine management and direction of the armed 
forces’ chiefs185. The Army, as an organisation, has a larger capacity (in manpower, budget, 
facilities and hardware) than Pakistan Air Force (PAF) or Navy (PN). In addition, the Army’s 
active involvement in the country’s politics place it in a dominant position over the other two 
services, creating an imbalance in the military system and a lack of coordination among the 
armed forces. Although the civilian regimes have an interest in empowering CJCSC in order 
to balance the Army, CJCSC has never received substantial responsibility for supervising the 
                                                 
182
 Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 37; Roles and Responsibilities of Ministries of 
Defence in India and Pakistan, p. 19. 
183
 Ayesha Siddiqa- Agha, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 61; Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 45-46, 61.  
On CJCSC role as head of the armed forces see:  USG Media Leaks Have Pakistani Military Reviewing 
Contingencies (cable code: 08ISLAMABAD172, January 11
th
 2008), Wikileaks database of US embassy 
cables, published in ‘Dawn’ newspaper <http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/03/2008-us-pakistan-fight-over-
media-manipulation.html>; Pakistan: CJCS Mullen Meets with General Kidwai on Safeguarding Nuclear 
Assets’, (cable code: 07ISLAMABAD5391, February 20th 2008), Wikileaks database of US embassy cables, 
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 2011. 
184 The Armed Forces of Pakistan, pp. 37, 42; Crossed Swords, p. 425; Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and 
Military Buildup, p. 46; Yasub Ali Dogar, Pakistan’s Higher Defence Organisation, Defence Journal, 3:1 
(January 1999). <http://www.defencejournal.com/jan99/defence.htm> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012. 
185
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armed forces HQs: JSHQ cannot impose its will on the different armed forces
186
. CJCSC is 
also considered weaker than the military chiefs in light of his lack of command on any combat 
formation. 
2.4. The Pakistan Army: Structure and Functions 
Pakistan’s armed forces are one of the biggest in the international community with more than 
six hundred thousand personnel on active duty
187
. The Army is the largest military service 
with more than five hundred thousand soldiers and officers
188. The magnitude of the Army’s 
total strength is manifested by the number of senior officers within its ranks. The chapter will 
focus on the Army in light of its position as the most dominant organisation in Pakistan and 
thus the potential influence of the Army senior command on the nuclear issue, both at the 
policy level and with regard to the nature of the connection with the nuclear organisations.  
The Army command is divided into two broad functional categories: an operational arm 
which includes combat units organised in a military formation of nine corps and auxiliary 
sections; and a services arm which includes administrative personnel (such as medical staff, 
ordnance, electrical and mechanical engineers, military police, etc). The head of both sections 
is the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) who is a full general (four stars) and considered the most 
powerful military figure in the country. COAS also took control over the country for long 
periods by conducting coups and imposing martial law. The position of COAS has emerged 
as the focal power point both on military and political matters
189
. From time to time, and 
mainly during military regimes, COAS appoints a Vice COAS (VCOAS) who is responsible 
for the Army while COAS is dealing with national affairs. VCOAS, like COAS, is a full 
general, and is usually designated to succeed the Army chief
190
. 
The Army Headquarters (General Headquarters - GHQ) is the Army’s administrative wing for 
command and control over its combat formations. GHQ is responsible for staff work on 
planning, and for decision making on overall Army affairs and strategy
191
. 
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Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, p. 49.  
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GHQ includes Principal Staff Officers (PSOs), all Lieutenant-Generals (three stars), who 
assist COAS in managing the Army organisation. Each PSO is responsible for a branch in 
GHQ. The most important position in GHQ is the Chief of General Staff (CGS) who assists 
COAS in managing GHQ. CGS is also in charge of the General Staff Branch (GS) that 
includes two important directorates: 
COAS 
GS (CGS) 
MO 
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1) Military Operations Directorate (MO) which is responsible for formulating the Army’s 
policies on a range of issues: from military operational activities to national security 
concerns. 
2) Military Intelligence Directorate (MI) which as an intelligence agency has wide 
responsibilities, including a role in the control system over the nuclear programmes (see 
Chapter One). MI has greater power than its counterparts in PAF and PN: it can gather 
intelligence about politicians and other key civilian players. Until the 1980’s, MI retained 
its purely military emphasis and had a major role in providing support for the military’s 
activities, including in neighbouring countries. MI has been the Army’s main tool 
(together with the ISI) for interfering in politics by manoeuvring some of the actors in the 
political system and promoting military objectives. In this regard, MI was involved in 
manipulating several election results
192
. 
Apart from PSOs in GHQ, the corps commanders represent the operational segment of the 
Army. The Army’s corps are the highest level of military unit formation, and they are 
responsible for a geographical sector of operation. Corps commanders are part of the highest 
forum of decision making in the Army. The Corps Commanders’ Conference (CCC) 
convenes once a month or bi-monthly with the participation of the PSOs of GHQ and the rest 
of the Army’s senior command. After a decision is made all the members of the top echelon 
of the Army (both corps commanders and PSOs in the GHQ) are committed to it and cannot 
openly object to it
193
. In addition, Corps X’s responsibility for the defence of the national 
military and government centres (both in Rawalpindi and in Islamabad) places its commander 
in a pivotal position whenever the army’s high command decides to overthrow the civilian 
government.  
The Air Force and The Navy Headquarters (AHQ and NHQ, respectively) are identically 
organised. Unlike the Army, these military services deal only with matters concerning their 
respective military affairs, and usually are not involved in issues on a national level or in 
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politics. As mentioned earlier, both chiefs of PAF and PN are involved in the armed forces 
decision-making processes as members of JCSC
194
. 
2.5. Pakistan’s Intelligence Community 
Pakistan’s intelligence agencies are an important part of the defence establishment, and are 
well-known for their central role in decision making on national security matters, including 
issues relating to the nuclear organisations (see Chapter One). The Army utilizes the 
intelligence apparatus in order to consolidate its dominant status in the country. The 
intelligence agencies have two main objectives: to limit the influence and power of the 
Army’s opponents in the internal arena (mainly in the political system), and to promote the 
defence establishment’s vision for a regional order that includes a disorientated India and 
dominated Afghanistan (see Chapter Three). 
Pakistan’s intelligence community includes three main agencies: the Directorate of Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI) in GHQ, and the 
Intelligence Bureau (IB) which operates under the Prime Minister with administrative 
responsibility of the Interior Ministry (MOI)
195
. The ISI is the main intelligence agency and 
this chapter will focus on its role in decision making and its impact on national security 
issues
196
.  
                                                 
194
 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 123; Pakistan’s 
Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, pp. 49-51. 
195 Another intelligence agency under MOI is the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) which concentrates on 
criminal investigations, and has minor influence over national decision-making. 
196 About ISI’s history, missions and structure see also: Rana Banerji, Pakistan: Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) An Analytical Overview, Journal of Defence Studies 5:4 (October 2011), pp. 1-27. 
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The ISI has much more power and far more missions than equivalent intelligence agencies in 
western countries and its prime responsibility is for intelligence operations. In its creation in 
1947 (the year of Pakistan’s independence) the ISI originally received duties which are 
usually under the responsibility of intelligence agencies: counter-intelligence, analysis, 
coordination between the other intelligence services of the military and attending Pakistani 
military attachés. However, after a short period, the ISI began to concentrate its main 
activities on special operations: in the first aggression between India and Pakistan over the 
Kashmir region in October 1947, the ISI was responsible for recruiting tribal armed groups 
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against India, and for providing them with logistic support
197
. Since the general elections of 
December 1970, the ISI has been granted the authority to handle domestic political analysis, 
and it began making efforts to link up with elements in the political parties, in particular the 
Islamic parties, with a view of recruiting them as a foil for popular non-religious parties. 
Following the 1971 War, the ISI’s responsibilities were expanded, and the agency initiated a 
much more aggressive intelligence collection system. Furthermore, the ISI began large scale 
operations in India with a larger group of agents and resources. Following the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979, the ISI was given further impetus to conduct special operations 
against the Russian forces
198
. 
 The ISI is a military organisation whose Director General (DG) is a senior officer 
(Lieutenant-General - three stars), usually from the Army, and normally appointed according 
to COAS’s discretion (although officially the national leadership has authority over the 
appointment). DG ISI as a general is part of the Army senior command and participates in the 
military and the Army’s decision making. Officially, the ISI is directly subordinate to the 
Prime Minister, and DG ISI maintains direct contacts with the President and the Prime 
Minister, and receives their instructions. Nevertheless, due to the ISI’s strong military 
affiliation, it generally follows the directives of the upper most ranks of the Army and 
specifically COAS’s instructions. Unlike MI, the ISI is an independent directorate and it is not 
part of the Army’s GHQ199. 
It is important to evaluate the ISI structure in order to identify its strong operational 
tendencies which might indicate the nature of its influence within the defence establishment. 
In light of the ISI’s character as an intelligence agency together with its cloak of secrecy, it is 
difficult to determine its exact organisational structure. In addition, intelligence organisations, 
mainly those which are responsible for special operations, tend to modify their structure 
according to changes in their focus and prime missions. According to several sources, there 
are approximately six directors (DG) spearheading the ISI’s various sections. At least four of 
them are also deputies of DG ISI (DDG). All of the directors are military officers of the 
armed forces, although usually most of them (if not all of them) are Army two star generals 
(Major-General), and each director heads a wing. A proposed contemporary structure of the 
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ISI through a combination of relevant data on its current and former organisational framework 
is as follows:  
1) DDG of Analysis and Foreign Relations Wing [DDG (A)]. This wing is responsible for 
the overall intelligence assessment of the ISI. It probably also maintains official contacts 
with foreign intelligence agencies and with Pakistan’s military attachés who serve in 
diplomatic missions across the international community
200
. 
2) DDG of Counter Intelligence/Internal Wing [DDG (C)]201. This wing is considered one of 
the most important wings of the ISI: ‘C Wing’ was responsible for monitoring the political 
system and probably also the civilian society and its institutions. ‘C Wing’ was the ISI’s 
main tool for influencing political issues and political processes, including general 
elections. Pakistan’s government announced the abolition of the Political Section of ‘C 
Wing’ as part of a process to distance the military from politics202; However, DG ISI 
decided to leave only the post of director of the Political Section vacant, while 
maintaining the section: there are several reports which claim that the ISI’s capabilities to 
interfere in the political arena were not hurt by the decision
203. Furthermore, ‘C Wing’ is 
still likely to be responsible for countering subversive activities against the regime, and 
preventing foreign intelligence agencies from operating in Pakistan and particularly within 
its establishment
204
.  
3) DDG of Security/Strategic/External Wing [DDG (S)]205. This wing is responsible for 
directing intelligence operations outside Pakistan. In this regard, ‘S Wing’ managed the 
overall connection with militant organisations in the Kashmir Region against India and in 
Afghanistan. ‘S Wing’ was probably responsible for facilitating the recruitment and 
training of militants and helping to construct their training operation camps
206
. After the 
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capture of Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin-Laden, in May 2011 ‘S Wing’ was mentioned as 
accountable for maintaining contact with bin-Laden even after the 9/11 terror attacks
207
. In 
addition, ‘S Wing’ maintains contacts with organisations that have been involved in terror 
attacks against NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan since 2001
208
.  
4) DDG of ‘B Wing’ [DDG (B)]. It is not clear what this wing is responsible for, although 
there is information on its existence
209
. By comparing the current structure of the ISI with 
the former one which was revealed in the 1990’s, it could be conjectured that ‘B Wing’ 
dealt with special operations
210
.   
5) DG of Counter Terrorism Wing [DG (CT)]. This wing is probably responsible for 
intelligence support in military efforts to eliminate terror groups which challenge the 
authority of the government. ‘CT Wing’ most likely concentrates on following and 
collecting information on militant groups which gained control over territories in the 
remote region of the country, mainly in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (until 2010 
called NWFP), and in Baluchistan Province. ‘CT Wing’ is likely to be one of the newest 
wings of the ISI, and apparently was created after the 9/11 terror attacks and the increase 
in terror activities in the country
211
.  
6) DG of Technical Wing [DG (T)]. This wing is likely to be responsible for the R&D of 
devices and communication systems for the ISI’s special operations and intelligence 
gathering. In view of the fact that DG (T) is the only director in the ISI from the Army’s 
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Signal Corps, this wing is probably also responsible for gathering information through 
communication and signal intelligence
212
.  
3. The Main Characters and Organisational Culture of Pakistan’s Defence 
Establishment 
Illustrating Pakistan’s defence establishment, the structure and functions of its main agencies, 
and its prominent players, facilitates the following discussion about the main character of its 
bureaucratic system. This character could strongly indicate where the overlaps exist in the 
system, with emphasis on decision making, which could in turn provide some explanations 
why nuclear proliferation was possible from Pakistan. This part of the analysis will focus on 
the following aspects of Pakistan’s defence establishment which are most likely to influence 
its management of the control mechanism over the nuclear organisations:  
1) The extent of the interaction of the military establishment with civilian agencies which 
can contribute to the formulation of national security policy and decision making. 
2) The internal dynamics in the Army’s HQ and senior command that could influence its 
administrative work and execution of policies. 
3) The involvement of the national leadership in decision making on national security issues, 
and its access to valuable information that could possibly support its conclusions.  
4) The interoperability of the armed forces and the coordination between different HQs and 
independent military directorates. 
5) The scope and nature of the influence of Pakistan’s intelligence community on decision 
making on national issues. 
♦♦♦ 
The above parameters of Pakistan’s defence establishment were carefully chosen while taking 
two assumptions in consideration. First, the character of the defence establishment is 
fundamental to any activity of organisations which are part of this apparatus; therefore, 
defining them could assist in illustrating the role of the defence establishment in the control 
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mechanism over nuclear organisations. In particular, the above analysis would help explain 
how efficient Pakistan’s control system is, and what its strengths and weaknesses might be. 
Second, defence establishments strongly tend to preserve their methods of operation and to be 
reluctant about any major reform that could significantly modify their organisational 
behaviour. This explanation also applies to Pakistan’s defence establishment which has 
experienced minor modifications since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. As a consequence, it 
is possible to assume continuity in the methods and in the organisational culture of Pakistan’s 
defence establishment which allows inductive analysis of its activities: it should be possible to 
present conclusions about the entire defence establishment, and explain its character. 
♦♦♦ 
3.1. Marginalisation of the Civilian Agencies  
Pakistan’s decision making on national security issues is heavily militarised: the Army and 
particularly its chief (COAS) are the dominant players in shaping national security policy, its 
priorities and objectives. The military agencies (the ISI and MI) are the key players in the 
intelligence community which holds considerable influence on national security issues and on 
the internal situation. As a result, civilian ministries and agencies with input on national 
security affairs are usually marginalised in decision-making processes. 
The Army always found it difficult to trust civilian institutions and their bureaucracy. It was 
clearly shown during the martial rule of the Army chiefs Field Marshal (five star general) 
Ayub Khan (October 1958 - March 1969) and General Yahya Khan (March 1969- December 
1971): although the various civilian agencies were carefully constructed under military 
supervision, they were marginalised and deprived of a significant part of their 
responsibilities
213
.  
This pattern was intensified following the military coup of COAS Zia ul-Haq in July 1977 
until his death in August 1988. In view of the low level of the Army’s confidence in civilian 
agencies, the Army deepened its penetration, in the Zia period, into the public sector: at the 
level of central government roughly one-fourth of the senior bureaucratic positions were 
occupied by senior military officers. In a structure similar to a shadow government, the Army 
appointed officers to shadow civilians at all levels of the administration
214
. A similar practice 
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Chapter Two 
94 
 
was exercised by COAS General Musharraf after he initiated a military coup in October 1999. 
Until Musharraf’s retirement as commander of the Army (November 2007), there was a 
massive induction of military personnel into civil administration: more than a thousand 
officers were brought into senior positions in the civil administration in all sectors of human 
endeavour
215
. Furthermore, hundreds of retired military officers manned top positions in the 
civil bureaucracy
216
. MOD too was controlled and filled by serving military personnel at the 
end of their career or after their retirement. In several instances, as after Benazir Bhutto’s 
victory in the general elections of November 1988, the Defence Minister was appointed at the 
discretion of the Army
217
. 
The marginalisation of the civilian organisations was not always a central feature of 
Pakistan’s decision making on national security issues. In the first decade after independence 
(1947-1958), civilian governments played the leading role in decision making on national 
security issues. For example, following India’s incursion into the Kashmir region in October 
1947 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan called for an ‘unofficial conference’ in Lahore which 
was led by senior civilian officials (such as the Defence Secretary and the Chief Minister of 
Punjab). The meeting was concluded with the formation of the Committee for the Liberation 
of Kashmir
218
. The involvement of civilians in decision making on defence issues was 
maintained during the first years of the martial regime headed by C-in-C Ayub Khan. Ayub 
Khan designated MOFA as the responsible organisation for policy formulation on the 
Kashmir issue: the inter-agency mechanism for the issue known as the ‘Kashmir Cell’ 
(including senior officials such as the Defence Secretary, and DGMO as the Army 
representative) was headed by the Foreign Secretary (MOFA’s director general) who reported 
directly to Ayub Khan. The ‘Kashmir Cell’ was responsible for planning the participation of 
irregular forces in a future conflict with India following a popular uprising in Kashmir
219
. 
However, soon after the first military coup of 1958 and until now, the Army HQ (GHQ) has 
taken the responsibility for national security matters, and has become the hub of strategic 
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planning. The Army’s agenda always prevails and has been favoured over the organisational 
position of civilian agencies. During Yahya Khan’s military regime (1969 - 1971) bypassing 
the formal state machinery of decision making was considered a routine procedure. This 
character of the military regime was one of the factors behind the devastating consequences of 
Yahya’s policies on East Pakistan. This policy led to civil war in 1971, to a humiliating 
military defeat against India, and eventually to the independence of East Pakistan as the 
Republic of Bangladesh. During Yahya Khan’s rule, he never convened DCC nor the 
Secretaries’ Coordination Committee on defence planning under the responsibility of civilian 
agencies and government ministries. Senior officials of MOD and MOFA were out of the 
loop on decision making and could not provide input on Pakistan’s international situation and 
national security
220
. The absence of the professional mandarins from national decision making 
and entrusting it to Yahya’s close circle of political advisors and military officers led to a 
distorted understanding of the contemporary situation and to ill-judged decisions
221
. 
The military maintained its dominant position under civilian governments. If an inter-agency 
forum convened it would usually be dominated by the military participants, and the national 
leadership was more attentive to their agenda. For example, in May 1992 the US threatened to 
declare Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif presided over a 
meeting with the participation of senior officials from MOFA, the ISI, and the military. The 
Foreign Secretary objected to the suggested policy which included supporting terror 
organisations, but his position was rejected by Prime Minister Sharif who supported the 
dominant military stance
222
. In addition, even after Sharif acquired more experience in his 
second term as Prime Minister (February 1997 - October 1999), he rarely convened DCC to 
discuss national security issues: during the ‘Kargil crisis’ in 1999 DCC only met at the end of 
the crisis: on the eve of Sharif’s critical visit to the US in July 1999 which ended the crisis 
with the withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces from Indian-controlled Kashmir223. 
MOFA was the main agency limited in its sway on decision making because of the Army’s 
authoritative position. Military officers have reservations in consulting MOFA on a regular 
basis on defence-related issues, and it is rarely consulted on matters pertaining to military 
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planning
224
. This marginalisation of MOFA led to a breakdown in communications between 
MOFA and the military establishment during the Kargil operation in spring 1999. As a result, 
the military planning did not include any reference to the vigilant international environment 
that followed India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests of May 1998, and to the concerns within the 
international community regarding a nuclear conflict in the Indian subcontinent. Eventually, 
international pressure led to the withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces without any political 
achievements and a significant change in Pakistan leverage vis-a-vis India
225
. 
In addition, MOFA’s inferior position is illustrated in critical decision-making processes. In 
the 1950’s and 1960’s MOFA was deeply involved in decision making on the Kashmir issue, 
as mentioned. However, its position diminished under the military regime of Zia in the 
1980’s. MOFA’s feeble position in decision-making was perpetuated under the civilian 
regime between 1988 and 1999. For example, during Benazir Bhutto’s first term as Prime 
Minister (December 1988 - August 1990), the ISI launched the ‘Kashmir Operation’ which 
included massive assistance and support to militant organisations. Although the ‘Kashmir 
Operation’ had detrimental implications for Pakistan’s relations with India and for its success 
in maintaining international backup for its claim on Kashmir, MOFA’s opinion was not heard 
during the operational planning
226
. In addition during Bhutto’s and Sharif’s first terms as 
Prime Minister MOFA had strong reservations regarding the Army’s Afghan policy and 
particularly its support for extreme Islamic factions; however, MOFA was shunned by the 
Army and the ISI
227
.           
It should be noted that the mindset of the defence establishment (and mainly the Army and the 
ISI) towards the civilian bureaucracy could be perceived as including certain duality, 
particularly under civilian regimes: parallel to the Army’s ‘routine procedure’ to disregard 
civilian agencies and deprive them of tangible power, it still makes an effort to preserve their 
standing as the responsible authority for national affairs. This approach could be observed in 
the role the Army designated to a civilian government in its national security agenda: 
although the civilian agencies could not influence the agenda of the defence establishment, 
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they were expected to contain international pressure arising from the policy of the defence 
establishment in Afghanistan, towards India, and on the nuclear issue
228
. 
♦♦♦ 
The marginalisation of civilian agencies and inter-agency mechanisms which grant them 
active participation and influence is also one of the main underlying principles behind the 
structure of the control system over the nuclear organisations: as described in Chapter One it 
is centralised under the military with minimal participation and influence of civilian agencies. 
♦♦♦ 
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3.2. Centralisation and Collective Decision Making 
As mentioned earlier, the Army is the most powerful organisation in Pakistan’s domestic 
system and the most influential on national security policies while the other armed forces play 
a secondary role in national security issues. Furthermore, the Army is the dominant agency in 
the control system over the nuclear organisations, and predominantly the nuclear 
programmes. As a consequence, the character of the Army and its operational approach are 
likely one of the most critical elements for illustrating Pakistan’s control mechanism.   
♦♦♦ 
The Army is known for being a disciplined and professional organisation with high quality 
manpower and senior ranking officers. Furthermore, like the armed forces of other countries, 
the Pakistan Army holds to its traditions and organisational culture and prefers to preserve 
them
229
. In this section, the Army will be scrutinised regarding the elements in its character 
which are relevant to the evaluation of its influence on the control system over the nuclear 
organisations and the potential efficiency of the Army’s role in this mechanism.  
3.2.1. The Power of Army Chief vs. the Generals 
The Army is operated by its top echelon which consists of senior officers (PSOs) responsible 
for GHQ’s diverse administrative divisions, and commanders of army corps. The most senior 
position in the Army is COAS who represents its interests and can mobilise the Army’s 
strength and influence. COAS’s dominant position as the head of the Army is also most 
pertinent to the control mechanism over the nuclear organisations. Understanding the power 
of COAS, its limitations, and his relations with his generals could indicate the extent of his 
role in the nuclear issue, and primarily if COAS is able to centralise the decision making 
without due consideration for other voices within the Army and in the state apparatus. 
♦♦♦ 
It should be emphasised that COAS’s influence is not limited to military affairs and his 
authority essentially shapes the entire political sphere of Pakistan. COAS is the pivotal player 
in any decision making on national security affairs, and holds internal influence in Pakistan’s 
political system. COAS has the capacity to decide on a military coup which would hand him 
direct control of the country. During periods of civilian regime COAS has been deeply 
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involved in political issues, and was part of the power equilibrium between the different 
factions in Pakistan’s internal arena. For example, in 1993 COAS General Abdul Waheed 
Kakar coerced both Prime Minister Sharif and President Ishaq Khan to resign and agree to 
new general elections
230
. 
COAS has powerful leverage over the Army’s senior command: he is usually the only full 
general (four stars) in the Army’s hierarchy231 and holds significant authority over the entire 
operation of the Army and over several administrative issues. Moreover, COAS usually 
selects his close associates for high command, thus eliminating the possibility of a challenge 
to his authority
232
. 
Although decision making at senior levels in the Army command is achieved through 
collective forums the Army is not a pluralist organisation: the commander-in-charge is 
ultimately the sole authority who decides on the course of action. As a result, although COAS 
can use official procedures for consulting the generals (by convening CCC or gathering his 
PSOs in GHQ) he is entitled to take any decision irrespective of consensual thinking within 
the senior ranks. For example, following the 9/11 terror attacks COAS General Pervez 
Musharraf encountered objection in the high command to the idea of assisting the US in 
eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda terror infrastructure in Afghanistan. The most vocal 
opposition was heard from senior officers: Musharraf’s deputy, General Usamani, along with 
DG ISI and two other generals, argued strongly against this course of action. However, COAS 
Musharraf, who was also the head of government following the 1999 military coup, decided 
otherwise, and shortly after allying with the US and the War on Terror his senior dissenters 
were retired from the Army
233
. 
In addition, the entire hierarchy and promotion system in the Army is based on seniority, and 
the leading candidate for COAS is usually the officer with the longest military service. A 
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military coup and the long tenure of COAS strengthen his position vis-a-vis his generals in 
light of his seniority and experience. The new generation of generals would be more 
estranged from COAS than the generals of his own generation. As a result, during the eras of 
Ayub Khan, Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf as Army chiefs and as heads of state their 
position was almost unquestioned within the Army, and they tended to ignore other opinions. 
For example, General Zia became ‘a one-man administration’, aided only by his immediate 
team. The corps commanders were not given a detailed explanation in real time, and Zia did 
not allow significant conversations in CCC, and treated his colleagues as junior acolytes
234
. 
COAS General Musharraf experienced a similar transition throughout his lingering tenure as 
head of state (1999 - 2008): a generation gap gradually became a barrier between him and the 
generals
235
. 
Furthermore, all Army chiefs have tended to centralise the supervision of the Army and its 
activities. For example, COAS General Zia did not permit any of his deputies to supervise the 
Army in his absence. Zia also encouraged corps commanders and other senior officers to 
bypass his deputies and approach him directly
236
. In addition, COAS General Musharraf 
centralised the planning of the Kargil Operation in 1999, and allowed the participation of only 
three generals
237
. The operational planning was presented to CCC in March 1999 as a fait 
accompli, and at this stage traditionally no one would challenge the Army chief. Corps 
Commander XII, Lieutenant-General Teriq Perves, criticised the command during the Kargil 
Operation, and was forced to retire from the military
238
.     
The protracted tenure of COAS encouraged decision making in informal ways. For example, 
Zia as Army chief was surrounded by a circle of political advisors and a few chosen aides 
who omitted him from alternative routes of information. Similar informality in decision 
making surrounded Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Yahya Khan
239
. 
Assisted by his inner circle of advisors, Yahya came up with both political and military ideas 
and orders without the benefit of debate or input from relevant elements in the Army, (nor 
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Navy or PAF). Yahya could not tolerate disagreement with his views, and would postpone 
decisions when faced with arguments that did not accord with his views
240
.  
The result of informal decision making and centralisation has been a tendency of Army chiefs 
to conclude strategic decisions without proper consultation. The most vivid example is C-in-C 
Yahya Khan and his loss of control in 1971 over the situation in East Pakistan which led to its 
independence as Bangladesh. Without any formal consultation Yahya decided on a military 
response to the political deadlock which followed the general election of December 1970. 
This internal crisis erupted as a result of the refusal of the military and political elite of West 
Pakistan to transfer power to the Awami League party that represented the Bengali people of 
East Pakistan
241
. In spite of the far-reaching implications of a decision to suppress the civilian 
unrest in East Pakistan by force, GHQ’s involvement was limited: Yahya instructed a close 
circle of six senior Army officers
242
 to formulate an operational plan for curbing the agitation 
in the Eastern province
243
. Later, COAS General Zia adopted a similar stance in decision 
making and ignored the opinions of his fellow senior officers on national affairs. In 1984, Zia 
was also able to ignore the CCC strong opinion in favour of new general election and the 
transfer of power to an elected government. In May 1988, Zia decided to dismiss Prime 
Minister Junejo without ratifying the decision with the Army’s top echelon. VCOAS and DG 
ISI, who were responsible for evaluating the stability of the regime, were not privy to the 
plan
244
. 
On the other hand, in spite of COAS’s authority and firm control over the Army, the Army’s 
senior brass exerts sway on decision making and has the power to challenge COAS. 
Normally, the option to question COAS’s judgement is more plausible when COAS does not 
enjoy authority as head of state or if he fails to address a major crisis. The 1971 War was a 
challenge to the authority of the Army chief General Yahya Khan who was perceived within 
the armed forces to be responsible for the devastating outcome of the military conflict. As a 
result, in December 1971 Yahya was forced to resign by senior officers who argued that he no 
                                                 
240 Crossed Swords, pp. 311-313. 
241 A History of the Pakistan Army, p. 170. 
242 The group included the Martial Law Administrator (MLA) of East Pakistan, GOC of the 14th division in East 
Pakistan, the head of civil administration under martial law (an officer of the rank of Major-General), the 
Chief of Staff (COS) of the Eastern command, the PSO to the President, and DGMO - the only representative 
from GHQ. 
243 Crossed Swords, pp. 264-265. 
244 Ibid, pp. 379-385, 421. 
Chapter Two 
011 
 
longer enjoyed the confidence of the officer corps. Their demand for Yahya’s resignation was 
raised in light of agitation in the ranks of the young Army officers and in GHQ
245
. 
It should be noted that even in normal times COAS has to calculate the opinions of his 
generals in decision making. For example, in October 2009 COAS General Ashfaq Pervez 
Kayani clarified to the American ambassador in Islamabad his stance regarding US policy 
stating that his position was crucially influenced by the reactions of the corps commanders to 
the implications of US policy
246
. Furthermore, COAS needs his colleagues’ consent for his 
position as the head of the army, and they can formally remove him from his post: Field-
Marshal (five star general) Ayub Khan was forced by the Army high command to retire in 
March 1969 following the outcome of the 1965 War with India and due to his protracted term 
of office (1958-1969)
247
. 
Similarly, COAS General Musharraf could not have carried out a military coup in October 
1999 without the support of his fellow generals: CGS, Corps Commander X, and Corps 
Commander V in Karachi
248
. These generals directed the entire coup and took over the 
government while Musharraf was still confined on board a flight
249
. Musharraf managed to 
hold his position as Army chief despite being dismissed by Prime Minister Sharif who 
appointed DG ISI to head the Army
250
. Before and after the coup Musharraf made significant 
efforts to secure the Army’s support for his leadership: he consulted frequently with the 
generals, and after the debacle of the Kargil Operation Musharraf toured the garrisons and 
confronted the low morale and bitterness of the lower ranks. Similar to Musharraf, COAS 
General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani toured the garrisons in May 2011 following the US unilateral 
commando operation to capture Osama bin-Laden without the cooperation of the Pakistan 
Army which aroused discontent among the officer ranks
251
.    
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Widening differences of opinion between the senior brass and COAS, who has a fixed term of 
office and does not function as head of state, could lead to his removal or to the adoption of a 
different policy than that advocated by the Army chief. COAS General Beg was a dominant 
Army chief but he still depended on the support of his generals. When Beg acted against 
Prime Minister Bhutto in 1990 in order to overthrow her government, he had to guarantee the 
support of the senior brass (through CCC)
252
. Later, the generals managed to block some of 
Beg’s main initiatives: For example, Beg’s agenda for supporting Saddam’s regime in Iraq in 
the Gulf War of 1991 was blocked by the fierce opposition of the majority of the Army senior 
command that did not want to aggravate the US and Saudi Arabia, and Prime Minister Sharif 
ignored Beg’s initiative253. Finally, the generals supported Prime Minister Sharif in his move 
to announce Beg’s successor three months before Beg’s retirement thus turning him into a 
lame duck in decision making. Another Army chief, General Karamat (1996 - 1998), strongly 
believed that his dismissal by the Prime Minister was also encouraged by senior generals
254
. 
♦♦♦ 
The strong position of the Army chief enables him to promote his own initiatives with more 
independence than other generals, including in the nuclear sphere. As described in Chapter 
One, COAS General Beg enthusiastically advocated nuclear assistance to Iran and it seems he 
was able to promote it without the need to consult his colleagues in the Army who might have 
supported his retirement after General Beg had already initiated nuclear exports to Iran. The 
option of nuclear export initiated by the Army chief is still relevant in light of the direct 
subordination of SPD to COAS and SPD’s control over the nuclear organisations. 
♦♦♦ 
3.2.2. Small Circle of Powerful Positions 
Apart from COAS there are several key positions in GHQ that are considered more influential 
in decision making than the other PSOs. In addition, some posts of Army corps commanders 
are also pivotal positions in the Army’s hierarchy.  
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As mentioned, VCOAS, when appointed, is only second to COAS in the Army’s senior 
command and considered to be the leading candidate to succeed him: all the Army chiefs 
(Generals Yahya Khan, Zia ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf) who appointed a deputy were 
succeeded by him
255
. However, VCOAS is a temporary position and the division of 
responsibility with COAS is flexible and is left to the latter’s own discretion. As discussed 
earlier, COAS could still maintain a high profile in Army business, and could easily ignore 
the opinion of VCOAS who did not have an official role in decision making in GHQ
256
. 
When COAS does not appoint a deputy, CGS is usually the most powerful position in Army 
HQ. CGS is responsible for GHQ’s smooth operation and coordination between the different 
sections of GHQ and the relevant Army corps. Furthermore, CGS is directly responsible for 
military operations and military intelligence. Hence, CGS has authority regarding the key 
elements in any military activity, and half of the Army chiefs were elevated to their position 
after they served as CGS
257
. In light of the focal position of CGS in the Army high command, 
as part of the Army organisational culture COAS appoints one of his close colleagues to this 
position
258
.  
The position of DGMO who works under CGS empowers the latter and gives him authority 
over the entire sphere of military planning. Generals Kayani and Musharraf were elevated to 
the post of COAS after serving as DGMO. In several instances DGMO was part of the close 
circle of military planning while his superior, CGS, remained uninformed: for example, in 
1971, DGMO was the only senior officer in GHQ involved in the initial plan of ‘Operation 
Blitz’ to seize control over East Pakistan259. DGMO was also very dominant in planning the 
use of militant groups as proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir: in 1993, DGMO General 
Musharraf was behind a plan to recruit militant organisations and send them to Kashmir, and 
in 1994 initiated contacts with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition, DGMO has been part 
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of the decision making particularly if it had operational consequences: DGMO has been the 
main authority in coordinating the Army’s activities in the War on Terror260.       
Apart from the three senior positions in the Army hierarchy who have been mentioned, DG 
MI is also considered to have some influence on decision making in policies and planning 
within the Army. DG MI is responsible for three elements which secure his position in the 
senior command: intelligence to support military operations, acquiring information on the 
political leadership by monitoring the stability of the government, and supervising 
information security within the Army which enables him to collect information on members 
of the high command
261
. 
The corps commanders are not involved on a daily basis in policy decisions which take place 
in GHQ. However, COAS usually needs at least their tacit support for his policies and 
decisions - which are presented to them in CCC. Among the corps commanders, Corps 
Commander X is considered a crucial position in the Army hierarchy. As a result of his 
responsibility for the protection of the federal government, this commander is a key player in 
any attempt at a military coup, and he is usually a trusted close colleague of COAS
262
. 
Naturally, the commander of the SFC is more involved than other corps commanders in 
decision making on issues related to the nuclear issue
263
. 
♦♦♦ 
The limited position of power of position in the Army which might have influence over the 
nuclear issue (as a result of its influence on national security policies, normally discussed in 
the Army senior command) simplifies the option for COAS to secure a consensus on any 
alteration in the non-proliferation policy. Naturally, DG SPD who is not part of GHQ and 
supervises the nuclear organisations must also accept the new policy. 
♦♦♦ 
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3.2.3. The Concept of Operations and Plans 
♦♦♦ 
Examining the planning of the Army, both its operations and policies on national security 
issues might provide some insights into the Army’s overall capability to control the nuclear 
organisations. The planning process, mainly in GHQ, could reveal what the deliberations of 
the Army’s decision-makers are and their ability to take into consideration the broader 
implications of their policies. Mastering this skill is essential when dealing with nuclear 
capabilities which are a focal element in Pakistan’s national security paradigm. 
According to past experience, there is a substantial basis for questioning the Army’s calibre in 
strategic planning which is essential for handling complex circumstances and considering the 
various factors. As a result, grave reservations might appear about the Army’s ability to 
maintain proper administrative work in its control over the nuclear organisations and to 
evaluate the overall environment for their activities. These problems would be displayed 
when presenting the Army’s evaluation of external factors in its planning, its definition of the 
framework for the operation and the Army’s ability to optimise its professionalism and 
improve its modus operandi.  
♦♦♦ 
Regarding the Army’s ability to maintain a wide perspective, as mentioned earlier, the 
Pakistan Army marginalises MOFA in the decision-making process and prevents it from 
influencing the national strategy which is solely in the realm of the military. In parallel, the 
Army has not developed an equivalent self-capability for the evaluation of the international 
environment which should be considered when formulating the objectives of national 
security. Furthermore, the Pakistan Army traditionally tends to project growing impatience 
towards senior officers who advise caution and restraint due to the international implications 
of suggested policies or military actions
264
. 
The Army consistently misperceives the wider implications of its military operations. The 
Army failed to anticipate the results of its military campaigns in 1971 and in 1999. In the 
1971 War, which began as an operation to rein in public agitation in East Pakistan, the Army 
did not take into consideration the possibility of complex eventualities for Pakistan and for its 
national security. Among the scenarios which were not contemplated and later materialised 
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were: the mass desertion of Bengali soldiers; the creation of Bengali refugee camps in India 
as a source of instability in East Pakistan; the establishment of a Bengali separatist militant 
force with the assistance of India which operated against Pakistan Army; and eventually 
India’s military invasion into East Pakistan265. 
In the ‘Kargil Operation’ of 1999, the Army failed to grasp the new strategic circumstances of 
its campaign following Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. It should have 
considered international concerns regarding a conflict between the nuclear rivals and the 
problematic timing for a military initiative in Kashmir only a year after the nuclear tests. 
Hence, even with some tactical achievements in the battlefield, the operation appears to have 
been doomed to fail in pressurising India to agree to negotiations from a weaker position. 
Neither did the Army give serious consideration to the possibility of expansion of the conflict 
to other areas along the border between the two countries
266
. 
Furthermore, the crucial factor in the Army’s misperception of its strategic situation for 
achieving its objectives is its apparent misunderstanding of the nature of US foreign policy, 
and particularly towards South Asia. This inherent failure in the Army’s strategic thinking 
was one of the main factors behind its imbroglio in the 1971 War. C-in-C General Yahya 
Khan was convinced that he could rely on an American military intervention if India gained 
the upper hand in a military conflict with Pakistan. Yahya was firm in his conviction about 
being indispensable in the eyes of Washington following his pivotal role in the engagement 
between the US and China in the late 1960’s (which eventually led to a normalisation in US-
China relations)
267
. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, the Army’s traditional perception 
included US military support as one of the pillars of Pakistan’s national security, and thus the 
Army’s top echelon was convinced that the US as a superpower would rescue Pakistan from 
its inferior position in the power equation with India. However, the US was careful in its 
commitments to Pakistan and avoided obligating itself to any military intervention. The Army 
held onto this conviction about the US, although a lack of understanding about the limits of 
US involvement occurred during the 1965 War, also known as ‘Operation Gibraltar’. The 
Pakistan Army, under the control of President Ayub Khan, also counted on US military 
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support for its initiative in light of Pakistan’s alliance with the US and the tension between the 
US and India. However, as a result of the outbreak of conflict, the US imposed an arms 
embargo on India and Pakistan and remained neutral during the military conflict
268
. 
The flaw in grasping the complex conditions in which the military operation was taking place 
and in miscalculating the impact of these conditions on strategic planning also had 
repercussions in defining the operational framework and objectives. In the Indo-Pakistani war 
of 1965 there was no clear definition regarding how the operation would eventually assist 
Pakistan in exerting pressure on India on the Kashmir issue. The top command maintained 
ambiguity about the final objective: was the purpose of the military operation to occupy 
territory or merely to increase diplomatic pressure on India? In addition, the Army planned to 
rely on the support in the operation of the Kashmiri people under India’s control; however, 
they abstained from a widespread uprising against India, and determined the operation’s 
failure
269
. 
The War of 1971 was the first test of the Army’s grand strategy for defending the eastern 
region of Pakistan. According to the Army’s strategic thinking, the western part of Pakistan 
was more vital to the existence of the country and had to be protected by the majority of the 
military forces. In an emergency crisis, due to the geographic constraints that impeded 
substantial military assistance to the eastern region (the distance between the two sectors of 
the country was more than a thousand kilometres and between them lays the territory of India, 
Pakistan’s arch-enemy), the military forces in the west were designated to attack India. 
However, when India invaded East Pakistan in November 1971, the Army command avoided 
a full-scale war that might have jeopardised the western region too. Eventually, the Pakistani 
forces in the east, were outnumbered and organised for riot control missions with no heavy 
weaponry, were defeated within two weeks by India’s armed forces270. 
Regarding the Army’s record in improving its procedures, it also has mixed results. After the 
devastating consequences of the Army’s strategy in 1971, it avoided in-depth examination of 
its operation or the foundation of its military thinking which were the main factors behind the 
failure. The final report of the commission, compiled at the end of the war to investigate the 
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military failure (‘Hamoodur Rahman Commission’) was ignored and censored in order to 
avoid further embarrassment for the Army
271
.  
Furthermore, as part of the Army’s culture and internal discourse, several alien elements 
penetrated the planning process and accentuated its inadequacy. The Indian soldiery was 
reported as “too cowardly and ill-organised to offer any effective military response which 
could pose a threat to Pakistan”. A similar approach was designated to the Bengalis as a ‘non-
martial race’: Yahya Khan, along with most of his generals and senior officials believed that 
the Bengalis would succumb to military repression and said that “show them the teeth and 
they will be all right”. The underestimation of Pakistan’s rivals was followed by the 
glorification of the Army as invincible which in turn reinforced the tendency of the high 
command to avoid scrutinising malfunctions in the Army apparatus. Furthermore, the Army 
preferred, in its concept of operation, to emphasise the element of surprise as a response to its 
fundamental inferiority vis-a-vis India. For example, according to the basic planning of 
‘Operation Blitz’ of March 1971, the campaign was to be launched with great cunning, 
surprise, deception and speed. A similar perception accompanied the planning of the ‘Kargil 
Operation’ in 1999272. During the tenure of COAS General Zia ul-Haq the military planning 
of the Pakistani Army came under the heavy influence of Islamic teaching in the form of 
Islamic slogans and prayers. As a result, cold military logic was neglected and likewise the 
methodology of subjecting plans to military critique and precision
273
. 
♦♦♦ 
As evident in the military planning, the Army presented a limited ability to comprehend 
Pakistan’s strategic environment and its influence on the prospects of the planned operation. 
A particular shortfall is noticed when calculating the approach of major powers such as the 
US, and international constrains which need to be calculated in any planning of a major 
operation, particularly in a sensitive conflict such as between Pakistan and India. The limited 
consideration by the Army of international implications and US interests, whether as a result 
of misperception or due to the marginalisation of this dimension in the planning stage, is even 
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more crucial when considering a policy of nuclear non-proliferation: This aspect is a key 
obstacle for a nuclear weapons country when offering its assistance to foreign countries.  
♦♦♦ 
3.3. Lack of Civilian Supervision over the Military 
One of the most important aspects in the character of any defence establishment is its 
relations with the national government which has the authority to supervise its activities. 
These relations are particularly important regarding control over the nuclear programmes and 
its military character. As a result, the national leadership should have a firm hold on the 
armed forces in order to influence the operation of the control system, and particularly 
military policy guidelines and procedures. Civil-military relations define the extent of military 
involvement in politics and domestic affairs, and the military influence on national security 
thinking. In the case of Pakistan, the armed forces and especially the Army were always the 
dominant organisations on defence issues and most of the time they had an overwhelming 
influence on other national affairs. Furthermore, the military has controlled Pakistan for half 
of the period since its independence and maintained a dominant position even when it was 
formally subordinate to a civilian government. 
During periods of civilian regime, the Prime Minister has been the Army’s main contender for 
the national dominant position, and the Army has aspired to be involved in the appointment to 
this position
274
. It should be emphasised that the founders of Pakistan conferred on the Prime 
Minister a major role in any issue pertaining to national security. For example, in the Kashmir 
crisis of 1948, the Prime Minister was the one who made the crucial decisions. Although the 
President is Pakistan’s nominal head of state and appoints the chiefs of the armed forces 
Pakistan constitutionally has a parliamentary system of government which hands most of the 
responsibilities for the affairs of the nation to the Prime Minister. The President has the 
prerogative to dissolve parliament and call for new general elections (nowadays, only with the 
approval of the Supreme Court), but the Prime Minister appoints the cabinet and presides as 
head of government on national security issues
275
.      
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The military has used several ways in order to marginalise civilian governments and prime 
ministers. The most fundamental one has been the ‘divide and rule’ principle. A necessary 
precondition for consolidating the Army’s dominance was to have a seriously divided 
parliament and warring political parties, so that the Army could assume the role of referee. 
For example, COAS General Kakar forced both President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister 
Sharif to resign in 1993 following their legal row over the eighth constitutional amendment 
(allowing the President to dissolve Parliament)
276
.  
A great deal of effort was devoted by the Army for supporting weak parties, and ensuring that 
they performed well. Behind the scenes, the formula required both manipulation of the 
political process and use of state mechanisms and the influence of the intelligence agencies on 
the political system to enforce the Army’s position on the civilian leadership. Apparently, 
similar techniques were used by COAS General Kayani on the civilian government in order to 
guarantee the preservation of the military agenda both on the War on Terror and the relations 
with the US
277
. In parallel, the military resorted to co-opting the President as a junior partner 
in defence decision making and formulation of policies that affected the armed forces. The 
President was there to ensure that the interests of the defence establishment would be 
protected even without direct military control over the country
278
. 
Another approach which was selected by the Army was to deprive the Prime Minister of any 
substantial authority over defence issues. This stance was employed during Prime Minister 
Bhutto’s first term (1988-1990). Bhutto was also forced to accept that her Foreign Minister 
and the Defence Minister would be appointed at the Army’s discretion and she would not be 
able to intervene in the Army’s expenditure and privileges. During her first term Bhutto tried 
to take control of the military: she appointed a new DG ISI after removing the former DG. 
However, COAS General Beg centralised all intelligence responsibilities within MI in GHQ, 
and effectively isolated the ISI from any important role in intelligence operations. Bhutto’s 
attempts to appoint her own candidate for the position of CJCSC also failed
279
.  
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In addition, the military was able to control the information available to Prime Ministers 
Bhutto and Sharif. In his first term, Sharif was kept ignorant by the ISI of the criticism against 
him within the Army’s senior command. Regarding Bhutto, as mentioned, in the late 1980’s 
the military tried to diminish Bhutto’s political power and to remove her from the position of 
Prime Minister, and as a consequence Bhutto was not informed on a regular basis about 
defence issues
280
. Furthermore, Bhutto argued that she did not have prior knowledge of the 
ISI’s support for the insurgency in Kashmir. Later, following the ‘Kargil Operation’ in 1999, 
Prime Minister Sharif complained that he too had not been informed about the Army’s 
operational planning regarding India. COAS General Musharraf only casually broached 
Sharif about the Kargil Plan in December 1998, but the Army did not present any well-
planned operation
281
. 
Parallel to the Army’s attempt to isolate Prime Ministers, during Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s term 
as President (August 1988 - July 1993), his role, as perceived by him, was to guard and cater 
to the military’s long-term political interest. In this regard President Ishaq Khan admitted that 
he had dismissed Prime Minister Bhutto following a request from the military
282
. 
Another method which was used by the Army was to receive the principle authorisation of the 
Prime Minister in advance for any operation without the need for it to be approved again later. 
For example, the ‘Kashmir Operation’ was planned in the late 1980’s by COAS General Beg 
and DG ISI Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul. The operation included recruiting tens of 
thousands of volunteers from Afghanistan for an insurgency operation inside Indian-
controlled Kashmir. In November 1989 when briefing Prime Minister Bhutto on the Kashmir 
plan General Beg asked for authorisation to strike whenever it was needed without recourse to 
the Prime Minister
283
.  
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The Army command made the same request of Bhutto in 1993 during her second term as 
Prime Minister. DGMO Major-General Musharraf asked Bhutto to give the Army the 
responsibility for deciding the timing of conflicts in Kashmir, suggesting the move would 
enable the Pakistani military to react more quickly if there was a pre-emptive strike by India. 
In both instances Bhutto refused the requests; however, the Army’s position was sufficiently 
strong to pressurise Bhutto into choosing a policy with higher stakes: Bhutto claimed she had 
felt obliged to appease the Army and had approved a low intensity insurgency into Kashmir. 
At least in one instance Bhutto’s tacit approval led to the undesired results she aspired to 
prevent: Her consent for the Army’s operation exacerbated the situation in 1990 between 
India and Pakistan following an increase in the number of training camps and the volume of 
fighters that were being sent into Indian-controlled Kashmir
284
.  
This attitude which emphasised the government’s appeasement of the Army and intelligence 
agencies was dominant in Bhutto’s second term as Prime Minister. Bhutto was not able to 
answer to western pressure and halt terror in Kashmir for fear of her own intelligence 
agencies. Bhutto was convinced that the ISI and the military “would never leave her alone” if 
she interfered in national security policies, and so merely refrained from any confrontation. 
Prime Minister Sharif adopted the same approach in his first term, and allowed the military a 
free hand in national security matters. Apparently, the approach of ‘do not ask, do not tell’ of 
the civilian leadership is still relevant: US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, described in 
her memoir that following the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008 Pakistan’s President 
Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani flatly denied that Pakistan was the 
origin of the attack possibly because they were ignorant of the full account of the terror 
operation
285
. 
On other occasions, the Army did not even pretend to ask for government approval or chose 
to ignore the instructions of the Prime Minister: 
1) The Army and the government had different objectives during Bhutto’s first term as Prime 
Minister: Bhutto favoured a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, while the Army and the 
ISI wanted to facilitate the Mujahedeen’s defeat of the regime in Kabul. In addition, 
Bhutto wanted to moderate the support for the insurgency in Kashmir, but the Army, 
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pleased with this enhanced capability against India, wished to escalate it. In this regard, 
Bhutto’s government gave approval for the ISI to provide some support to indigenous 
Kashmiri groups in their demand for a plebiscite, funding for refugee rehabilitation as 
well as for a media campaign on behalf of the Kashmiris. However, the ISI went further 
and expedited the process of setting up training camps for militants who would wage an 
armed insurgency inside Indian-Kashmir
286
. 
2) the ISI continued to support insurgent activity in Afghanistan, although Prime Minister 
Sharif, during his first term, was in favour of a reconciliation process between the rival 
Afghan factions
287
. 
3) Following the failed attempt by former Mujahedeen fighters to attack the World Trade 
Centre in New York in February 1993, under American pressure, Prime Minister Sharif 
ordered the ISI to shut down militant camps in ‘Azad Kashmir’ (Pakistani-held Kashmir). 
However, the ISI ignored the instruction and relocated camps to areas adjacent to the 
Afghan border
288
. 
4) Bhutto ordered, in December 1995, the arrest of terror leaders who were involved in 
kidnapping foreign tourists in Indian-controlled Kashmir, but the ISI misled her into 
believing that it had no connection with these leaders and it refrained from arresting 
anyone. Furthermore, Bhutto could not stop the ISI from allowing the terrorists who were 
involved in the terror attack to return to Pakistan and receive a public rally
289
. 
On extreme occasions, the Army turned against the Prime Minister with the clear objective of 
preventing him from exercising his power. This was the case in Prime Minister Bhutto’s first 
term when she was surrounded by deliberate incompetence. The civilian and military 
bureaucracies deliberately prevented the smooth operation of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat: 
phone calls were misdirected, files went missing, and Bhutto’s servants were blackmailed by 
the ISI. Similar incidents happened to undermine Prime Minister Sharif in the early days of 
his first term and his phone was wiretapped
290
. 
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The civilian government was also restrained in its reactions to the military agenda. One of the 
methods adopted by civilian governments for reducing the Army’s influence was to support 
the smaller military services. On rare occasions, the civilian leader was able to exercise his 
power over the Army’s high command and appoint or dismiss COAS291. On other occasions, 
it was demonstrated that prime ministers have the power to enforce their will if they decide to 
confront the defence establishment. For example, in the late 1980’s Prime Minister Bhutto 
refused on the ISI request to extend diplomatic recognition to the Afghan interim 
government
292
. 
♦♦♦ 
In short, the civilian leadership has been constantly marginalised with little influence on 
national security issues and nuclear matters as well. It appears that the civilian government 
since the late 1980’s showed inferiority sentiments when dealing with defence policy and 
most of the time preferred to avoid confrontation with the military for fear of severe 
retaliation. Hence, it can be evaluated that the role of the civilian leadership in the control 
system over nuclear organisations through their participation in NCA meetings and its 
committees is equally feeble to their position in Pakistan’s civil-military relations. 
3.4. Flawed Inter-Agency Mechanisms within the Armed Forces 
Evaluating the inter-agency mechanism is significant in any analysis of a government system 
such as control systems (see Chapter Four) which include various government agencies. In 
Pakistan, in light of the dominant position of the military in the control system, it is 
particularly important to examine the procedures and character of the interactions between the 
different military services, and between their respective HQs, in order to evaluate if this 
bureaucratic arrangement is ingrained in Pakistan’s military. In this connection, the 
interrelationships between the HQs of the different military services, including the Joint-HQ 
(JSHQ) should also be assessed.  
♦♦♦ 
It appears that another fundamental shortcoming in Pakistan’s defence establishment is its 
ineptitude in joint planning, and the lack of interoperability of the armed forces. The reforms 
                                                 
291 Crossed Swords, pp. 481-482; Deception, p. 227; Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, pp. 223, 248, 281. 
292 Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 234-
241; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 189-195. 
Chapter Two 
006 
 
in the defence establishment which were initiated in the 1970’s by Prime Minister Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto were meant to improve this flaw in the defence establishment. However, the inter-
agency mechanism was always a major weakness in the work of Pakistan’s armed forces. It 
was clearly demonstrated in their lack of interoperability during military conflicts when it was 
essential for a successful outcome of the military campaign. All large-scale military 
operations were planned by the Army without any significant input from the Air Force and 
Navy. Moreover, AHQ and NHQ were aware that a military operation was taking place only 
after it had been instituted by GHQ: ‘Operation Gibraltar’ of the 1965 War was formulated 
without the involvement of PAF or the Navy. The military effort to seize the Indian part of 
Kashmir was considered the sole responsibility of the Army
293
.  
The lack of operability was one of the main contributory factors in the defeat in the 1971 War 
when the capabilities of the Air Force and Navy were not utilised properly in an attempt to 
rescue the Army from a military defeat. Absurdly, NHQ and its maritime forces ascertained 
information about the commencement of the Army’s ‘Operation Searchlight’ in March 1971 
through an Indian radio broadcast. Later, despite the grave implications for Pakistan’s 
security, the Navy chief was not even informed by the Army chief about the opening of the 
western front, and learnt about it from CAS. During the conflict there was a lack of 
coordination between AHQ and GHQ, and PAF was incapable of delivering air support to the 
combat units
294
. It seems that these failures are still relevant: the committee for investigating 
the military activity surrounding the American capture in May 2011 of Al Qaeda leader, 
Osama bin-Laden, examined the possibility that some of the malfunctions were the result of a 
lack of coordination within the armed forces
295
. 
The Army’s disregard for the other military services was also exemplified whenever the 
Army decided to conduct a coup and rule the country. The chiefs of the Air Force and Navy 
and their HQs played a negligible role in the process of imposing martial rule and usually did 
not receive any alert about the Army’s intentions296. 
Apart from the bureaucratic arrangements for inter-agency coordination within the armed 
forces, the informal level of the bureaucracy is also quite instrumental in the lack of routine 
joint efforts of the military services. The personality of the services’ chiefs is pivotal in 
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securing the services position in the defence establishment and in the degree of influence it 
commands on decision making. Hence, the chiefs of the armed forces have consistently 
concentrated on strengthening their own internal position rather involving themselves in 
collaboration with other military services
297
.  
In addition to the HQs of military services, JSHQ was persistently marginalised by the Army. 
Prior to the creation of JSHQ in 1976 the Army chiefs who were also the military rulers of the 
country avoided any substantial use of the inter-services’ mechanisms of consultation and 
coordination within the armed forces. For example, CMLA General Yahya Khan intentionally 
paralysed the essential strategic operative coordination between the military senior commands 
within the framework of JCSC
298
. The Army aspired to curtail the scope of CJCSC and the 
responsibilities of JSHQ: following the coup in 1977 CJCSC was consolidated in practice as a 
ceremonial position without any authority over the chiefs of the military services
299
. The 
relatively weak position of CJCSC in the defence establishment reflected directly on the 
responsibilities of JSHQ. Instead of being the focal point of military policy and planning it 
was limited to administrative duties. CJCSC and JSHQ were not party to the Army’s decision 
to launch a coup in July 1977 and were later kept in the dark about significant military 
operations such as the ‘Kargil Operation’300. 
♦♦♦ 
As clearly exemplified, the Army is remotely limited by the organisational positions of the 
other military services, and can execute its own policies, plans, and operations without a 
mandatory obligation to coordinate them within the armed forces: as evident from historical 
experience, the Army chose this option on more than one occasion. The main consequence for 
the control system is more centralisation of power in GHQ with no effective influence of the 
other military chiefs (who are NCA members) and their HQs on a possible alteration in the 
non-proliferation policy. Although SPD is an inter-services organisation its direct control by 
the Army guarantees that the other services will not be able to interfere in its activities. 
♦♦♦ 
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3.5. Significant Influence of the Intelligence Agencies on National Security Issues 
Pakistan’s intelligence community is a prominent section of the defence establishment, and is 
considered most influential in decision making. Furthermore, the intelligence services have a 
crucial impact on the country’s strategic situation due to their character as operational entities 
at the service of the Army.  
As described in Chapter One on Pakistan’s control system, the ISI, and to some extent the 
other intelligence agencies, also have a role in the supervision of the nuclear organisations, 
mainly regarding the security of these organisations’ activities and in their procurement 
efforts in foreign countries. As a consequence, the ISI probably has access to the nuclear 
organisations’ technologies, materials and knowledge. Due to its responsibilities in the 
security apparatus of the nuclear programmes the ISI obtained sensitive information on all the 
employees at all levels in the nuclear organisations during their vetting stage and through 
routine security verification. Furthermore, the ISI has direct access to the manpower of the 
nuclear and missile industrial complex. 
♦♦♦ 
In light of the ISI’s role in the control system and its dominant position in Pakistan’s defence 
establishment, the final section of this chapter will be dedicated to the character of the ISI as 
the core of Pakistan’s intelligence community and as a player in decision making on national 
security issues. Through this discussion it should be possible to identify the ISI’s function in 
national affairs and how it might impinge on its influence within the realm of the nuclear 
organisations. 
♦♦♦ 
3.5.1. Organisational Inclination towards Special Missions and Operations 
The ISI’s character could be essentially defined by its designation as the operational arm of 
the military for special and sensitive missions. The ISI is foremost an operational organisation 
for clandestine missions and its scope of activities has always been wider than the traditional 
responsibilities of intelligence agencies. As a security service the heavy burden of preserving 
the stability of the regime lies with the ISI.  
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♦♦♦ 
According to the estimated structure of the ISI presented earlier, four out of its six 
organisational wings (‘S’, ‘C’, ‘CT’, and ‘B’ wings) are probably focused on intelligence 
operations. These wings are responsible for missions which are connected to insurgency 
groups in Afghanistan and India; for promoting the defence establishment interests in the 
political system; for countering terror attacks against the state apparatus and particularly the 
military; and for launching special operations within Pakistan and abroad. As a result, the ISI 
has a strong tendency to conduct operations with little consideration for international 
implications and political considerations. It was principally in the interests of the ISI’s 
operational wings to continue with large-scale special intelligence missions which gave them 
greater influence
301
.  
♦♦♦ 
By affiliating themselves to covert operations the ISI was involved in various key events 
which determined Pakistan’s strategic situation and its national security thinking. The main 
ISI operation which elevated its position in the defence establishment was its responsibility 
for the insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviet military occupation between 1979 and 
1989: following the ‘Afghan Operation’, the ISI was forged as a combination of elements of 
the military and special operations
302
. 
The agency was soon designated as a point of contact with militant organisations and it 
gained comprehensive responsibility for one of the most important strategic tools of 
Pakistan’s defence establishment (see Chapter Three). The ISI controlled the militant 
organisations fighting in Kashmir which were its creation and were occasionally reorganised 
according to operational objectives. Similar manipulations were employed by the ISI on 
militant groups operating in Afghanistan: for example, militants who fought in Afghanistan 
were sent by the ISI to Kashmir in 1998 after the Taliban movement established its control 
over the majority of the Afghan territory
303
. 
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In addition, it was an ISI initiative to launch a proxy war against the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan by assisting the Mujahedeen. The ISI favoured military means in order to 
establish Afghan Muslim fundamentalists as the dominant political force in Afghanistan. The 
agency rejected the perspective of MOFA which favoured diplomacy for promoting 
Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan304. Furthermore, prolonging the ‘Afghan Operation’ was in 
the interests of the ISI’s operational wings giving them greater influence as the designated 
agency responsible for the entire Afghan policy and as Pakistan’s official liaison with the 
Afghan factions. The ISI was also designated by the Army and government to be responsible 
for contacts with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. Later, the ISI 
was authorised to have direct contacts with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and in 
September 2001, following 9/11, the ISI negotiated with the Taliban on US demands
305
.   
The ISI was also the main operator of the ‘Kashmir Operation’ in its different transformations 
since the 1960’s. Following the ISI’s proven success in arranging a proxy war in Afghanistan, 
the agency received, in the late 1980’s, the leading role in organising the insurgency in 
Kashmir by deploying the operational capabilities of the militants who fought in Afghanistan. 
The ISI was responsible for escalating the situation in 1990, by increasing the number of 
training camps and the volume of fighters that were being secretly sent to cross the Indian 
border
306
.  
♦♦♦ 
The ISI’s actions clearly countered any substantial possibility for Pakistan’s civilian 
government to exercise its diplomatic measures and promote a political settlement for the 
Kashmir conflict. Although the ISI was instructed by the Army and operated under civilian 
governments which reconciled with the agency initiative, the ISI’s dedication to the 
operations, which brought the agency a central role in shaping the national security policy, 
was far greater than any consideration for the international implications of the operations for 
Pakistan. 
♦♦♦ 
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Apart from involvement in insurgency in neighbouring countries the ISI has been suspected 
of being affiliated to terrorists who have endangered the stability of the international 
community. It appears that the ISI was ready to utilise these terrorists as long as they served 
its purpose. In this context, the ISI had contacts with Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin-Laden. Bin-
Laden had lengthy experience in the service of the Mujahedeen groups which fought against 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, under the instructions and with the assistance of the ISI. 
At the end of the 1980’s DG ISI Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul (together with future Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif) met bin-Laden and asked him to fund the overthrow of incumbent 
Prime Minister Bhutto. Bin-Laden also maintained close contacts with the the ISI bureau in 
Peshawar
307
. 
Bin-Laden’s involvement in terror attacks did not deter the ISI from preserving its contacts 
with him and with Al-Qaeda. As late as 1999, the US had information on the ISI connections 
with bin-Laden in all likelihood for the ISI to acquire his services in Kashmir. There was also 
speculation that bin-Laden had been warned by the ISI in 1998 of the US cruise missile attack 
against his camp in Afghanistan
308
. 
Later, following the 9/11 events the ISI was suspected of aiding bin-Laden to find shelter in 
Pakistan and to flee from Afghanistan as a result of the military operation of the US-led 
coalition. According to an ISI agent who was in charge of contacts with Al-Qaeda, he helped 
bin-Laden to cross to Pakistan on the instruction of his superiors and with the help of two 
other agents
309
. Furthermore, after bin-Laden’s capture in Pakistan in May 2011, and the 
revelations about his residence in the country for several years, US intelligence was 
suspicious that bin-Laden had been under the ISI protection - possibly its ‘S Wing’310. 
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Unconfirmed reports even claimed that bin-Laden had been living in an ISI safe house
311
. In 
addition, it was argued that the Taliban leader, Mula Omar, was living in Peshawar, the 
capital city of Baluchistan Province, under official protection, most probably of the ISI
312
. 
Moreover, the ISI itself is suspected of involvement in aiding terror activities which stretch 
beyond the defined goal of Kashmir or with militants who launch terror attacks against NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. According to US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, 
the ISI helped to orchestrate the terror attack on the American embassy in Kabul in September 
2011, and US intelligence senior officials claimed that the ISI was behind the terror attack on 
the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2007
313
. Several reports suggest that the ISI also assisted 
with the training and planning of the terror attack on the Indian city of Mumbai in November 
2008
314
. In addition, according to US intelligence reports, the ISI planned several suicide 
attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan
315
.         
Although Pakistan’s affiliation with terror attacks has severe repercussions on its relations 
with its neighbouring countries and with the US, and on its position in the international 
community, these considerations have been overshadowed by the operational aspects and 
agenda of the ISI and the Army. As a consequence, following the 9/11 events the ISI 
vehemently objected to the decision of COAS General Musharraf, to support the US in the 
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War on Terror, and America’s determination to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
which was under the ISI patronage
316
. 
At most, the diplomatic dimensions which follow the ISI’s activities have been taken into 
consideration as a constraint which demands intense secrecy in the contacts between the ISI 
and militant organisations. Following the 9/11 events the ISI made efforts to conceal its 
involvement in the insurgency in Kashmir. Furthermore, following President Musharraf’s 
speech on January 2002 advocating action against terror organisations the ISI arrested 
hundreds of militants who were members of organisations which operate in Kashmir only to 
release them after a short period
317
. 
3.5.2. Promoting its Own Agenda 
♦♦♦ 
Apart from its character as an operational agency, which affects the ISI’s role in decision 
making on national security issues, the question of control over the ISI is also crucial. It is 
necessary to discern the extent of freedom the ISI enjoys in the promotion of its agenda and 
its organisational interests, particularly at the expense of its superiors: the military high 
command and the federal government. Control over the ISI has implications for the agency’s 
role in the state supervision of the nuclear organisations, and especially for the ISI’s 
inclination to pursue an independent agenda on the issue of nuclear export. As discussed 
earlier, the ISI seems to assign little consideration to international implications which in turn 
represent a significant factor in Pakistan’s strategic thinking regarding the avoidance of 
nuclear assistance to foreign countries. As a consequence, the ISI without the effective 
supervision of the military and government which has a greater awareness of the international 
dimension might consider allowing nuclear proliferation from Pakistan or even assisting the 
officials behind it in Pakistan’s nuclear programmes and defence establishment. 
♦♦♦ 
The ISI is observed as an interventionist organisation which aggressively promotes its own 
agenda on national security: the agency shapes events through its covert operations. Since the 
ISI became a powerful agency in the Afghan war in the late 1970’s, whenever there has been 
a civilian government, the agency has generally ignored its instructions. Attempts by Prime 
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Minister Bhutto in 1989 and Prime Minister Gilani in 2008 to rein in the ISI and to place the 
agency under civilian control failed miserably
318
. The ISI also turned against prime ministers 
in order to preserve the defence establishment’s perception of national security. For example, 
the ISI challenged the Afghan policy of Prime Minister Sharif for a political settlement and 
continued its support of the Afghan warlords. Sharif also retreated from his diplomatic efforts 
towards India, due to ISI objections
319
.  
Occasionally, the ISI was used by the Army command against the civilian leadership in order 
to diminish its political support and to prevent it from acting against military dominance on 
national security issues. Between January 1989 and July 1990 the ISI steered the 
destabilisation of Pakistan’s biggest province and its largest city, Punjab and Karachi 
(respectively), in order to undermine the public and political support of Prime Minister 
Bhutto’s government. Furthermore, the ISI was behind the establishment of political parties to 
counter PPP, the ruling party, and helped Bhutto’s main political rival, Nawaz Sharif, to 
reside as the Chief Minister of Punjab. Later, Bhutto’s widower and the co-chairman of PPP 
(and future president), Asif Ali Zardari, complained about the ISI’s attitude towards him 
following the general elections of February 2008
320
. 
In addition, DG ISI Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani publicly admitted that the ISI was also 
responsible for funding the activities against Bhutto’s government321. In the general elections 
of November 1988, the ISI mobilised Islamists against PPP and Bhutto in order to limit her 
political power as the prominent rival of the defence establishment. the ISI also tried to form a 
government coalition of the IJI political party
322
. In the run-up to the general elections of 
February 2008 the ISI was involved in designating the next Prime Minister and pressurised 
Saudi Arabia to halt its funding of Sharif’s party - PML (N)323. The ISI was also involved in 
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securing a sanctuary for President Musharraf in a third country following his anticipated 
impeachment by parliament in August 2008
324
. 
The relations between the ISI and the military, and especially the Army, are more respectful. 
It seems that the ISI is genuinely answerable to the military senior command and especially 
the Army chief. There are two main reasons for the Army’s efficient control of the ISI. First, 
although the ISI exists as an independent directorate, the agency is part of the military 
machine in major aspects: manpower, budget, and resources. The Army controls the ISI in 
spite of DG ISI being officially appointed by the Prime Minister: The core of its personnel is 
drawn from the Army. The ISI officers are dependent on the military for their career and are 
part of the military hierarchy and chain of command. It provides COAS with substantial 
leverage for using the ISI to serve the greater organisational interest of the armed forces
325
.  
Second, the Army agenda usually corresponds with that of the ISI’s: in light of the Army’s 
inferior position versus the Indian military and its incapability to control Afghanistan or even 
large parts of the tribal areas in FATA and the north-west province, the Army is interested in 
strengthening the ISI which proved its credibility in the past in these two critical sectors of 
Pakistan’s national security, and in manipulating the domestic arena326.  
The Army has also been able to decide on initiatives which are opposed by the ISI. In 1999 
the Army decided to launch the ‘Kargil Operation’ in spite of the ISI’s objection to it on 
operational grounds. The most famous clash between the ISI and the Army occurred 
concerning the strategic decision of COAS General Musharraf to side with the US after the 
9/11 attacks. DG ISI Lieutenant-General Mahmud Ahmed objected to the decision, failed to 
convince his ‘protégé’, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to accept the US demands, and 
was forced to retire a few days later prior to the start of the US military campaign in October 
2001
327
. 
However, it seems that the ISI could gain the potential to challenge the Army senior 
command, irrespective of the consequences, if it so desired. Shuja Nawaz argues that the ISI 
broadened its role and became a pervasive force in Pakistani politics that could even force the 
hand of its benefactors or sponsors, the Army chief included. The Afghan operation in the late 
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1970’s gave the ISI an autonomy and financial strength that it had not possessed before, 
creating independence from the Army
328
. Furthermore, the ISI has its own capabilities to 
influence the internal situation in Pakistan and the Army’s public image. Nevertheless, it 
should be emphasised that a substantial gulf between the Army and the ISI, regarding their 
agenda and interests, is currently only a theoretical scenario with no hold on the current 
situation within the defence establishment. In addition, it is difficult to evaluate accurately 
what the outcome of such friction would be. 
4. Conclusion 
The organisational culture of Pakistan’s defence establishment contains several features 
which could influence the capabilities and efficiency of the control system over nuclear 
organisations. These traits have been demonstrated since Pakistan’s independence and clearly 
still carry weight in the performance and perceptions of the defence establishment. The 
principle inherent explanation for the entire work of this establishment, and largely for 
Pakistan’s strategic situation, is the dominant position of the Army in the national security 
policy and its ability to coerce all the other state agencies to fulfil its agenda for the nation.     
As a result, the Army systematically marginalises civilian agencies such as MOFA and MOD 
whose potential contribution to national security thinking is essential. The Army, together 
with the other military services, seizes the ministries’ constitutional responsibilities and sets 
the national foreign and defence policies while neglecting the contribution of civilian 
agencies. 
♦♦♦ 
The potential contribution of the civilian agencies to national security remains limited, and in 
turn the diversity of perspectives which should be the platform for formulating policies is 
curtailed. The outcome might probably be a narrow viewpoint of the strategic situation, 
mainly of the international environment. This state of affairs affects the control system which 
deals with sensitive issues that require the close examination of their international dimension 
as a crucial factor in the decision-making process. In practice, the civilian agencies (like 
SECDIV which is under MOFA - see Chapter One) probably have a secondary role in the 
control system. The apparatus’ professionalism is severely weakened and it can easily ignore 
the international implications in its decision-making process. 
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In addition, the civilian leadership lacks efficient tools to supervise the defence establishment 
and particularly the armed forces: the cabinet depends for its decision making on selectively 
released information from the military, and the military has autonomy over defence matters 
(like the composition of the defence budget). The leadership relies on the goodwill of the high 
command of the military services and the intelligence agencies which influence the 
government’s political stability and policies. In light of the dependence of the heads of state 
on the military for their political survival as well, they usually try to please it and not question 
its agenda. As a result, the leadership is reluctant to impose inter-agency mechanisms on the 
Army and deprive it of its exclusiveness on national security issues: the national leadership 
has the power to oppose the Army’s interest on specific issues; however the more it tends to 
exercise its authority on sensitive issues, the more it risks military efforts to subvert it. This 
equation is particularly relevant to the nuclear issue and to the military control over the 
nuclear organisations. 
♦♦♦ 
The lack of inter-agency bureaucratic mechanisms also illustrates the relations between the 
Army and other military services: PAF and the Navy. The Army is not constrained by its 
obligation to formulate the coordinated policy and agenda of the armed forces. As a result, the 
Army aspires to restrict the position of the inter-agency structural manifestations: JSHQ, 
CJCSC, and JCSC. Their inferior position deprives them of significant participation in the 
control system over the nuclear organisations, although it is a strategic issue, one of the 
highest in the national security framework, and despite the fact that SPD is an inter-services 
directorate. JSHQ could potentially offer broader deliberations on the interests of the military 
and their relevance to decision making in the operation of the nuclear organisations. 
♦♦♦ 
The Army, as the main agency which shapes national security policies, functions on the 
principles of centralisation and strict discipline - both are the legacy of the British Indian 
military. The Army chief holds a significant amount of power and authority which can only 
be questioned in extreme scenarios when his failure is obvious. COAS, together with the 
consent of a few close aides, can reach critical decisions without involving the entire Army 
machinery or even the high command. Although the generals can resist the broader agenda of 
the Army chief and limit his ability in decision making on the overall national security policy, 
it is anticipated that they will face obstacles in influencing COAS to avoid specific initiatives 
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that he can promote in a short time and with a close circle of confidants. As a consequence, 
COAS and several senior officers in key positions (such as DG SPD, CGS, DGMO, DG MI, 
and DG ISI) can decide on a policy of nuclear assistance, and there is no official mechanism 
or informal organisational arrangement that can be used to block their intentions. 
Another shortcoming in the Army’s organisational culture (which contains wider 
consequences beyond the issue of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan) is the reluctance to 
learn from its failures. As far as it is known, the Army also avoided any thorough 
investigation into the circumstances which allowed the activity of AQ Khan’s nuclear 
proliferation network, although Pakistan’s official version about the network stated that it was 
an unauthorised private initiative. It seems that since the exposure of the proliferation network 
in January 2004 the Army has maintained the practices and structure of the control system 
over the nuclear organisations, thus, theoretically, enabling the possibility of nuclear export 
activity. On the other hand, if the proliferation network operated according to official 
instructions, then the conditions for the reoccurrence of that structural procedure would still 
be valid. 
♦♦♦ 
One of the major failures which was exposed in the military planning process, particularly 
during the 1971 War and the ‘Kargil Conflict’ in spring 1999, is the inadequate consideration 
of international circumstances and US foreign policy. The Army’s misperception of the 
international environment eventually hindered the successful outcome of military operations. 
Similarly, the Army might be inclined in its decision-making process to underestimate the 
international implications of another episode of nuclear export. 
A further possibility for malfunctions in the control system is the inefficiency in the Army’s 
routine control of the nuclear organisations and in preventing proliferation as a result of the 
private initiative of their personnel or officials and middle ranking officers. As evident, the 
Army finds it difficult to control entities which are connected to it, but are not an integral part 
of its apparatus, such as militant organisations based in Pakistan (see also Chapter Three). 
Moreover, there is a possibility for independent initiatives of lower ranks within the ISI which 
is part of the military, but is a separate directorate. In extreme situations, such as the 1971 
War, The Army central command lost control of several combat units which fought in East 
Pakistan. As a consequence, although the Army generally has proved to be a well disciplined 
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organisation, its strict supervision over the nuclear organisations might be partial, particularly 
when they serve its objective to empower Pakistan’s military strength: it seems that the 
Army’s senior command shows little interest in the internal affairs of the affiliated 
organisations as long as they serve the Army’s objectives.  
In addition to the Army, the intelligence community sustains a role in national security 
decision making far beyond the traditional position of intelligence and security agencies. The 
intelligence agencies, and particularly the ISI, are one of the most important pillars of military 
dominance in Pakistan and have overwhelming influence on the national security agenda. The 
intelligence apparatus has an inherent tendency to favour covert operation as the main tool for 
handling the country’s security challenges due to its strong affiliation to the covert operations 
in India and Afghanistan.  
The ISI’s intimate contacts and vested interests make the agency reluctant to maintain a 
proper balance between launching militant attacks in order to promote national interests and 
the international implications of these actions. Furthermore, the covert operations have 
positioned the ISI as a key player in any decision making on national security issues in light 
of its responsibility for the leverage Pakistan currently holds in the form of terror proxies 
against its arch-enemy, India; and in successfully guaranteeing a pro-Pakistani regime in 
Afghanistan. Hence, the ISI is unlikely to restrain its operations and give proper consideration 
to the diplomatic dimension of its activities. 
The influence of the ISI and other intelligence agencies on national decision making is also 
relevant to their role regarding control over the nuclear programmes. The above tendencies 
might be an indication for the ISI’s favourable approach towards nuclear proliferation which 
is usually a clandestine project designated to promote Pakistan’s strategic objectives and 
ignore the strict international norms which forbid direct assistance to foreign nuclear 
programmes. The ISI might even show leniency towards private initiative to offer nuclear 
assistance to countries and elements in the Muslim world in view of the long period of radical 
influence of the militant groups and their spiritual leaders through their connections with the 
agency. 
It seems that a reform to improve the control system over nuclear organisations should be 
closely linked to reforms in the defence establishment. In both cases assimilating the character 
of inter-agency cooperation is mandatory for sound decision making which takes a broader 
view on national security, as was intended in Bhutto’s unfulfilled reforms in the defence 
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establishment. In this regard, parallel to empowering inter-agency mechanisms for defence 
issues (namely JSHQ, JCSC and DCC), it is vital to strengthen the civilian flank of the 
defence establishment. 
 The Role of Pakistan’s Military in the Control System over Nuclear Programmes 
 
030 
 
Chapter Two: Glossary of Abbreviations 
AFI - Air Force Intelligence Directorate 
AG - Adjutant General Branch 
AHQ - Air Force Headquarters 
AQ Khan - Abdul Qadeer Khan 
ASFC - Army Strategic Forces Command 
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation  
C-in-C - Commander in Chief 
CAS - Chief of Air Force Staff 
CCC - Corps Commanders’ Conference 
CGS - Chief of General Staff 
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency 
CJCSC - Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
CLS - Chief of Logistic Staff 
CMLA - Chief Martial Law Administrator 
CNS - Chief of Navy Staff 
COAS - Chief of Army Staff 
CTJWG - Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group 
DCC - Cabinet Committee for Defence 
DDG (A) - Deputy Director General, Analysis and Foreign Relations Wing 
DDG (B) - Deputy Director General ‘B’ Wing 
DDG (C) - Deputy Director General, Counter-Intelligence/Internal Wing 
DDG (S) - Deputy Director General, Security/External Wing 
DG - Director General 
DG (CT) - Director General Counter-Terrorism 
DG (T) - Director General, Technical Wing 
DG ISI - Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence 
DG MI - Director General, Military Intelligence 
DG SPD - Director General, Strategic Plans Division 
DMS - Directorate of Medical Services 
FATA - Federal Administrative Tribal Areas 
FCNA - Force Command Northern Area 
FIA - Federal Investigation Agency 
FMC - Foreign Military Cooperation Directorate  
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GHQ - General Headquarters 
GOC - General Officer in Command 
GS - General Staff Branch 
HQ - Headquarters 
IB - Intelligence Bureau 
IGA - Inspector General Armament 
IGC&IT - Inspector General Communications and IT Branch 
IGT&E - Inspector General Training and Evaluation Branch 
IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IJI - Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 
IS Wing - Inter-Services Wing  
ISI - Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence 
ISPR - Inter-Services Public Relations 
ISSB - Inter-Services Selection Board 
JAG - Judge Advocate General Branch 
JCSC - Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
JI&IO - Joint Intelligence and Information Operations Directorate 
JSHQ - Joint Staff Headquarters 
JW&TRG - Joint Warfare and Training Directorate  
MES - Military Engineering Service 
MI - Military Intelligence Directorate 
MLA - Martial Law Administrator 
MO - Military Operations Directorate 
MOD -Ministry of Defence 
MODP - Ministry of Defence Production 
MOF - Ministry of Finance 
MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOI - Ministry of Interior 
MS - Military Secretary 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCA - National Command Authority 
NDU - National Defence University 
NI - Navy Intelligence 
NHQ - Navy Headquarters 
NWFP - North West Frontier Province 
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OP&PL - Operations and Plans Directorate 
PAF - Pakistan Air Force 
PILDAT - Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 
PM - Prime Ministry 
PML - Pakistan Muslim League 
PML (N) - Pakistan Muslim League (of Nawaz Sharif) 
PN - Pakistan Navy 
PSO - Principal Staff Officer  
QMG - Quarter Master General 
R&D - Research and Development 
RUSI - Royal United Services Institute 
SAAG - South Asia Analysis Group 
SD - Starr Duties Directorate 
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SPD - Strategic Plans Division 
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 Chapter Three: The Strategic Thinking of Pakistan’s Military and 
the Element of Using Proxies as the Framework for Connections with 
Terror Organisations and the Nuclear Proliferation Network. 
1. Introduction 
After discussing, in Chapter Two, the main elements in the nature of Pakistan’s military and 
how they influenced the operation of the control system over the nuclear organisations this 
chapter will examine the second factor which encouraged nuclear proliferation from Pakistan: 
military strategic thinking and the extent of the integration of the notion of nuclear assistance 
in this conceptual framework. The emphasis of the analysis will be on the principle of using 
proxies which seems to be part of the military strategic thinking on both nuclear proliferation 
and terror sponsorship and they are also the main methods of the military in promoting its 
interpretation of national security objectives. 
The accounts of AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network are a litmus test for evaluating the 
efficiency, capability and will of Pakistan’s control system over the nuclear organisations to 
prevent the incidence of nuclear export. The network operated, between 1987 and 2003, as an 
export venture involving nuclear technologies and related equipment. The network was 
originally created as an import network to answer the needs of Pakistan’s nuclear programme 
at least in the 1970’s and in the first half of the 1980’s.  
As elaborated in Chapter One and in the Introduction of this thesis, Pakistan officially denied 
any complicity in the nuclear exports executed by the proliferation network. Soon after the 
exposure of the network through which Libya’s nuclear ambitions were realised and the 
revelations of the network assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme, the military regime in 
Islamabad quickly dismantled the network and neutralised the network’s main operators, and 
its head, the former DG KRL, AQ Khan. Pakistani spokesmen and scholars argued that AQ 
Khan operated without government authorisation and enjoyed a free hand in developing the 
nuclear programme under his responsibility (the uranium enrichment programme). It has been 
emphasised that most of AQ Khan’s partners in the proliferation network were non-Pakistanis 
and thus the responsibility for the nuclear proliferation should be shared by several countries, 
including western countries.  
Even when concurring with Pakistan’s explanations about the proliferation network as a 
private venture without the knowledge or approval of Pakistan’s authorities, one should still 
question the efficiency of Pakistan’s control mechanism over the nuclear organisations due to 
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its poor performance in preventing nuclear proliferation from the country. Hence, it is vital to 
evaluate AQ Khan’s network as a phenomenon that might be only an inductive expression of 
a systematic malfunction in Pakistan’s control over its most sensitive assets. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the nature and objectives of AQ Khan’s network have strong 
similarities to the operations of other non-state players which seem to serve Pakistan’s 
essential interests: militant organisations which operate to undermine India’s control of 
Kashmir and to promote the objective of an Afghanistan controlled by Pakistan’s allied 
militants after the military withdrawal of US and NATO forces. AQ Khan’s proliferation 
network appears to directly promote Pakistan’s interests too as manifested by consecutive 
heads of state (Prime Minister Zolfikar Ali Bhutto and martial ruler General Zia ul-Haq) and 
by one Army chief (General Mirza Aslam Beg): gaining financial revenues, acquiring 
valuable technologies for developing the nuclear weapons programme, strengthening 
Pakistan’s connections with Muslim countries, and creating a leverage in order to pressurise 
the US to maintain military and economic assistance (see Chapter One). 
♦♦♦ 
Moreover, if it is possible to portray a similar rationale of using non-state actors as proxies of 
Pakistan’s national security agenda for both nuclear exports and the militant attacks in 
India/Kashmir and Afghanistan, it will contribute additional support to the argument of this 
thesis (and of most scholars) that Pakistan’s nuclear exports were either sanctioned or with the 
awareness of Pakistan’s control system. Hence, the reinforcement of the above assumption 
that the military is responsible for the occurrence of nuclear proliferation suggests that its 
current character could again lead to nuclear exports. 
♦♦♦ 
This chapter will aim to examine the relations between the concept of nuclear assistance and 
the military’s strategic thinking by examining the element of using proxies in this intangible 
framework. It should be noted that this chapter will concentrate on proposing an analysis for 
the military connection with terror organisations. A scrutiny of these relations deserves a 
much broader analysis which is beyond the scope of this thesis. At the beginning, the strategic 
thinking of the military will be presented and will demonstrate how well-rooted the use of 
proxies is in Pakistan’s historical experience. Next, the organisational arrangements for 
directing both the proliferation network and the militant groups will be illustrated and finally 
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the discussion will deal with the similarities and differences between the two operations of the 
non-state participants.               
2. Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Significance of Proxies 
The notion of promoting strategic objectives through third parties or proxies is incorporated in 
Pakistan’s national security thinking. Pakistan’s agenda was heavily influenced by the 
military and particularly by the Army which is the most dominant organisation in Pakistan’s 
defence establishment (see Chapter Two). Furthermore, for significant periods the Army had 
direct control over the country through martial rule. The Army itself had to rely heavily on 
security agencies (such as the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence - ISI) to maintain its 
interests in the internal arena and these agencies in turn contributed to the Army’s perceptions 
of the country’s strategic situation. In practice, Pakistan’s national security thinking was 
developed and conceived in the military’s various HQs and academic institutions, rather than 
in MOD or in any other civilian agency.  
As a result, the strategic framework is concentrated in a limited military orientated 
perspective and less on a broader approach regarding Pakistan’s regional and global position 
and focus on the opportunities and threats which derive from its overall status. The 
considerations for ‘soft power’ such as diplomatic and economic leverages are on the 
sidelines of the consensual approach of promoting Pakistan’s national security through 
evident force and violent means. It would be inaccurate to assert that Pakistan is not an active 
player in diplomatic arenas (and in some forums even very active) when promoting its 
agenda, or tactfully adjusting its contacts with its neighbouring countries (mainly India and 
Afghanistan). However, Pakistan’s defence establishment (which determines both defence 
and foreign policies) has a strong inclination towards projecting power via aggressive means, 
such as military force and intelligence operations. 
The ‘proxy approach’ of Pakistan is fundamental in its national security thinking in light of its 
strategic environment. According to Pakistan’s comprehensive defence policy, its main 
adversary has been India since the bitter partition of the two countries in August 1947 which 
caused large-scale inter-community violence between Muslims and Hindus and millions of 
refugees who were exchanged by both countries in the biggest population swap of all time. 
Furthermore, Pakistan’s abrupt independence process within a short period and the fact that 
its two sections were on opposite sides of the Indian sub-continent created various 
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complications for the newborn state which lacked any proper institutions and bureaucracy. 
Pakistan’s creation in a delicate situation led India’s prominent political figures to question its 
ability to survive as a unified sovereign entity. In turn, pessimistic Indian assessments had 
ignited Pakistan’s concerns about India’s aspirations to annex Pakistan into the Indian 
federation
329
. 
Pakistan also received a small portion of the mutual resources of British-India while most of 
the finances, production lines and military means were seized by India
330
. In addition, in 
1948, a few months following the partition, both countries clashed over the control of the 
Kashmir region, and this conflict has remained unresolved. 
Moreover, India threatens the very core of Pakistan’s legitimacy by representing an opposite 
model for self-determination: Pakistan officially presents itself as the national homeland for 
Muslims in South Asia while India is a secular state which encourages the assimilation of 
Muslims in its society and in its civil service and political system. Pakistan’s position was 
weakened following the 1971 War when it lost its eastern region (Bangladesh), and thus its 
identity as representing the majority of Muslims in South Asia. Currently, around a third of 
the Muslims in South Asia reside in Pakistan while most of them remained in India or became 
citizens of Bangladesh. 
♦♦♦ 
The above historical circumstances led to Pakistan’s designation of India as its main foe 
which must be confronted. Pakistan aspires for equilibrium with India in the power balance, 
with an emphasis on military strength, so Pakistan would be able to promote its interests in 
South Asia without India’s supremacy which has overshadowed Pakistan’s international and 
regional position. From this perspective Pakistan shaped its entire national security thinking: 
the need for an alliance with a superpower (usually the US) in order to create a balance with 
India, the aspiration for ‘strategic depth’ and control of Afghanistan, and intimate contacts 
with China following the latter’s enmity towards India, and the Sino-Indian military conflict 
of 1962.  
♦♦♦ 
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An equal position to India would enable Pakistan to promote its agenda for Kashmir and 
would allow it to consider various military options in order to take hold of that region. 
Elements in the senior command of Pakistan’s military might even aspire to change the entire 
power balance with India by separating India into different parts according to ethnic and 
religious affiliations. Moreover, Pakistan’s political and military leadership has always 
aspired to a central role for Pakistan among Muslim countries and in international and 
regional arenas: in light of Pakistan’s designation as a homeland for Muslims it pursued a 
leading position within the Islamic civilisation as a tower of Islamic thought and culture 
which could influence the entire Muslim Ummah.  
However, Pakistan has been powerless to enforce its interests on India as a result of the 
latter’s superior position in South Asia. The military balance has always been in India’s 
favour having the resources to become a potential regional power in Asia and even a major 
power in the international community. Pakistan attempted, in 1948 and in 1965, to use 
conventional force in order to occupy the Indian part of Kashmir, but failed despite taking the 
initiative and by exploiting the element of surprise. In the ‘Kargil Operation’ of spring 1999 
Pakistan failed even when it downgraded the scope of the military operation and its 
objectives: Pakistan strove for a limited territorial achievement in Kashmir which would 
strengthen its position vis-a-vis India. The operation was meant to force India into negotiating 
on the future of the region from a weaker position. 
♦♦♦ 
Failure when using conventional force led Pakistan to decide to turn to asymmetric means 
which would neutralise India’s conventional supremacy which is by all accounts continuing to 
increase. One obvious asymmetric means has been Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear capability 
since the beginning of the 1970’s as a response to India’s nuclear programme development 
and its nuclear test in May 1974, and to the catastrophic outcome of the Indo-Pakistani war of 
1971. Not only did Pakistan fail in two previous wars (in 1947-1948 and 1965) to force India 
to negotiate on a political settlement for the Kashmir conflict, but following the 1971 war it 
was severely weakened and this considerably diminished the prospect of coercing India on the 
Kashmir issue. As a result, following the 1971 war Pakistan’s strategic objective was to 
develop nuclear capability which would neutralise India’s conventional military supremacy. 
In a similar way to the perception of using militant organisations to promote Pakistan’s 
agenda in Kashmir and in Afghanistan, there is a strong possibility that the Pakistan Army 
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assimilated the operation of nuclear entities in its strategic thinking. If indeed nuclear 
assistance was sanctioned by the military (as discussed in Chapter One), the assistance derives 
from Pakistan’s national security objectives. The nuclear export project was firmly connected 
to the perception by Pakistan’s defence establishment of India as Pakistan’s archenemy and 
the objective of this establishment was to achieve strategic parity with India. Following 
Pakistan’s successful campaign to acquire nuclear capability as a means to counter-balance 
nuclear India and its conventional military superiority it appears that Pakistan aspired to 
utilise its new capabilities in other ways in order to narrow the power gap with India. 
First, Pakistan’s nuclear expertise and components were offered for sale in order to fund its 
development of nuclear and missile programmes and to launch extensive militant attacks in 
Indian-held Kashmir. Second, Pakistan essentially contacted Muslim countries in order to 
help them develop their indigenous nuclear capabilities in return for backup from its fellow 
Muslim countries in its struggle against India. This reasoning was foremost in Pakistan’s 
nuclear assistance to Iran, considered as potential strategic depth in the scenario of a full 
military conflict with India
331
.  
Third, nuclear proliferation appears to be use to strengthen Pakistan’s leverage of the US in 
order to preserve American military and economic assistance to Islamabad and to prevent 
Pakistan’s international isolation. US support was one of the main pillars in Pakistan’s 
strategic thinking regarding the prime objective of modifying the strategic balance with 
India
332
. By allegedly initiating the nuclear export project Pakistan’s defence establishment 
aspired to signal its potential to jeopardise the international norm of nuclear non-proliferation 
and US interests, not only in South Asia but in other regions too such as the Middle East and 
East Asia. A limited assistance also increases the possibilities for future support and for more 
financial revenues. As a result, Pakistan probably avoided delivering complete capabilities 
(i.e., nuclear device/warhead or fissile material).  
Fourth, in the specific cases of China and North Korea nuclear assistance was offered in 
return for a desired military capability which immensely improved immensely Pakistan’s 
deterrence against India: Pakistan received long-range missile systems (capable of carrying 
                                                 
331
 Asma Shakir Khawaja, Pakistan and the ‘New Great Game’ (Islamabad Policy Research Institute, April 
2003). <http://ipripak.org/papers/pakandnewgame.shtml> Accessed on February 29
th
 2012; Christine Fair, 
Indo-Iranian Ties: Thicker than Oil, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11:1 (March 2007), pp. 42, 
44.  
332 Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, pp. 30-36.  
Chapter Three 
041 
 
nuclear warheads) from North Korea and critical nuclear assistance from China in the early 
and critical stages of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.               
♦♦♦ 
The nuclear capability, which became operational as late as the mid 1980’s, was quickly used 
as an umbrella for another kind of asymmetric war against India’s presence in Kashmir: 
insurrectionary attacks against India’s security forces and public installations parallel to 
agitation among the Muslim inhabitants who constitute the majority in the province. The 
excellent results of the militant forces in Afghanistan in the 1980’s against the Soviet 
occupation and their successful campaign (with external support including that of Pakistan) 
led Pakistan’s military high command to decide on the use of the same methods and launch a 
guerrilla war against India’s forces and sovereign presence in Kashmir: militant organisations 
were created and used their bases in Pakistan to infiltrate into Kashmir and to fight against 
India’s security forces throughout the 1990’s333.  
Although India threatened to launch a military campaign against Pakistan in light of its 
massive assistance to the militants (the tension between the two countries almost caused an 
armed conflict in the summer of 1990) Pakistan’s nuclear capability successfully deterred 
India from initiating a full scale war: a wide military conflict might provoke Pakistan into 
threatening a nuclear attack if its decision makers feared that the country’s existence was at 
risk, and in light of its Army’s inferiority vis-a-vis India’s armed forces. Furthermore, unlike 
the rounds of skirmish between the two countries until the end of the 1980’s, due to the 
nuclear dimension of any potential military conflict between the countries the international 
community hastily made efforts to ease the tension and indirectly served Pakistan’s objective 
by emasculating India’s military option. However, the attacks in Kashmir by militant groups 
did not brought the expected change in India’s position or diplomatic gains for Pakistan’s 
cause. 
As a result, under its nuclear umbrella and what was perceived in Pakistan as India’s lack of 
military option to retaliate, the Army launched the ‘Kargil Operation’ in 1999 after Pakistan 
declared itself a nuclear state and conducted its first nuclear tests in May 1998. As part of this 
operation, the Pakistan Army sent regular forces (and not militant groups) into Indian-
controlled Kashmir in order to achieve tactical gains which would pose a strategic threat to 
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India’s hold on Kashmir. However, this time Pakistan faced international pressure, especially 
from the US, and was forced to withdraw its army units to their former positions. 
The failure of the ‘Kargil Operation’ led to the expansion of the operational framework of 
militant attacks and included targets in India, beyond Kashmir. Two of the most distinctive 
terror attacks took place in the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001 and the 
Mumbai terror attack of November 2008 (‘26/11’)334. However, the hardened international 
perspective on terrorism as a result of the 9/11 terror attacks added constraints to Pakistan’s 
ability to use militant operations as a leverage on India. Launching terror attacks only 
increased the international criticism of Pakistan and the sympathy in western countries 
towards India. As mentioned, the current international restrictions on Pakistan also apply to 
initiating a limited military operation due to the nuclear dimension which would follow; while 
a full scale military conflict with India would be too risky due to Pakistan’s military 
inferiority. It seems that for now Pakistan is in a deadlock and incapable of forcing India by 
the use of its asymmetric means to succumb to Pakistan’s conditions for a solution to the 
conflict, not to mention the failure of the same means to narrow the power balance between 
the two countries. 
Nevertheless, as exemplified above, the use of proxies was part of exploiting asymmetric 
means in the conflict with India both in nuclear proliferation and terror sponsorship. In light 
of the inferior position of Pakistan in the power imbalance with India, which is expected to 
persist in the foreseeable future, the tendency of Pakistan’s military to preserve the principle 
of using proxies for promoting its national agenda in all likelihood will continue. 
3. The Notion of Proxies in Pakistan’s Historical Experience 
The perception of promoting the primary objectives of national security through proxies is 
deeply rooted in Pakistan’s asymmetric efforts to challenge India both on the nuclear and 
terror fronts. Pakistan relied on third parties almost immediately after its independence: 
during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1947-1948 Pakistan was still chaotic following the labour 
pains of its creation: the armed forces were under the command of British officers who 
refused to allow the military to invade into Kashmir. As a result, Pakistan was assisted by 
Pashtu tribal warriors (called ‘Lashkars’) in its military campaign to capture the entire 
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Kashmir region. These irregular forces were instructed by Pakistan Army officers and were 
the leading forces in the conflict
335
 . 
During the military regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958 - 1969) the idea of relying on 
proxies became an integral part of Pakistan’s national security. In this regard, according to a 
policy paper of a governmental think-tank from the time of Ayub’s regime, Pakistan should 
look beyond its alliance with the US when calculating its defence requirement and cultivate 
the option of irregular warfare
336
. Prior to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 trained insurgents 
were used as infiltrators into the Indian-part of Kashmir. Their objective was to ignite a 
popular uprising against India’s control in the province and recruit the population to support 
the Pakistani invaders. However, the Kashmiris were reluctant to join Pakistan’s effort, and 
Pakistan’s ‘Operation Gibraltar’ of August 1965 failed337.  
In the crisis of 1971, which broke out following the results of the general elections of 
December 1970 and ended in the formation of Bangladesh in East Pakistan, the Army decided 
to rely on irregular forces in order to suppress the Bengali agitation. As a result, the Army 
decided to raise a volunteer force of tens of thousands of non-Bengali civilians settled in East 
Pakistan. Furthermore, religious parties received, from the Army, a role in East Pakistan and 
joined efforts with the security forces. Members of these parties formed peace committees 
throughout East Pakistan and functioned as the intelligence network of the Pakistan Army
338
. 
The religious parties were also called to assist in forming two paramilitary counterinsurgency 
units and by September 1971 a force of fifty thousand volunteers had been raised: one for 
specialised operations and one for the protection of installations and vital points. The Army 
created a designated directorate for controlling the volunteer units
339
. 
The most successful outcome of Pakistan’s instrumental approach to proxies was its 
assistance to the Mujahedin who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet presence (1979 - 
1989). Pakistan’s covert operation in Afghanistan began in the 1960’s, before the Soviet 
occupation, in order to prevent the creation of an Afghan regime friendly towards India and 
Russia, and Pakistan concentrated on allying factions in Afghan politics
340
. As part of the 
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resistance campaign against the Soviets, tens of thousands of militants were trained and armed 
in Pakistan, most of whom were Afghan refugees who had fled to Pakistan. Pakistan also 
provided the territory to construct the Mujahedin camps from which they could launch attacks 
against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The achievement of the Mujahedin to drive the 
Soviets out of Afghanistan convinced Pakistan that a similar strategy against India in Kashmir 
had the potential to succeed too.  
In the late 1980’s, several militant organisations were formed and set up training camps and 
operational bases in Pakistan-held Kashmir (‘Azad Kashmir’) and began their operation in 
1989 in the Indian-held part of Kashmir. As mentioned earlier, after a decade of concentrated 
attacks on India’s security forces and government installations in Kashmir, in the late 1990’s 
the militant organisations extended their scope of activities into the heartland of India. In 
Afghanistan, Pakistan’s defence establishment supported the Taliban as a proxy and assisted 
it in gaining control over most of the country until 2001. Following the 9/11 terror attacks 
Pakistan was forced to abandon, under heavy American pressure, its alliance with the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. However, subsequent to the US military operation ‘Enduring 
Freedom’ in October 2001 to eliminate the Taliban regime, Pakistan began to cultivate 
militant organisations that might be part of a future regime after the US/NATO military 
presence in Afghanistan ends. As a result, Pakistan helped the Taliban to recover its 
capabilities within Pakistan’s territory in order to use it as a key element in the future regime 
in Kabul. Furthermore, Pakistan assists militant groups in destabilising the current Afghan 
regime which is not committed to Pakistan’s interests. This assistance also enabled the 
militants to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan in light of their role as the main force behind 
the existence of the current regime in Kabul, and because the western forces are perceived by 
the militants as occupiers
341
. 
Similar to the Army’s utilisation of terror organisations, in order to promote its objective to 
acquire military capabilities the Army used Pakistan’s nuclear entities as proxies for the 
development of nuclear capabilities and as it appear for providing nuclear assistance to 
foreign countries. Following the initial decision of the nation’s political and scientific 
leadership to pursue the route of nuclear weapons development in January 1972 (known as the 
‘Multan Conference’) Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) established a 
                                                 
341 For example, see: Elizabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, Pakistan Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on US 
Embassy, New York Times (September 22
nd
 2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-
asserts-pakistani-role-in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?ref=asia&pagewanted=all> Accessed on September 23
rd
 
2011. 
Chapter Three 
044 
 
proliferation network for the clandestine import of nuclear materials and technologies. Later, 
in 1976, the new nuclear agency for developing the nuclear programme of uranium 
enrichment, the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL, known later as Khan’s Research 
Laboratories - KRL), established a proliferation network for its own requirements. These 
kinds of networks for nuclear purchases were quite common among all states which aspired to 
develop nuclear capabilities.  
In Pakistan’s case, the notion of using a proxy for promoting national security objectives in 
the nuclear sphere was further advanced. The necessity for a nuclear network served the 
policy decision of Pakistan’s defence establishment to develop its nuclear import network as a 
venture: Pakistan’s military used the nuclear network as its proxy in its presumed strategic 
decision to assist other countries in acquiring nuclear weapons. The Pakistan Army granted 
the head of ERL/KRL, Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan), the responsibility for the network in 
light of his vast successful experience in operating the network for acquisition of materials 
and equipment for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. AQ Khan argued that the network 
delivered or offered nuclear assistance to countries which were considered by the Pakistan 
Army as the most suitable ‘customers’ based on the parameters presented earlier342. 
It should be noted that apart from enlisting terror organisations and nuclear entities into the 
service of Pakistan’s national security agenda, the Army and intelligence community also 
used a similar approach with Pakistan’s political system. The defence establishment’s main 
proxies over the years have been the religious parties. According to Shuja Nawaz, the 
relations between the army/intelligence agencies and the religious parties can be characterised 
as “principle-client relations”343. Due to the Islamic parties’ inherent conservatism regarding 
Pakistan’s national needs, their hostility towards India and their connections with radical 
Islamic militants, they became the Army’s preferred choice as allies in the political system. 
Furthermore, the religious parties increasingly expanded the number of their followers and 
sympathisers within the ranks of the armed forces and security agencies, mainly the ISI
344
. 
In light of their usually marginal power in the National Assembly (Pakistan’s lower house of 
parliament), religious parties were used by the Army in order to create a constant political 
threat to the government’s stability mainly through their organisational talent for recruiting 
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their supporters for mass protests and demonstrations. Pakistan’s religious parties and their 
connections with the Army warrant a separate discussion, but it can be determined that the 
Army relied on these parties and occasionally provided them with resources for public 
campaigns during and between general elections. During the martial rule of COAS General 
Zia ul-Haq, who had a stronger religious bent than most of his fellow generals, the Islamic 
parties and their clerics enjoyed greater influence in public administration and direct access to 
Zia himself and other heads of the military regime
345
. 
The Pakistan Army did not hesitate to use religious parties in order to limit the political 
support of the civilian leadership which had an agenda independent of the defence 
establishment. In this connection, Pakistan’s military used Islamic parties to weaken the 
political power of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
346
. Later, following the ISI influence on 
Bhutto to schedule general elections for March 1977 and the ensuing political crisis, the ISI 
encouraged the Islamic parties, which were Bhutto’s main political opposition, to destabilise 
the country and to set the conditions for another coup and martial regime
347. Bhutto’s 
daughter, Benazir Bhutto, was also considered a threat by the defence establishment. Bhutto 
was confronted too in the general elections of November 1988 by a religious party as a rival, 
the IJI, which received funds and support from the Army and intelligence services. Following 
the elections and Bhutto’s successful attempt to form a government IJI remained the most 
vocal opposition to her rule and after her overthrow by the President one of IJI prominent 
leaders, Nawaz Sharif, became Prime Minister
348
. 
Besides their role in the political system, the Islamic parties also participated in executing the 
Army’s agenda. The first Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) Field-Marshal Ayub 
Khan cooperated with the religious parties in order to use their contacts in Arab countries to 
guarantee their backing of Pakistan’s position on Kashmir349. In the internal crisis of 1971 
with East Pakistan the Islamic parties assumed responsibility for recruiting support for the 
military regime’s position against the political aspirations of the Bengalis in the country’s 
eastern section. The religious parties formed a social network in East Pakistan which was in 
aid of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus350. Furthermore, the religious parties formed a 
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volunteer force to support the army’s operations in East Pakistan351. In 1993, General 
Musharraf as the Army’s senior officer responsible for operations and plans (and later the 
Army chief) also approached the Islamic parties for volunteers for his ‘Kashmir Operation’ 
plan
352
. 
4. The Nature of Pakistan’s System of Using Proxies for Nuclear Proliferation 
and Militant Insurgency 
As discussed in the previous section, the idea of using proxies in order to promote national 
objectives is deeply inherent in Pakistan’s strategic thinking and historical experience. This 
section of the chapter will be devoted for illustrating how Pakistan has managed to operate its 
proxies as militant organisations and nuclear networks. The main focus of this section will be 
on the similar character of Pakistan’s approach to the different proxies and how it can explain 
the paradigm of Pakistan’s military involvement in nuclear exports. 
4.1. Pakistan’s Control over Nuclear Proliferation and Terror Networks: The 
Organisational Dimension  
The type of proxies in the service of Pakistan’s military agenda could be presented as a loose 
confederation of private companies and businessmen (in the case of the nuclear proliferation 
network) or as a flexible conglomerate of armed groups which were recruited to achieve 
Pakistan’s national security objectives. The clandestine nature of the nuclear and terror 
networks and their informal status influenced the nature of the state’s control mechanism: 
Pakistan’s defence establishment (mainly the Army and the ISI) avoided direct control over 
the operational side of these networks and provided them with a substantial degree of 
independence as long as they achieved the desired results. It could be said that the defence 
establishment was constantly aware of the activity of its nuclear and terror proxies. 
Nevertheless, it seems that this establishment could have been in the dark about specific 
nuclear shipments or terror attacks which might have occurred as a result of the self-interest 
of the proxies or out of inertia with their operation which was sanctioned by the state. 
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4.1.1. The Organisational Arrangements for Controlling the Nuclear Proliferation Network  
The organisational arrangement of the control mechanisms over the different nuclear proxies 
reaffirms the above assumption. The nuclear proliferation network was conducted from two 
main centres:  
1) KRL complex in Kahuta, Pakistan. ERL/KRL was directed between 1975 and March 
2001 by DG KRL, AQ Khan, and this nuclear agency was the main source of nuclear 
equipment which was transferred to foreign countries. AQ Khan was personally in charge 
of the proliferation network and was assisted by KRL’s cadre of senior officials and 
scientists. 
2) The city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The proliferation network 
orchestrated, from Dubai, the transfer of shipments whose origins were usually outside 
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Pakistan. Following AQ Khan’s removal from KRL in March 2001, Dubai was designated 
as the main hub of the proliferation network
353
. 
From these two centres, the nuclear proliferation network contacted and operated around 
thirty companies in a wide geographical spread: from Switzerland to South Africa, Turkey 
and Malaysia
354
.    
As far as it is known, there was no involvement in the proliferation network by officials from 
other nuclear organisations. KRL and AQ Khan coordinated the activity of the proliferation 
network without any involvement from other nuclear organisations, like Pakistan’s Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC). KRL subordinate to the Army and to a designated directorate in 
the Army’s headquarters (GHQ), the Combat Development Directorate (CDD), which was 
established in 1993. Since 1999 KRL has been supervised by CDD’s successor, the Strategic 
Plans Division (SPD) which operates from the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) but reports 
directly to the Army chief
355
. 
Furthermore, the ISI too, through its Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous section (JIM, probably 
integrated in ISI’s ‘S Wing’) and its agents in Pakistan’s diplomatic missions was involved in 
assisting the network with the acquisition of items and equipment for Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons programme. The ISI was responsible for guaranteeing the safety of Pakistani 
officials and scientists who were part of the nuclear proliferation network
356
. 
It seems that AQ Khan personally and his close associates were the focal point and main 
interlink between Pakistan’s defence establishment and private companies and middlemen 
who were part of the network. Apparently, AQ Khan was perceived by the establishment as 
an expert in locating the necessary equipment and technologies for the nuclear proliferation 
project. This image of Khan was based on his successful efforts to obtain and import the 
necessary items for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, particularly during the 1970’s 
and 1980’s. Furthermore, AQ Khan had a list of potential suppliers in Europe, Asia, and 
North America which turned out to be very useful for importing related equipment for 
Pakistan’s nuclear programmes.  
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As a consequence, AQ Khan enjoyed a free hand in dealing with the private section of his 
proliferation network and was assisted by his aides who served as the network’s middlemen in 
its contacts with private companies. Most of these middlemen already worked in the service 
of AQ Khan and KRL during the 1970’s and 1980’s to purchase equipment and technologies 
for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. They were responsible for exploiting loopholes in 
the export control systems of foreign countries and approaching private companies for 
purchasing dual-use items. When the nuclear proliferation network expanded its operational 
framework, beyond importing components for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, and exported  
materials and technologies for the benefit of nuclear weapons programmes in foreign 
countries, the expertise and experience of the network’s middlemen were valuable for the 
success of the nuclear proliferation project. 
Among the operators of the proliferation network was AQ Khan’s financial adviser, BSA 
Tahir, as head of SMB group which operated from Dubai. Tahir was involved in providing 
Iran with centrifuge designs and components for its uranium enrichment programme, and 
contacted a Malaysian company, Scomi, to manufacture specific centrifuge parts for Libya’s 
nuclear weapons programme. Another middleman was Gerhard Wisser who arranged, through 
his interlocutors in South Africa, the construction of a complex steel system to feed and 
withdraw uranium hexafluoride from centrifuge cascades
357
. The loose organisation of the 
proliferation network and its layers of operation were intentionally used to conceal from 
significant numbers of apparently innocent companies the final destination of the dual-use 
equipment and its end use in nuclear weapons programmes. 
4.1.2. The Organisational Arrangements for Controlling Militant Groups 
Regarding control over Pakistan’s militant proxies it was more complex than that in the 
nuclear spectrum. There were several armed groups operating in Afghanistan and against 
India which were reluctant to be subordinate to one authority among the militants. Thus, a 
warlord equivalent to AQ Khan in the nuclear spectrum was not available to coordinate the 
militancy campaigns. The prominent Pakistani-based militant organisations which fought 
against India in Kashmir were Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujahideen, and 
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. The militant organisations varied in their ethnic and religious 
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orientation, in their affiliation to one of the religious centres and to Pakistan’s Islamic 
political parties
358
.  
This situation was encouraged by the ISI which aspired for manoeuvring space between the 
different armed groups and to contain them with ‘divide and rule’ tactics359. Apart from 
Pakistani-led militant organisations, there were also indigenous Kashmiri armed groups which 
Pakistan usually marginalised and occasionally suppressed in light of their agenda for the full 
independence of Kashmir (and not as a part of Pakistan). As a consequence, the ISI preferred 
to send militants who had battled against the Soviets in Afghanistan and were recruited from 
around the world to fight in Kashmir in the late 1980’s360. Some of the armed organisations 
which have fought against India have also been involved in attacks against the US and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan since Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001
361
. 
There were other militant organisations which were involved solely in Afghanistan. During 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s the ISI supported Mujahedin groups which 
were based in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. These militant organisations recruited 
Afghan refugees, ethnic Pashtuns in Pakistan and Muslim fighters who joined the struggle as 
a result of their radical ideology. Pakistan’s religious parties like Jamaat e-Islami (JI) and 
Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI) aided the ISI and created several Mujahedin groups
362
. One 
prominent militant organisation, Hezb e-Islami, was the ISI’s most favoured armed group and 
its leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had already received the ISI’s assistance in the 1970’s. In 
the post-Soviet era of Afghanistan the ISI invested significant efforts to help Hezb e-Islami to 
seize control of Afghanistan but in vain
363
.  
In the early 1990’s, Pakistan shifted its support to the Taliban movement which began as a 
social movement and had already established itself in Afghan society and managed to control 
most of the country until 2001. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban was withdrawn for a short 
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period following the 9/11 terror attacks and Pakistan’s role in the US military operation in 
Afghanistan. However, after a short lull of a few years, the ISI re-embraced the Taliban as 
Pakistan’s contender for power in Afghanistan following NATO withdrawal from the country. 
As a result, immediately after operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ the ISI helped the Taliban to 
reorganise in Pakistan’s tribal areas next to the Afghan border and to continue assaulting the 
forces of the US-led military coalition. In this regard, the ISI spread its protection over the 
Taliban’s leadership, known as the ‘Shura Council’, and has allowed this group to settle in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas (FATA) and in urban areas of Karachi and Peshawar364. 
The ISI is the designated agency responsible for clandestine warfare including orchestrating 
militant operations. As a result, through its Joint Intelligence North (JIN), and later the ‘S 
Wing’, the ISI coordinated the operations of the militant organisations and was responsible 
for providing them with training infrastructure and delivering funds and weaponry
365
. 
Occasionally, the ISI camouflaged its patronage of terror organisations and employed retired 
military officers as instructors for militants in their bases
366
. 
The lack of a unified command and control apparatus over the militants obliged the ISI to deal 
separately with each militant organisation in order to promote Pakistan’s national security 
interests. The ISI failed to create an acceptable authority among the different militant 
organisations even on a short term basis. Moreover, the ISI has been forced to deal with the 
tendency of militant networked groups to be dispersed and with flat hierarchy, although 
different strands of each militant group can communicate and coordinate their campaigns to 
some degree. In addition, individual armed groups may be hierarchically structured, but there 
is little or no overall command across the militant network
367
. 
The ISI’s links to militant groups were usually established when the armed organisation was 
created by the intelligence agency and hence owed its allegiance to the ISI. As a result, 
according to changes in circumstances, not always directly related to the militant group and 
its performance, the ISI could change the location of the militant organisation and the 
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financial assistance it received
368
. Furthermore, the ISI constructed an administrative 
mechanism for channelling funds, weaponry and logistics to its terror proxies
369
. In some 
instances, the ISI has also been involved in the recruitment stage of new fighters
370
. 
Regarding the major militant organisations which fought against the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan in the 1980’s and their power base was in Afghanistan, they held offices in the 
Baluchistan provincial capital, Quetta, and liaised with the ISI’s support mechanism. This 
system allocated resources for each militant group according to its operational effectiveness 
and its pro-Pakistani agenda. For important operations, the ISI tended to send supplies 
directly to field commanders in Afghanistan
371
. 
The planning of the overall militant operations was usually conducted in the Army’s HQ 
(GHQ) as part of comprehensive military planning regarding the military efforts to force India 
to release its grip on Kashmir and to elevate, in Afghanistan, an allied regime which would 
specifically prevent any Indian foothold on Pakistan’s Afghan border. As a result, the Military 
Operation Directorate and its director general (DGMO) were deeply involved in military 
plans which included the use of militants as proxies. The Army’s and specifically DGMO’s 
involvement were more apparent when militant organisations were used as an auxiliary force 
to the main military campaign
372
. Furthermore, during the militant struggle against the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan, army officers occasionally accompanied the Mujahedeen on their 
missions, mainly to instruct them on the proper use of their weapons systems which were 
supplied to them
373
. 
♦♦♦ 
As evident from the control mechanisms over both kinds of proxies - in the nuclear and terror 
spectrums the nature of the control mechanisms was quite limited in connection areas and 
with no direct involvement of the national leadership or the military high command. In both 
cases, there was a designated agency responsible for the operational framework: CDD/SPD 
regarding nuclear proliferation, and the ISI regarding irregular warfare and terror attacks (the 
ISI was also a secondary player in the nuclear issue). Both heads of the ISI and CDD/SPD 
reported directly to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), but usually there was no direct 
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connection between COAS or other Army generals and the proxies: militant organisations and 
KRL’s (headed by AQ Khan) private business partners.  
♦♦♦ 
In the periods of civilian governments they did not have control over all the proxies and their 
instrumental role in empowering Pakistan’s national security was shaped and dictated by the 
military, and the government has been powerless to alter this policy
374
. Mainly military rulers 
have attempted to ‘manage’ militant Islam, trying to exploit it so that it would serve its 
nation-building function
375
. At best, the civilian national leadership was approached by the 
military for the authorisation of specific operational planning which involved militant 
proxies
376
. 
4.2. The Differences between the Nuclear Network and Terror Organisations as 
Proxies  
Naturally, there are significant differences in the operation methods of militant groups and the 
nuclear proliferation network and there are different repercussions as a result of these 
distinctions for Pakistan’s contact and relations with the dissimilar proxies. Apart from the 
obvious contrast from the perspective of the state apparatus (between the characteristics of 
armed organisations and a proliferation network, based on scientists and businessmen), the 
most noteworthy difference is in the control mechanisms. As mentioned before, In the matter 
of militant organisations there is a need to control several entities. Regarding the nuclear 
proliferation project the state supervision is focused on a network which includes several 
private entities and individuals who are mandatory for its success. 
Furthermore, due to the violent unyielding nature of the armed organisations it seems that the 
defence establishment found it more difficult to supervise all the activities of the militant 
organisations and their contacts with various radical Islamic elements within the country and 
beyond its borders. Some of Pakistan’s militant proxies, like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
have maintained contacts with Al-Qaeda operatives and militant groups which have been 
fighting against Pakistan’s security forces. On the other hand, it was easier for the defence 
establishment to control the nuclear proliferation network which was directed by scientists 
and officials who are more disciplined and follow directives. Moreover, although AQ Khan 
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enjoyed distinguished credentials and was perceived as a very powerful and influential figure 
in Pakistan’s domestic arena, his pivotal position in the network mainly required him to 
exercise authority and potentially simplified supervision of the network’s operation.    
In addition, the characteristics of the nuclear proliferation project involved specific scientific 
and industrial knowledge about which sensitive items can be purchased and where and what 
can be discussed with foreign countries in order to offer them lucrative nuclear assistance 
designed for their needs. As a result, private entities and individuals who were part of the 
project worked together with the same objective. These entities were also most interested in 
the specific objective of increasing their financial revenue and this goal might occasionally 
disrupt the negotiation and initiation of a business agreement. However, the financial 
incentive was also a significant catalyst in promoting the nuclear proliferation project in light 
of its revenue potential. Furthermore, AQ Khan as head of KRL was the main point of contact 
between the network and the defence establishment and was entrusted with supervising and 
coordinating the activity of the proliferation network.  
Regarding the use of terror groups as proxies, militant organisations usually have different 
agendas, and even contradictory ones, which could degenerate into violent rivalries. The 
military has to exercise its coercive power in order to bring this loose organisational 
conglomerate of militant groups, which perceive violent means to promote their interests as 
legitimate even among themselves, into a unified operational framework. As a consequence, 
Pakistan’s defence establishment has maintained direct contact with each terror organisation 
designated as proxy, normally through the ISI and its ‘S Wing’, and with no assigned point of 
contact like the position of AQ Khan and his control over the nuclear proxies in the 
proliferation network. 
In addition, the nuclear proliferation network operated mainly outside Pakistan’s territory and 
its control centre was established in the city of Dubai under the directive of AQ Khan. The 
city’s location on important commercial sea and aerial routes, its proximity to Pakistan and its 
advanced modern infrastructures enabled the network’s command centre to better control and 
coordinate the nuclear proliferation efforts: as mentioned, a significant part of the nuclear 
exports were from sources outside Pakistan. Unlike the global spread of entities which were 
incorporated in the proliferation network and were located in Asia, Europe and Africa, most 
of Pakistan’s proxies for terror attacks have been located in Pakistan itself. Terror 
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organisations which operated in India and Afghanistan were usually stationed in the border 
areas and administered training camps and other facilities for their operations. 
Another difference between the two kinds of proxies lies in the primary motivation for their 
initiatives. Regarding the terror proxies, although they enjoyed significant independence in 
their activities, and despite the fact that not all of them were sanctioned by the defence 
establishment, their operational framework was formulated by the defence establishment 
through Army GHQ and the ISI. These agencies determine the objectives and main arena of 
their accomplishments: occasionally Kashmir and Afghanistan depending on the strategic 
environment. For example, following the 9/11 terror attacks, and due to the considerable shift 
in the international circumstances, in order to prevent a backlash against Pakistan’s violent 
struggle in Kashmir, the ISI separated its entire framework of support for the militant 
organisation which fought against India from armed groups continuing to operate in 
Afghanistan
377
. 
On the other hand, it seems that in a substantial number of cases AQ Khan and his associates 
in the proliferation network were the ones who initiated the activity and defined its 
framework. For example, it appears that it was AQ Khan’s scheme to approach North Korea 
for assistance in developing long range missiles and he recruited the necessary military and 
civilian senior officials to promote this idea. The network was also the first to negotiate 
nuclear assistance with Libya in 1997 as a turn-key project, which later used Pakistan’s 
resources for setting the project in motion.    
4.3. The Common Ground in Pakistan’s Control over its Proxies in the Nuclear and 
Terror Spectrums 
As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the main consideration of Pakistan’s defence 
establishment (including its civilian agencies and the civilian national leadership) for the use 
of proxies to promote national objectives has been its own weaknesses in achieving these 
objectives with its own capabilities, and its feeble regional and international position. As a 
result, the nuclear proliferation network was used by the establishment to realise 
achievements as a first national priority such as securing US military and economic 
assistance, and sustaining Pakistan’s nuclear programmes both financially and 
technologically. Similar to the perception of using the nuclear network as a proxy, militant 
organisations operated in Afghanistan and India on behalf of Pakistan’s agenda in order to 
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undermine the internal stability in these countries and coerce them into containing the core of 
Pakistan’s demands and coalescing with its regional agenda. 
♦♦♦ 
Furthermore, in its approach to the different proxies Pakistan’s defence establishment strictly 
preserves its option to deny any involvement in its proxies’ operational framework which 
violates US and international norms. Preserving deniability was primarily vital for Pakistan’s 
national security in light of an expected severe international reaction to its policies of 
encouraging nuclear export and flourishing terror networks. Furthermore, these approaches 
have undermined continuous efforts specifically by the US, Pakistan’s main benefactor, to 
curb both nuclear proliferation and global terrorism orchestrated by Al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates. As a result, Pakistan’s official policy has argued that it has only provided moral 
support for terror organisations which operate against India and in Kashmir and has denied 
any military assistance to the Taliban. On the nuclear issue, Pakistan argued that the AQ Khan 
network was a private initiative of AQ Khan and his associates and the network operation was 
not sanctioned by the government. 
♦♦♦ 
The similarity in Pakistan’s evasive approach to the operation of both the proliferation 
network and the terror organisations was also illustrated in the arguments in which Pakistan 
officially claimed denial of complicity in their activities. When the insurgency in Kashmir 
was initiated by the Army and the ISI Pakistani diplomats and civilian officials claimed 
private individual and Islamist parties (like JI) were behind the support for Kashmiri militants. 
The government officially promised to close down training camps for Kashmiri militants set 
up by individuals and political parties and to halt “the training with outsiders, including 
Kashmiris”378. A Similar attitude was publicly expressed by Pakistani spokesmen following 
the exposure of AQ Khan’s proliferation network: AQ Khan and his associates were driven by 
private initiative and had no support from any state agency in Pakistan. As with the 
international fighters who joined the insurgency in Kashmir, Pakistan’s government claimed 
that the nuclear proliferation network involved individuals from at least half a dozen 
countries; thus the network was also an international phenomenon and Pakistan’s share of the 
blame was equivalent to the other countries. 
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As a derivative of the desire of the defence establishment for deniability regarding its 
connections to terror, nuclear proxies and their activities, the latter enjoyed significant 
freedom of operation. It appears that the underlying principle of the establishment towards its 
proxies’ activities was that no questions were asked as long as the proxies achieved the 
desired results and effect. AQ Khan’s proliferation network served the goal of nuclear 
assistance to interested countries while operating freely outside Pakistan in the global market 
to acquire dual-use items and components for a nuclear weapons programme. As far as it is 
known, the defence establishment was not directly involved in orchestrating these acquisitions 
which were left for the discretion of AQ Khan and his associates in the network. A similar 
approach has probably been adopted by the defence establishment vis-a-vis terror 
organisations. Their goal was to force India to negotiate the issue of Kashmir in terms, 
agreeable to Pakistan, and to assist Pakistan in consolidating its influence in Afghanistan. 
Most of the attacks of the militant groups were probably their own initiative and they realised 
what was expected of them even without immediate instruction from the ISI or other factions 
of the defence establishment.  
In order to preserve its denial capability, the defence establishment kept its connection as 
clandestine as possible, with both militant organisations and with the nuclear proliferation 
network. the ISI assumed the responsibility for orchestrating irregular warfare and terror 
attacks because of its secretive nature as a security agency (See in Chapter Two). Similarly, 
the supervision of KRL and subsequently of AQ Khan’s proliferation network was entrusted 
to CDD/SPD which was separate from the rest of GHQ and later became an independent 
directorate because of the sensitivity of its responsibilities. 
5. Conclusion: Pakistan’s Approach towards Proxies and the Control System 
over the Nuclear Organisations 
As demonstrated, since the first Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-1948, the utilisation of proxies is 
Pakistan’s eminent talent in order to achieve its strategic national security objectives: 
compensate for its inferiority in the power equation with India, align Afghanistan on its side, 
and attain in its global and regional aspirations forcing the US to support it both militarily and 
economically. Pakistan’s proxies empowered its position as a critical player in any scenario 
promoting regional stability in South Asia and prevailed over global terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation. 
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Pakistan’s dependence on its proxies in the nuclear spectrum poses a unique challenge to its 
control system over its nuclear organisations. As far as is known, the nuclear proliferation 
network was exposed and dismantled in late 2003, but it seems that Pakistan’s defence 
establishment keenly preserved the option to reactivate the network when necessary. In short, 
Pakistan’s strong inclination towards adopting proxies undermines any serious effort by it to 
seal the loopholes in its control system and improve it. 
Currently, Pakistan’s nuclear apparatus and its military masters (particularly SPD) are 
promoting the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It could be asserted that this new 
effort is accompanied by nuclear purchasing activities carried out by private entities to 
provide Pakistan’s need for components and technologies for its new nuclear venture. This 
clandestine activity could again become a basis for new proliferation activity, similar to the 
evolution of AQ Khan’s network form nuclear import to nuclear export operations. However, 
neutralising AQ Khan himself in 2004, a lack of his organisational and business virtues makes 
it harder for any future operation of a proliferation network to emerge. 
♦♦♦ 
The similarities in the operation of the different proxies in the nuclear and terror spheres 
strongly raise the possibility that it was directed by a comparable institution with a clear and 
distinctive strategic thought. The magnitude and the pretentiousness of the nuclear 
proliferation together with AQ Khan himself between 1987 and 2003 and the nuclear proxies 
vast operational framework brought several countries significantly closer to a nuclear 
weapons programme (and offered similar assistance to several more) thus strongly suggesting 
that Pakistan’s control mechanism during that period contained the network’s operation. The 
control system has shared a similar rationale which has been behind supervising the 
operations of militant organisations in Afghanistan and in India/Kashmir: designated agency 
which controls the proxies but maintains the freedom of operation of these organisations in 
order to allow them to express their full strength and in parallel to present Pakistan as 
detached from the proxies’ forbidden business. CDD/SPD received the role in the nuclear 
sphere of supervising the relevant proxy (the proliferation network) while keeping its 
operation under the radar: in a scenario whereby the nuclear proliferation is exposed, 
Pakistan’s control system will be able to renounce it like the ISI’s role regarding irregular 
warfare and terrorism. 
♦♦♦ 
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It should be emphasised that even according to the official Pakistani position which 
denounced and exposed the proliferation network in 2004 the network still operated after the 
inauguration of the new control system in 1999. If SPD was not aware of AQ Khan’s 
activities, as the Army argues, then it showed appalling incompetence and complete 
irresponsibility by losing control over this proxy and enabled it to export sensitive nuclear 
technologies and materials out of Pakistan. However, strict military supervision over the 
nuclear complexes almost rules out this option. 
Like some of the terror proxies which have flirted with terror organisations operating against 
Pakistan’s regime, there is a possibility that a few strands of the nuclear proliferation network 
were able to continue with their operation even without the consent of the defence 
establishment. Furthermore, it seems that retired officials and scientists who were part of the 
nuclear programmes can take an initiative while counting on the relaxed attitude of the 
security agencies towards their activities. These were the circumstances of the meeting, 
organised between Al Qaeda leader Osama bin-Laden, and retired nuclear scientists in August 
2001 (see Chapter One): officials in the defence establishment knew about their deeds but 
avoided any action prior to US pressure to arrest them. 
Furthermore, the freedom of operation and the relaxed supervision of the defence 
establishment over their activities open the door for cooperation between the two kinds of 
proxies. If Pakistan chooses to recreate another proliferation network, there is a possibility 
that private individuals within the proliferation network, motivated by greed or radical 
ideology, would decide to assist terror groups in Pakistan or global terror organisations like 
Al-Qaeda in developing WMD capability. The expansion of the militant phenomenon in 
Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 increases the likelihood of an 
encounter between a potentially new nuclear proliferation network and some of the terror 
proxies, both of whom have the operational freedom to achieve results that was embodied in 
their character by the defence establishment itself. 
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Chapter Three: Glossary of Abbreviations 
AQ Khan - Abdul Qadeer Khan 
BSA Tahir - Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir 
CDD - Combat Development Directorate 
CMLA - Chief Martial Law Administrator 
COAS - Chief of Army Staff 
DG ISI - Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence 
DG KRL - Director General, Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Research Laboratories 
DG SPD - Director General, Strategic Plans Division 
DGMO - Director General of Military Operations 
ERL - Engineering Research Laboratories 
FATA - Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FBIS - Federal Broadcast Information Service 
GHQ - General Headquarters 
GTI - Gulf Technical Industries  
HEI - Hezb-e-Islami 
HM - Hizbul Mujahideen 
HQ - Headquarters 
HUM - Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 
IJI - Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 
ISI - Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence 
JEM - Jaish-e-Mohammed  
JI - Jamaat-e-Islami 
JIM - Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous 
JIN - Joint Intelligence North 
JUI - Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam 
KRL - Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Research Laboratories 
LET - Lashkar-e-Taiba 
MOD - Ministry of Defence 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCA - National Command Authority 
PAEC - Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
R&D - Research and Development 
‘S’ Wing - Security/External Wing 
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SPD - Strategic Plans Division 
UAE - United Arab Emirates 
US - United States of America 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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 Chapter Four: The Structure and Practices of Pakistan’s Control 
System over its Nuclear Organisations in comparison with Prominent 
Countries with Nuclear Programmes 
1. Introduction 
The close examination in previous chapters of the organisational nature of the Pakistan Army 
and its strategic thinking offered explanations for the phenomenon of nuclear export from 
Pakistan and for the existence of AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. This chapter will 
broaden the discussion and will try to appraise Pakistan’s control system over nuclear 
organisations on an international comparative scale. The objective of this chapter is to 
evaluate Pakistan’s control system, examine the ability of the system to prevent proliferation, 
explain why it failed to do so and intimate whether nuclear proliferation from Pakistan may 
reoccur. This chapter will evaluate the export control practices of Pakistan in order to assess 
the efficiency of its national control system. Pakistan’s export controls will be scrutinised in 
the context of theoretical thinking on this issue and by comparing Pakistan’s export controls 
with other countries in order to expose the differences and perhaps the underlying problems in 
the Pakistani system. 
In a broader sense, the efficiency of a national control system over nuclear programmes serves 
as the main indicator of a country’s readiness and ability to implement non-proliferation 
policy. The control system is an important instrument which the state uses in order to put its 
writ into effect, and it is a crucial component of national security. The control system 
comprises the practices, procedures and organisational culture of decision-making processes, 
division of responsibilities and mechanisms of exercising power over non-conventional 
assets: strategic capabilities, R&D institutes (both facilities and personnel), technologies, and 
materials. The national control system has several functions including those related to non-
proliferation objectives, such as the safety and the security of non-conventional capabilities 
and countering any attempt by unauthorised individuals to gain non-conventional equipment 
for illegal purposes (crime and terrorism). In addition, the control system is a crucial element 
in emergencies necessitating the deployment or even operation of nuclear weapons. During 
these precarious periods the control system functions as a command and control apparatus 
over the nuclear forces with the ability to order the launch of a nuclear attack. 
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♦♦♦ 
Export control mechanisms are usually a central function of the control system, and they are 
primarily designed to prevent a country’s loss of technological information. Nuclear-related 
equipment and dual-use items constitute an important component in any national aspiration 
for military superiority over other countries. Hence, export controls are considered a crucial 
tool in any non-proliferation efforts and in any attempt to evaluate them. Moreover, akin to 
nuclear command and control in wartime, in normal times the export control mechanisms are 
the main manifestation of the national control system in light of their comprehensiveness and 
the bureaucracy needed to support these mechanisms. As a result, this chapter will deal with 
the term control system mainly as it relates to the export control apparatus. 
♦♦♦ 
Unlike the broad literature and research regarding the operational complexity of deploying 
nuclear capabilities, and  the knowledge of  when these devastating capabilities are  required, 
much less is said in academic debate about the subject of export controls. With the spread of 
knowledge and equipment essential for nuclear development, export control arrangements are 
also significant for assessing the possible use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, few 
publications exist describing the nature of export controls and especially their importance in 
non-proliferation efforts. Most of the existing literature which deals with export controls aims 
at  assisting commercial exporters to understand the legal procedures and restrictions relevant 
to the export of defence and dual-use items: ways of obtaining an export licence, the 
applicable regulations, the legal documents needed for submission with the export 
application, etc. Thus, the majority of publications can be defined as sharing the ‘legal-
commercial approach’ in light of their focus on the legal dimension of export control 
mechanisms. ‘The Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook’379 is an example of a 
comprehensive publication which covers the legal frameworks and procedures for export 
controls in several key countries.  
Furthermore, the limited amount of literature in Security Studies dedicated to export control 
mechanisms and their contribution to non-proliferation objectives is focused on evaluating 
their efficiency from a procedural point of view. According to this ‘practices approach’, 
                                                 
379 Yann Aubin and Arnaud Idiart, Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook: A Practical Guide to 
Military and Dual-Use Goods, Trade Restrictions, and Compliance (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2007). 
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efficient export control systems should include specific bureaucratic arrangements and 
administrative tools which curtail any eventuality of assistance to WMD programmes. Among 
other matters, this approach emphasises the importance of developed schemes of enforcement 
and penalties that should exist parallel to the export control mechanisms to ensure the success 
of non-proliferation efforts. In addition, one of the main practices stressed by this approach is 
the cooperation between a national export control system and international export control 
regimes as the main arrangement for exchanging information, for unified standards, and for 
cooperation between countries.    
The method of the ‘practices approach’ for evaluating export controls is developed in ‘To 
Supply or to Deny: Comparing Export Controls in Five Key Countries’380. In this publication, 
each of the selected countries is examined on specific administrative arrangements and 
legislations, and a comparison made between the arrangements of other selected countries. 
Apart from a comparative analysis between export controls in different countries, some 
publications focus on a specific national export control system and examine its practices. It 
should be emphasised that both the ‘legal-commercial’ and the ‘practices’ approaches give 
similar weight to legal and administrative arrangements, but the first approach tries to explain 
it for the benefit of potential exporters while the latter analyses the practices in order to 
strengthen  non-proliferation objectives.            
♦♦♦ 
This chapter will try to offer a newly self-developed approach, the ‘structural approach’, for 
evaluating export controls (and thus control systems in general), and scrutinises the 
bureaucratic aspects of export control mechanisms. Analysing Pakistan’s export controls 
according to the ‘structural approach’ is more appropriate than the other approaches 
mentioned earlier (the ‘legal-commercial’ and ‘practices’ approaches).  
After establishing the method for assessing the subject of control systems, it is important to 
emphasise that the ‘structural approach’ can be used as a mean for comparative analysis, and 
does not apply solely to the case study of Pakistan. By comparing Pakistan’s export controls 
with export controls of other countries in accordance with the ‘structural approach’ it will be 
possible to illustrate the differences between Pakistan and other countries and the structural 
problems which facilitated nuclear assistance from Pakistan.  
                                                 
380 Michael D. Beck, Richard T. Cupitt, Seema Gahlaut and Scott A. Jones, To Supply or to Deny: Comparing 
Nonproliferation Export Controls in Five Key Countries (London: Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
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♦♦♦ 
Hence, the discussion will first deal with the evolved export controls of western countries: the 
US, the UK and Germany. These countries have diverse and long experience in preventing 
WMD-related assistance which is a result of their strong commitment to non-proliferation 
norms. The goal of seeking common ground among western countries is to suggest a 
theoretical framework for the structural dimension of export control mechanisms based on 
these countries’ wide experience in operating a national control system. 
Based on the new theoretical framework and the conclusions drawn about western export 
controls an evaluation will be made regarding the experience of export control mechanisms of 
non-western countries with considerable familiarity in directing nuclear programmes, and the 
export of military and dual-use technologies will be evaluated. The chosen countries for 
analysis are Russia and India which are both nuclear weapons countries and have a wide 
potential for defence and dual-use items export. The export controls of these countries 
evolved more slowly than in western countries mainly because of the limited involvement of 
the private sector in defence and dual-use export.  
Finally, subsequent to formulating the structural principle of export controls and evaluating 
their implementation, Pakistan’s export control mechanisms will be examined in comparison 
with other national export controls. The comparative analysis is expected to emphasize the 
structural weak spots of Pakistan’s export controls and the missing organisational elements.   
Each section of this chapter is devoted to a specific country and will focus on the character 
and responsibilities of export control agencies, and decision-making processes. In addition, 
the comparative analysis will also deal with export controls on defence items in general in 
light of the similarity between their export control process and that on dual-use items related 
to nuclear weapons. The supervision over state-owned defence industries resembles in its 
nature and goals the control system over agencies responsible for nuclear weapons 
development. In addition, in a broader sense, nuclear programmes are also considered as 
military programmes and there is a strong resemblance in the state’s attitude towards both 
kind of sensitive items - defence equipment and dual-use components and technologies. 
Furthermore, each section will deal with various structural elements of the export control 
mechanism: the degree of involvement of the national leadership, the division of 
responsibilities between the different agencies, special export control processes for examining 
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the requests of state-owned entities and the fundamental narratives which guide the export 
control mechanisms. 
2. The Framework of Export Controls381 
Export controls are comprehensively defined by the Institute for Science and International 
Security (ISIS) as a set of public measures for determining the order of foreign trade activities 
in respect of goods, information, work and services, results of intellectual activity, which can 
be used to develop WMD, their means of delivery, other weapons and military equipment. 
The purpose of export controls is to limit the ability of unauthorised users in obtaining 
unlawful commodities. Export control mechanisms are one of the key elements of policy 
designated to prevent proliferation of WMD-related items carried by sovereign states
382
. As 
discussed earlier, export control mechanisms are also the standard expression of a national 
control system over nuclear organisations.   
There are several elements which contribute to the complexity of export control systems: 
rapid technology evolution; the lack of internationally harmonised rules; the complexity of 
laws and regulations; and the limited government resources available to conduct the 
control
383
. Export controls also have wide-ranging economic considerations and states can use 
liberal regulations in order to gain a trade advantage over their competitors. 
Furthermore, another layer of export control arrangements exists above the national level and 
it is necessary for handling challenges which derive from globalisation processes in addition 
to combined inter-state efforts. Several international regimes of export controls were formed 
in order to consolidate unified international norms, standards, and control lists among major 
suppliers for the transfer of sensitive military and WMD-related items. These regimes’ 
guidelines are embodied, respectively, in international arms control treaties: the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). The four principal regimes are: 
1) The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) establishes guidelines and the control list for 
transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials and technologies which could 
                                                 
381
 For better explanation of the concept of export controls, it is recommended to use the report on export 
controls of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS): Roadmap to Responsible Export 
Controls: Learning from the Past <http://www.exportcontrols.org/index.html>. This report is also referenced 
in this chapter when relevant. 
382
 Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook, p. 5. 
383  Ibid. 
The Role of Pakistan’s Military in the Control System over Nuclear Programmes 
 
067 
 
make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear 
explosive
384
. 
2) The Australian Group (AG) strives to prevent any contribution to chemical and biological 
weapons programmes through the supply of chemical precursors, biological agents, and 
dual-use equipment. The participating governments in this regime agree to common 
guidelines and control lists for chemical and biological export licensing
385
. 
3) The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an association of supplier states that 
aim to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for WMD and to 
coordinate national export control licensing efforts. MTCR has two categories of 
controlled items: Category I includes complete systems and sub-systems (capable of 
carrying a payload of five-hundred kilograms over a range of at least three-hundred 
kilometres); and Category II includes missile-related components that could be used for 
production of Category I systems
386
. 
4) The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is also an informal agreement which was established 
to control transfers of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and 
technologies
387
. WA includes agreed lists of items.   
In addition, following the 9/11 terror attacks and the exposure of AQ Khan’s network of 
nuclear proliferation in April 2004 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
1540. The resolution requires member states to implement internal legislation to prevent non-
state organisations from manufacturing, acquiring, or transporting WMD within or from their 
territory
388
.  
Effective national export control mechanisms should combine efforts between governments 
and companies
389
. Government agencies have prime responsibility for deciding whether to 
supply or to deny licensing requests. The private sector also influences export controls, since 
                                                 
384 NSG Guidelines were published as Part Two of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) INFCIRC 
254. The original guidelines (published in 1978) became Part One of INFCIRC/254. 
<http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/PDF/infcirc254r9p1-071107.pdf> 
<http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/PDF/infcirc254r7p2-060320.pdf>.  
385
 See the AG official website <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html>. 
386  See the MTCR official website <http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html>. 
387  The official website of WA <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html>. 
388  The official website of the UNSCR 1540 committee <http://www.un.org/sc/1540>. 
389
 Another player in export control systems is the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) sector, which 
takes part through its outreach activities. NGO’s facilitate information exchanges between national 
government agencies and provide training through a network of experts. However, NGO’s only play a 
supportive role to government’s efforts, and usually do not share any responsibilities within the export 
control mechanism. 
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research and development (R&D), production, and marketing of advanced technology are not 
solely under state-owned enterprises. Industries in many countries implement an Internal 
Compliance Programme (ICP) to ensure compliance with the state’s export control 
regulations
390
. 
As discussed earlier, national export controls are characterised and formulated according to 
the country’s administrative arrangements and organisational culture. However, there are 
elements which are considered, by the widely held ‘practices approach,’ as obligatory 
requirements for effective export control mechanisms: 
1) Bureaucratic process. An export control mechanism should consist of administrative 
institutions which are part of the national governmental system. These agencies have legal 
responsibility for reviewing and implementing export control policies. A legislative 
framework should determine the designated government organisations which are involved 
in implementing export regulations. In addition, there should be a mechanism for dispute 
resolution by higher authorities in the government
391
. 
2) Licensing system. The licensing system allows government authorities to regulate the 
transfer of sensitive items and technologies. The licensing system consists of all the legal 
frameworks, agencies and forms that appertain to export applications. The licensing 
system comprises officials that receive and decide on export applications and officials 
who participate in the decision-making processes regarding the application. The activity 
of the licensing system depends on the submission of an application that includes 
information about the potential export: the exporter’s identity, the technological and 
quantity specifications of the items, the destination and the customer’s details392.   
3) Regime adherence. This requirement is based on the country’s participation in export 
control regimes (such as the MTCR and NSG) which includes adopting a legal basis for 
adherence to the regime guidelines, and the designation of institutions to carry out the 
policy which derives from the regime’s instructions. Some countries are not members of 
an export control regime, but still adhere to its guidelines
393
. 
4) Control lists. These lists define items that are subject to licensing requirements. An 
effective export control mechanism should include separate lists for different dual-use and 
                                                 
390 To Supply or to Deny, p. 9. 
391 Ibid, p. 17 
392
 Ibid, pp. 16-17.  
393 Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
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military items: nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other means of delivery, and 
conventional weapons
394
. 
5) Controlled list of countries. A ‘black list’ of countries exists to which exports are limited 
or prohibited. In most cases the list includes countries that are under suspicion of 
developing WMD programmes, or countries which are under UN sanctions. Occasionally, 
the list could also include countries that are considered irresponsible because they sponsor 
terrorism or as a result of a violation of copyright and industrial espionage activities. A 
country could also be on the control list due to internal or regional instability (civil war, 
military conflict, etc.)
395
. 
6) Catch-all clause. A catch-all clause is the legal instrument that prohibits companies from 
any kind of assistance to WMD programmes. Usually the catch-all clause determines that 
companies should refrain from the export of items that they have “reason to believe” are 
part of an effort to develop WMD programmes. This provision is aimed at preventing 
companies from assisting WMD programmes, even if the items for export are not included 
in the control lists
396
.    
7) Customs authority. The customs service is responsible for inspecting transfers and 
preventing the illicit export of WMD dual-use and military-related items
397
. 
8) Information sharing. In order for export control systems to be effective, governments must 
explain their requirements to industry. A country can also share information with other 
countries and members of export control regimes
398
. 
9) Verification. An export control mechanism should have agencies and procedures that will 
be responsible for confirming that the information included in the export application is 
accurate
399
. 
10) Record keeping. Decrees that records of all licenses and transactions be properly 
maintained and made available to other agencies upon request
400
.  
11) Penalties. Designated agencies review suspect exports and enforce penalties as determined 
by officials and experts. These penalties should include confiscation of items that are 
                                                 
394 Ibid, p. 17. 
395
 Ibid. 
396
 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid, p. 18 
399
 Ibid. 
400 Key Elements of an Effective Export Control System. 
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illegally exported, fines levied on convicted exporters, and prison sentences for state and 
industry officials who give assistance in bypassing export control regulations
401
.   
12) Training. Officials in the export control mechanism should receive instruction as part of a 
non-proliferation training scheme
402
.  
13) Transhipments. Items in transit through the country are subject to control laws and 
regulations
403
. 
14)  Public notification. Conveys the government's responsibility to keep the public informed 
on all export control policies
404
. 
3. Pakistan’s Export Control Mechanisms and their Evaluation according to 
the ‘Practices Approach’ 
Export controls were apparently already necessary in Pakistan during the 1980’s when 
Pakistan successfully developed nuclear and missile programmes. However, Pakistan’s export 
control mechanisms mainly evolved following its nuclear tests of May 1998 which officially 
ended Pakistan’s policy of nuclear opacity. Concretely, the reforms were supposed to be part 
of Pakistani efforts to remove international military and economic sanctions against it which 
were launched following its continuing nuclear activities. Another goal was to portray 
Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state with reliable command and control over its nuclear 
capabilities, which was fundamentally important in light of Pakistan’s potentially explosive 
conflict with another nuclear weapons country, India. The formulation of the export controls 
was further consolidated in 2004 following the exposure of AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation 
network
405
.  
It should be noted that Pakistan’s nuclear organisations have been under military supervision 
almost since the beginning of the development of nuclear weapons (see Chapter One). The 
reforms in the export control mechanism were mainly intended to consolidate the dominant 
role of the Pakistan military in the national control system by officially enshrining its de-facto 
status. This character of the supervision over the nuclear organisations in Pakistan is 
extensively elaborated upon throughout this thesis.  
                                                 
401 Ibid. 
402 To Supply or to Deny, p. 18. 
403 Key Elements of an Effective Export Control System. 
404 Ibid. 
405
 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 287. 
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♦♦♦ 
 As a result of the reforms, Pakistan adopted most of the administrative measures which are 
considered mandatory by the ‘practices approach’ as detailed earlier. Some of them were 
already in use under the Export Policy Order which is an annual update of the Import and 
Export (Control) Act of 1950
406
. Following the exposure of AQ Khan’s proliferation network 
and the adoption of UNSC resolution 1540, Pakistan created, in 2004, an official legal 
framework with a new parliamentary act called ‘the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, 
Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery 
Systems Act, 2004’407.  
Both above-mentioned legislations led to the formalisation of most of the administrative 
measures for export control required by the ‘practices approach’. Most of the internal 
procedures for export controls still remained opaque in these primary legislations and there 
are overlaps and contradictions in them. However, the focal elements of Pakistan’s export 
controls  are encapsulated in the legal framework and they can be measured according to the 
standards of the ‘practices approach’.  
♦♦♦ 
The principle of bureaucratic process is manifested in the legislation in their determining the 
division of authority among the different government agencies. It also designated the 
Oversight Board of Export Control as the highest arbitrator when disagreement arises in inter-
agency consultations on export of WMD-related equipment and dual-use items
408
. 
The licensing system for exporting WMD-related and dual-use items by the private sector is 
officially arranged and detailed in regulations called ‘Export Control Rules’, enacted in 2009, 
                                                 
406  For example, see the updated Export Policy Order of 2009: Government of Pakistan/Ministry of Commerce, 
Export Policy Order 2009 [SRO 767 (I)/2009], Gazette of Pakistan - Extra Ordinary Part Two (September 
4
th
 2009). <www.pc.gov.pk/Policies/Export%20Policy%20Order%202009.pdf> Accessed on December 29
th
 
2011.   
407 Sobia Saeed Paracha, Strategic Export Controls: Case Study of Pakistan, Research Report No. 28 (October 
2009), South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), pp. 5-6; Senate Secretariat (of Pakistan), The Export 
Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and 
their Delivery Systems Act, 2004, Gazette of Pakistan (September 27
th
 2004). The act was published by 
IAEA as INFCIRC 636: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc636.pdf> 
Accessed on March 12
th
 2012.    
408 The Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological 
Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004, Paragraph (6); Zafar Ali (director of Policy in SECDIV), 
Pakistan’s Export Control Measures. Presentation at the Workshop on ‘Partnership for Global Security’ 
(Washington DC, February 21
st
-22
nd
 2008). 
<http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/zafar_export.pdf.> Accessed on March 12
th
 2012. 
Chapter Four 
071 
 
and which stem from the Export Control Act of 2004
409
. The statutory regulations set the 
procedures for private exporters i.e. how to apply for a licence, the documents needed with 
the application, and what the process for granting an export license is. However, there is no 
information on the licensing process for exports on behalf of the Ministry of Defence and 
these export applications are exempt from both legislations
410
. The exemption of the majority 
of the exports is most probably granted to state agencies. As other parts of this chapter will 
indicate, the exemption procedure is common in many countries which can export dual-use 
and WMD-related materials and defence equipment.  
Regarding the principle of regime adherence, Pakistan is not a member of most arms control 
treaties (particularly the NPT) nor any of the export control regimes. However, Pakistan’s 
official non-proliferation policy corresponds to international norms in this sphere and adheres 
to the standards of the export control regimes
411. For example, Pakistan’s current control lists 
of supervised items are similar to the control lists of the relevant export control regimes. 
The control lists mentioned above also endorse the principle of the ‘practices approach’. 
Following the Export Control Act of 2004, Pakistan published control lists of items which 
need to be scrutinised according to the export control regulations. There is a separate control 
list for each WMD programme: nuclear, biological, chemical, and their means of delivery
412
. 
On the other hand, Pakistan avoided publishing a list of controlled items of conventional 
weaponry. 
The Export Control Act of 2004 also endorses other elements of the ‘practices approach’. The 
act includes a catch-all clause which requires exporters to notify the pertinent authorities of 
any knowledge regarding the possibility of a diversion of the export in order to develop 
WMD capabilities
413
. The act also determines punitive measures in the case of violations and 
                                                 
409 Government of Pakistan/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Export Control (Licensing and Enforcement) Rules, 
SRO 450(I)/2009 (May 29
th
 2009). The SRO is available on SECDIV website 
<http://www.mofa.gov.pk/SECDIV/Export%20Control%20(Licensing%20and%20Enforcement)%20Rules%
202009.pdf> Accessed on March 14
th
 2012. 
410 See: Export Policy Order, paragraph 4(2) (C).    
411 Strategic Export Controls: Case Study of Pakistan, pp. 11-13. 
412 Government of Pakistan/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Control Lists of Goods, Technologies, Materials and 
Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems, SRO 1078(I)/2005, 
Gazette of Pakistan (October 22
nd
 2005). The order was published by the IAEA in INFCIRC 669 
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc669.pdf> Accessed on December 29
th
 
2011. 
413 See: Paragraph 5(3) of the Export Control Act, 2004. 
The Role of Pakistan’s Military in the Control System over Nuclear Programmes 
 
073 
 
unauthorised export
414
, sets the procedures for record keeping
415
, and also applies to export 
through transhipment
416
. 
In addition, the assignments of the customs authority and verification of the ‘practices 
approach’ are also classified in Pakistan’s export control system:  the customs authority is 
defined in the legal framework and in the institutional arrangements in terms of its ability and 
that of other relevant authorities to verify the authenticity and reliability of every application 
for export licence
417
. The verification principle is also expressed in the regulation 
implementing the Export Control Act of 2004
418
. 
Pakistan’s export control system lacks three elements of the ‘practices approach’. The first is 
transmitting the export control policies and procedures into the public domain. Although, 
since 2004, Pakistan’s government has published essential information about export control 
mechanisms there are still considerable gaps in transparency, particularly about the decision-
making process and the considerations for evaluating an export application.  
The second element is training of personnel recruited for implementing the export control 
process which probably takes place but about which little is known. However, Pakistan 
received external assistance from the US in improving the awareness of export control 
mechanisms in its officials
419
. 
The third element is a ‘black list’ of countries for which the export control system should 
exercise higher vigilance when considering export of dual-use items to an end-user located in 
one of these restricted countries. Pakistan’s control system never officially presented any such 
list, but its authorities probably compiled this kind of list and demonstrated more care in 
examining any connection which might undermine foreign policy objectives. 
♦♦♦ 
In conclusion, from the above analysis of Pakistan’s export control mechanisms according to 
the ‘practices approach’ it is clearly shown that this approach is not useful in identifying the 
bureaucratic problems in Pakistan’s export controls. Although some elements are missing and 
others only partially exist, their combination is still far from indicating a significant loophole 
                                                 
414 See: Paragraphs 7-10 of the Export Control Act, 2004. 
415 See: Paragraph 6 of the Export Control Act, 2004. 
416 See: Paragraph 4(4) of the Export Control Act, 2004. 
417 Strategic Export Controls: Case Study of Pakistan, p. 9; Pakistan’s Export Control Measures. 
418 For details, see: The Export Control (Licensing and Enforcement) Rules. 
419 US Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism, Chapter Five, Section 5.1 (A) (August 18th 2010). 
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/170262.htm> Accessed on December 31
st
 2011. 
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in the export control mechanisms that might explain the extensive nuclear proliferation from 
Pakistan.  
The Export Control Act of 2004 and its regulations were indeed enacted after the exposure of 
AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network. However, as evident from the Export Policy Order 
and from statutory regulations which were in place before the exposure of the proliferation 
network, export controls already existed in Pakistan including a licensing system and 
bureaucratic process which were under the preview of MOD and its subsidiaries. In addition, 
trading with nuclear materials was supervised by Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
(PNRA)
420
. As far as can be determined, AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation would still be 
possible even after the reforms in Pakistan’s export controls which were  initiated after the 
nuclear tests of May 1998: officially, AQ Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and all the 
other nuclear organisations continue to be exempt from export control mechanisms
421
. 
Nuclear proliferation occurred by exploiting fundamental structural weaknesses in the export 
control mechanisms. The parameters of these weaknesses will be elaborated upon later in this 
chapter. 
♦♦♦ 
4. The ‘Structural Approach’ for Export Controls and its Pillars 
As apparent from the above analysis of Pakistan’s export controls, evaluation of the efficiency 
of these mechanisms only by examining the administrative elements of the system fails to 
explain the broader picture: they could be manipulated in accordance with the will and 
interests of the officials responsible for their operation. In order to assess the ability of a 
national control system to achieve non-proliferation goals through export control mechanisms 
one must examine the relations between the agencies which have responsibilities for export 
controls and the power structure behind them. It is essential to understand how decision 
making takes place and which organisations have influence over the process. Similar to the 
‘practices approach’, the ‘structural approach’ also includes several elements to evaluate the 
efficiency and resilience of export control mechanisms. 
                                                 
420 Several statutory orders (SROs) addressed the export of defence items and nuclear goods in the 1980’s and 
1990’s. PNRA Ordinance of 2001 gave it the responsibility for issuing NOC for all nuclear exports. See: 
Strategic Export Controls: Case Study of Pakistan, p. 6. 
421
Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, Curbing Proliferation from Emerging Suppliers: Export Controls in 
India and Pakistan, Arms Control Today, Vol. 33 (September 2003) 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_09/AnupamandGahlaut> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012. 
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The first procedural parameter of the ‘structural approach’ is the involvement of the national 
leadership in the export control process. This involvement is an indicator of the importance 
placed by the government on the control over WMD-related entities both in the public and 
private sectors. The national leadership is expected to be more sensitive to the political and 
international implications of sensitive defence and dual-use exports. Additionally, the political 
leadership can integrate the different considerations when evaluating strategic export; thus the 
national leadership will possibly exercise more caution than specific agencies (and R&D 
entities) with a narrower perspective before authorising the export of WMD-related items.   
The national leadership could potentially be involved in many aspects of supervision over 
nuclear organisations, the defence industry and private exporters of dual-use items: the 
leadership can steer discussions towards the desirable objectives of the development of 
nuclear programmes, decide on the division of responsibilities among the various export 
control agencies, and determine the legal framework of the export control mechanism through 
legislation and the enactment of regulations. Regarding decision making on export 
applications, usually the involvement of the political leadership is quite limited: most 
responsibilities for issuing export licences are delegated to the professional mandarins and to 
mid-level officials. The leadership at ministerial level normally participates in the evaluation 
of export applications with particular importance: either they are defined as sensitive as a 
result of their destination to problematic countries/end users or because of the nature of the 
transferred equipment; or the export has a high financial value. 
The second procedural element of the ‘structural approach’ is extensive inter-agency 
mechanisms. At every level of decision making within the export control framework it is 
essential that the final verdict should be agreed upon by several agencies which participate in 
the discussions and can express their independent position. Inter-agency mechanisms can 
neutralise the promotion of the narrower interests of a specific agency, and strengthen the 
possibility that the conclusion reached on an export application will be sound after 
considering a wide spectrum of factors. 
There are two organisational elements in the ‘structural approach’: an influential Foreign 
Ministry and a designated agency for export controls. Both of these elements are essential 
for the efficiency of the control system in securing non-proliferation objectives. The 
diplomatic corps in the foreign ministry is the most sensitive in the national bureaucracy to 
international norms and to foreign relations with other countries. Hence, a dominant foreign 
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ministry involved in export control mechanisms and with working relations with the nuclear 
organisations can be the best guardian against any decision on export of sensitive and dual-
use items. This task is crucial in light of the limited time the national leadership (usually also 
aware of the international dimension) can attend to export control issues and normally only 
decides on extremely delicate export applications. 
As for a designated export control agency, its existence guarantees that within the export 
control system there is a government body which is dedicated to monitoring the proceedings, 
and this agency is usually responsible for their implementation. It is preferable that this 
agency is administratively connected to ministries which also have an interest in adequate 
supervision of exports: either the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Moreover, it can generally be said that export control mechanisms dominated by civilian 
agencies will be more conscious of non-proliferation objectives. Normally, the defence 
establishment, and particularly the armed forces, assign a lower priority to decision making 
encompassing international considerations. The military prefers to promote national security 
objectives by adopting more aggressive measures. In addition, the defence establishment and 
the military are more receptive to the interests and economic situation of the defence industry 
which usually serves the armed forces with its R&D. Hence, though the defence 
establishment is aware of the potential risks to national security when exporting advanced 
technologies, the defence establishment is expected to be inclined towards authorising 
sensitive exports. The extent of influence of civilian agencies, and particularly the Foreign 
Ministry, over export controls is one of the methods for the evaluation of export control 
mechanisms.  
There are two legal elements of the ‘structural approach’ important for the operation of export 
control mechanisms in preventing proliferation: that it will apply to all exporters, including 
state-owned corporations and R&D institutes for defence and non-conventional equipment, 
and that potential exporters are  excluded  from the  decision-making processes of export 
control mechanisms. For obvious reasons, national governments are reluctant to implement 
export control regulations on their own agreements with other countries on defence 
cooperation and in sensitive areas. However, the exemption of state-owned entities is a 
potential loophole in the supervision which might be exploited by state corporations which 
are eager to increase their revenue. It is also quite clear that a conflict of interests is inherent 
by the participation of R&D organisations of WMD in decision making on exports beyond an 
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advisory capacity on professional and technical issues. Naturally, these organisations have a 
vested interest in promoting a relaxed attitude towards export controls and in approving their 
own export applications. 
The last parameter of the ‘structural approach’ is shared with the ‘practices approach’ and 
includes a comprehensive legal framework and regulations. As mentioned earlier, every 
efficient export control system should not just be organised properly according to the above 
principles, but it can also exercise its writ through a variety of administrative tools and verify 
that its decisions are implemented and that exporters do not abuse the licensing process. 
After discussing the ‘structural approach’ and its elements, the next part of the chapter will 
examine, in accordance with this approach, the organisational dimension of export control 
mechanisms in various countries and what can be learned from their experience. 
5. Western Model of Export Control 
The experience of western countries is the most comprehensive in the international 
community. Western countries have had the most time to improve their control mechanisms, 
to close loopholes and to assimilate an organisational culture which is highly aware of the 
importance of preventing proliferation. Export control mechanisms in Europe and North 
America are far from being flawless; occasionally they are breached and equipment related to 
nuclear programmes is transferred contrary to export regulations and in defiance of non-
proliferation norms. However, export control mechanisms in western countries are better 
planned and equipped than other countries to prevent proliferation the extent of which has 
shown a decline from western destinations. Even non-western countries (such as Russia and 
China) have conducted reforms in their export controls adopting the principles of western 
countries and their organisational arrangements.    
♦♦♦ 
Hence, the western experience in export control mechanisms will be considered in this thesis 
as the parameter for comparison. In addition, the structural and organisational arrangements 
of the export control apparatus in western countries should be the preferred objective of any 
country which aspires to an effective national control system for preventing proliferation. The 
point of analysing the organisational dimension of western export controls should be to use 
them as a litmus test for evaluating export mechanisms. Not surprisingly, there is a close 
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similarity between the western model and the theoretical framework for export control 
mechanisms which was outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
♦♦♦ 
The western model for export controls (as a manifestation of the national control system) is 
based on three pillars: general guiding principles, formal regulations, and division of 
responsibility between government ministries and agencies. These pillars lay the foundation 
for decision-making processes regarding export controls and their combination defines the 
nature of the control system.  
In this part of the chapter, the export control mechanisms of three leading western countries - 
the US, the UK, and Germany - will be discussed in order to show the execution of the above 
theoretical definitions of export controls. The main objective is to analyse the organisational 
dimension of the export control mechanisms in these countries in order to compare their 
different practices and to illustrate the structural principles of the western export controls. 
This model will be used later in this chapter to examine the export controls of non-western 
countries, and of Pakistan as the primary test case of this thesis. Hence, in this part of the 
chapter the organisational structure of each country will be presented and then broader 
insights will be concluded, including a model for export controls. 
5.1. The US Export Control Mechanisms 
The US export control mechanisms are more developed and comprehensive than those of any 
other country, and the volume and scope of US sensitive exports are the world’s largest422. 
The US government has long and extensive experience in export control and in the non-
proliferation field. Furthermore, the US has championed non-proliferation goals for several 
decades. It has initiated, acceded to or signed almost all major non-proliferation treaties and 
conventions, including export control regimes (NSG, AG, MTCR, and WA). US interest in 
export controls stems from its military and economic capabilities
423
. 
Historically, the US government aspired to find the correct balance between national security 
and foreign policy interests (on the one hand), and commercial and industrial interests (on the 
other hand). This goal led to some complex policy conflicts: between maintaining military 
superiority and achieving military interoperability with allied countries; and between 
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participating in world economic trends of outsourcing and globalisation and the need to 
preserve the national defence industrial base
424
.       
The US divides its legal framework for export controls into two main structures, one for 
military items and one for dual-use items: The Export Administration Act (EAA) regulates 
exports of dual-use items, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) for the export of defence 
items, including WMD-related items
425
. In addition, there is other legislation for specific 
fields: the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for missiles and satellite-related 
items; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the Atomic Energy Act for nuclear dual-use 
items; and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act for the chemical field
426
.    
Government agencies which are part of the export control mechanisms were given a variety of 
administrative tools in order to assist them in preventing illicit proliferation or smuggling of 
illegal arms and defence products. Most of these bureaucratic procedures are under the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) which comprises the legal basis for the supervision of 
overall US exports by the federal government. 
The central administrative tool is the US control lists. These lists correspond directly with the 
lists maintained by the various international export control regimes. Exporters must generally 
submit a license request to the appropriate agency for any item on one of these three lists:  
1) US Munitions List (USML). USML is a list of defence items, services and related 
technical data. USML is divided into twenty-one categories of defence equipment, 
ranging from firearms to nuclear weapons. USML is part of the International Traffic and 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) which implements the AECA for defence items’ export427. 
2) Commerce Control List (CCL). CCL is set to be the primary and obligatory regulation 
with regard to exporting dual-use materials and equipment which relates to advanced 
weapon systems, WMD-related R&D programmes and their means of delivery. In 
addition to corresponding with lists of international export control regimes, CCL includes 
items controlled in furtherance of US foreign policy and other objectives, including anti-
terrorism, crime control, regional stability, Firearms Convention, UN sanctions, and short 
                                                 
424 Export Control Laws and Regulations Handbook, p. 343. 
425
 International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (June 30
th
 1976). 
<http://www.adc.org/PDF/AECA1976.pdf> Accessed on March 14
th
 2012. 
426 To Supply or to Deny, p. 29. 
427 Ibid, p. 45. 
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supply reasons. CCL also contains ‘black lists’ of unlisted items destined for sensitive 
end-uses or dubious end-users
428
.  
3) Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). MCTL represents a working assumption as 
to what technologies and equipment must be protected from unauthorised export. MCTL 
itself, however, is not an export control list, but provides guidance in the development of 
such lists. MCTL is revised each year to reflect changes in technologies and the world 
environment. The technologies included in MCTL are perceived as providing the key to 
maintaining US military superiority
429
.  
The US export controls also relies on catch-all controls to ensure that problematic dual- use 
exports - which are not otherwise subject to export controls - are capable of being tracked or 
even refused as an export transaction
430
. Furthermore, the export control mechanisms include 
designated lists to evaluate the identity of the end-user and their right to an export license, 
such as Non-Proliferation Lists (persons and entities that were reprimanded under various 
non-proliferation executive orders)
431
, Entity List (foreign end users who pose a risk of 
diverting US exports for the development of WMD)
432
, and a List of States Sponsoring 
Terrorism
433
. 
5.1.1. The Structure and Framework of the US Export Control Mechanisms 
The US export controls are the most complicated among countries with advanced WMD 
programmes and a defence industry, and both its structure and decision-making processes 
include several players and administrative procedures: almost every technological category 
related to WMD and military capabilities (e.g. nuclear weapons development) has a 
designated export control process. The responsibilities within the sphere of export of WMD 
dual-use and related items and of military technologies are divided among a significant 
number of agencies. Hence, the system heavily relies on mechanisms of inter-agency 
consultations and on coordination between the different administrative entities.  
As a consequence, there is no specific agency which is designated for export control issues. 
The main government export control bureaucracy is the Directorate of Defence Trade 
                                                 
428 Ibid, p. 46. 
429
 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Export Control Provisions. 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/export/provisions.htm> Accessed on March 14
th
 2012. 
430
 Ibid. 
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Controls (DDTC) of the Department of State (DOS)
434
. DDTC is responsible for the export 
control mechanisms for defence items (as included in AECA and ITAR). Moreover, DDTC 
(with the Department of Defence - DOD) determines whether an item should be considered a 
defence item and thus under its licensing jurisdiction
435
. However, for carrying out its export 
control responsibilities DDTC relies on inter-agency processes and the support of other 
federal ministries and organisations, such as the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
and the intelligence community
436
. The agency responsible for administering and enforcing 
export controls on dual-use items is The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the 
Department of Commerce (DOC)
437
. 
Regarding the export of nuclear-related items, the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) of the Department of Energy (DOE) takes part in the licensing process of nuclear 
dual-use items. According to export control regulations, DOE, has the prerogative to review 
any export application submitted (to DOC/BIS) for export of a dual-use item
438
. When 
commercial enterprises apply for export licenses, NNSA assesses the proliferation risk 
associated with the proposed transfer
439
. Another state entity involved in export control of 
nuclear items is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
440
. NRC authority extends to 
nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities and equipment, nuclear material, and radioactive waste. 
NRC obtains the views and recommendations of other governmental agencies and 
departments in its pre-licensing reviews, and makes its standpoint and recommendations to 
DOE and DOC on nuclear-related export authorisations under their jurisdiction
441
. 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of Treasury (DOT) is the 
main enforcement export control agency at ministerial level. OFAC administers and enforces 
economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries, terrorism sponsoring 
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 Ibid. 
435 The National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a 
Changed Global Environment (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 80-81. 
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The Directorate of Defence Trade Controls (DDTC) and the Defence Trade Function, Getting Started with 
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organisations and international narcotics traffickers in line with US foreign policy and 
national security goals
442
. 
Apart from the government agencies that participate in the export control mechanism, the 
private sector is also aware of the non-proliferation dimension. Most of the nuclear, 
aerospace, military, and other research and development (R&D) institutions and enterprises 
also have their own export control bureaucracy. Similarly, hundreds of US companies have 
their own export control administration
443
.  
Unlike the control system of Pakistan and other countries which will be discussed in this 
thesis (Russia and China), the US armed forces have a secondary role in export control 
mechanisms, and in an advisory capacity: the armed forces are asked to provide their views 
on the implications of a technology export from the US to maintain their military superiority 
and to safeguard broader national security interests. Contrary to the situation in the above-
mentioned countries and even in some western countries, the armed forces are not involved in 
the control over R&D organisations of WMD and the defence industry which is managed by 
private enterprises and not by state-owned corporations. As a result, the US export control 
mechanisms are directed completely by civilian agencies. The only exception is the personal 
participation of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) at the highest level of appeal 
regarding a decision on exporting dual-use items. 
The defence establishment is mainly represented in the export control mechanism by the 
Department of Defence (DOD) which is also a civilian agency dedicated among other things 
to supervising the military services. The Defence Technology Security Administration 
(DTSA) of DOD provides the stewardship for technology security policies and programmes 
of DOD: DTSA does not issue export licenses, but primarily guarantees in its 
recommendations (to DOS on the export of defence items and to DOC on dual-use items) that 
critical US military technological advantages are preserved and that transfers which could 
prove detrimental to US security interests are controlled and limited
444
. 
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5.1.2. US Decision Making on Export Controls 
The export licensing process is more complicated than the one described in this sub-section: 
unlike in other countries, the US export control mechanism consists of several types of 
licenses and several different procedures. They are determined based on the character of the 
export application, such as the item’s technological specifications, its destination, its 
sensitivity etc. This sub-section will only deal with the relevant applications of the export 
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control process for the comparative analysis between the US export controls and that of other 
countries, and specifically of Pakistan’s export control mechanism. 
 As mentioned earlier, inter-agency involvement is a fundamental principle in US export 
controls which is exceptionally diversified: apart from the federal agencies specified above, 
there are other organisations which participate in the export control process, such as R&D 
institutions, divisions in other departments, and independent directorates. There are two main 
rules which rationalise the US export control mechanisms: all the views of all relevant 
government bodies should be considered, and several agencies or senior officials must reach a 
consensus for licensing a specific export application. 
The export control process is comprised of two separate routes, based on the character of the 
export item: a defence related item (as defined in USML) or a dual-use one (as mentioned in 
CCL). DDTC (of DOS), under DOC’s recommendation, determines through the Commodity 
Jurisdiction (CJ) process the adequate export control process in cases where an item can be 
attributed both as defence and dual-use item
446
. 
For export of defence items, DDTC manages the licensing process, and all exporters of 
defence-related equipment must be registered with it prior to any export application
447
. An 
export application for nuclear reactors and nuclear safety items is submitted to NRC
448
. The 
information submitted by registrants is reviewed by DOT to ensure there are no outstanding 
law enforcement concerns from an economic perspective. 
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DDTC refers a significant number of applications to DOD for comment and 
recommendations. In relation to the export of items included in USML, applications are also 
referred for review to other government agencies which posses relevant technical knowledge, 
such as other DOS divisions, DOE, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). Each participating agency can refuse or add conditions for granting an export 
licence. For specific WMD-related items, DDTC also refers applications to designated inter-
agency working groups directed by DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PMA): the 
Missile Technology Export Control Group (MTEC) for missile items, the SHIELD committee 
for chemical and biological weapons and the Subgroup for Nuclear Export Controls (SNEC) 
for nuclear items
451
. 
If the export application is authorised through the above inter-agency processes, DDTC 
conducts several clearances before granting the export license: reviews the application’s 
information against relevant control lists of entities (‘Black Lists’), and establishes the end-
use and end-user of the defence export. The US Congress must also be notified prior to the 
approval of applications that involve exports of substantial defence equipment
452
. If Congress 
has no objection, DDTC can approve the export application
453
. 
Regarding the export of dual-use items, as mentioned, BIS of DOC is the designated agency 
which manages the export control process: It is at BIS discretion to decide if an inter-agency 
consultation is necessary or whether BIS can decide to approve the export application
454
. 
However, due to the different factors which need to be considered in order to approve the 
export of dual-use items, most applications are discussed in inter-agency forums. 
Normally, BIS asks for the views of the three prominent federal ministries in the export 
control system: DOS, DOD, and DOE, and each of these ministries can also review any 
export application submitted to BIS. Usually these three ministries are more interested in 
export applications which include equipment relevant to the development of WMD-related 
programmes or which might have ramifications for national security. Other agencies and 
                                                 
451 Ibid, p. 39. 
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authorities can be invited to the inter-agency process, depending on the specific character of 
the export application. 
Without a consensus in the inter-agency process, a mechanism of appeal is initiated with an 
option for the participants in the inter-agency consultation to seek a higher authority. The 
resolution process begins with the Operating Committee (OC) which is the lowest level for 
appeal, and has four members, representatives of MOC (which also chairs the committee), 
DOS, DOD, and DOE
455
. For federal departments represented in OC, the second tier of appeal 
is the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP), chaired by the Secretary of Commerce 
(equivalent to a Minister) and agency members at the level of Assistant Secretary also 
participate in OC
456
.  
For ACEP members, the Export Administration Review Board (EARB) is the third tier of 
appeal at a ministerial level and is chaired by the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretaries of 
DOC, DOS, DOD and DOE are members in addition to CJCS and the Director General of 
CIA who are non-voting members. Other heads of federal agencies might also be invited to 
the present their views. Any permanent member of EARB can appeal to the President as the 
highest arbitrator
457
. 
5.2. The UK Export Control Mechanisms 
The UK export control experience was largely acquired after World War Two. The UK tried 
to retain its increasingly fragile military role in world politics in part through military sales, 
and arms sales were used to cement political ties with certain states (especially those in the 
Middle East with oil resources) and to support the cost of retaining an ‘independent’ defence 
industry base
458
.  
The British export control mechanism suffered from several structural problems, and 
government thinking on the regulation of arms transfers has been dominated by somewhat 
contradictory economic, security and political motives. UK export control mechanisms are 
opaque in nature and leave significant room for the officials and agencies involved in the 
export control apparatus to use their discretion: there is still a strong tendency to adopt a ‘case 
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by case’ approach when dealing with export applications459. At least until 2003, there was no 
single set of integrated guidelines covering exports, licensing and customs procedures
460
: 
Each department with a responsibility for export controls has its own set of internal 
guidelines
461
. These internal departmental guidelines were traditionally the only source of 
criteria for deciding on individual licence applications. 
The export control mechanisms are designated mainly for the private sector. Exports from the 
defence industry under a scheme of government-to-government transfer are exempt from the 
export control process. In addition, commercial companies acting on behalf of the government 
can also claim exemption
462
. 
In spite of the above tendencies, Britain’s export controls were arranged in a clear legal 
framework which leaves little room for misunderstanding. The main export control legislation 
is the Export Control Act of 2002 which sets the legal basis for export controls and the 
licensing process. The main export control regulations for defence items are the Export of 
Goods (Control) Orders (EGCO) of 1994
463. Britain’s membership of several international 
export control arrangements helps determine the composition of EGCO. As for supervision 
over the export of dual-use items it is based on ‘The Dual-Use and Related Goods (Export 
Control) Regulations (DUEC)’ which correspond with the regulations of the European 
Commission (EC)
464
. 
There are two control lists of goods and technologies. Defence items are controlled under the 
Military List (also known as the Munitions List) which is part of EGCO. The list covers 
military and security goods and related material. The Military List is based on the control list 
of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and it also includes restrictions on military exports to 
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particular countries and for specific kinds of equipment
465
. Britain’s export control 
mechanisms use the control lists of dual-use items in accordance with EC regulations. Apart 
from the main list of goods, a second list covers very sensitive items which are still subject to 
intra-EU licensing
466
. Furthermore, the relevant agencies of the export control bureaucracy 
compiled ‘black lists’ of countries and entities for their internal use467. 
Britain’s export control licensing system delegates the responsibility from government 
bureaucracy to the export company and its reliability is a key factor in the success of non-
proliferation efforts
468
. The system includes three types of permanent export licences: 
Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) for a single consignee, Open Individual Export 
Licence (OIEL) for a specific individual exporter of non-sensitive items who can demonstrate 
that the company has effective internal compliance procedures in line with export control 
regulations, and Open General Export Licence (OGEL) which completely removes the need 
for an exporter to apply for a specific licence. Exporters with OGEL are periodically 
scrutinised on their adherence to export control regulations
469
.There are different OGELs 
covering different items. Most major exports of defence items tend to require an SIEL, while 
exporters of dual-use goods and certain types of military equipment only need to register for 
an OGEL
470
.  
5.2.1. The Structure and Framework of Britain’s Export Control Mechanisms 
Britain’s national leadership is actively involved in the sphere of export control. At Cabinet 
level, the National Security Council (NSC, which received the responsibilities from the 
defunct Cabinet Committee for Defence and Overseas Policy) lays down formal guidelines 
covering political and strategic issues.  
Similar to the state of affairs in the US discussed previously, in the UK too the principle of 
inter-agency agreement is fundamental in export control mechanisms, although it is not as 
well organised as in the US. Furthermore, the responsibilities for the export control system are 
                                                 
465
 United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, p. 5. 
466 Introduction to the Export Control Organisation and to the Export Control: What the ECO Does, and Its UK 
Regulatory Role of Controlling of the Export of Strategic Goods (April 2009), pp. 5-6. Available on BIS 
website <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50852.pdf> Accessed on March 12
th
 2012. 
467 The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports, p. 129. 
468
 Ibid, p. 136. 
469 United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, p. 7.  
470 Introduction to the Export Control Organisation and to the Export Control, pp. 8-9. 
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divided among different agencies which normally have to reach a decision together on an 
export application.  
 
The inter-agency forum for export policy review is the inter-departmental Strategic Exports 
Working Party (SXWP). Reporting to the Cabinet Office, SXWP has representatives from the 
SXWP 
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Figure 01: Main Agencies in Britain’s Export Control Mechanisms and their Main Working 
Connections 
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Department (equivalent to a ministry) of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
The export control apparatus relies completely on civilian agencies. MOD is the main agency 
responsible for the policy on arms export by private entities
475
. MOD usually considers what 
the impact of selling the specific equipment would be on a regional balance of power, whether 
it would be a threat to British or allied forces, what level of technology should be released, 
and whether there is a risk of the equipment being diverted
476
. 
Within MOD there is no designated division for export control issues and they are usually 
handled by several units which are principally in charge of information security and 
intelligence
477
. In order to avoid a conflict of interests, the responsibility for defence export 
promotion was transferred from MOD to the Defence Export Service Organisation (DSO) 
under the Trade and Investment Organisation (UKTI) - an agency under the shared 
responsibility of FCO and BIS
478
. 
The formulation of export control policy is under the joint responsibility of MOD and FCO. 
FCO’s Counter-Proliferation Department is part of the export control system. Other 
departments and units of the ministry (regional and functional departments; and diplomatic 
missions) are consulted
479
. FCO considers the political and foreign policy impact of a 
proposed arms export
480
, but also the potential commercial benefits resulting from the sale of 
defence items and advanced technologies
481
. The Export Control Organisation (ECO) of BIS 
is the designated agency for the export licensing process and the main contact between the 
government and the defence and dual-use exporters
482
. In this regard, ECO is responsible for 
the adherence of private exporters to the regulations and procedures.  
Apart from the above agencies, the intelligence services play an important role in assisting 
specific export licensing matters. The Ministry of Economics and Finance (known as the 
                                                 
475 Ibid, p. 129-130. 
476
 Ibid, pp. 139-142. 
477 The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports, p. 130; United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual 
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exporters.   
478 
Rob Evans, Export Department Closure Leaves Defence Firms Out in the Cold, Guardian (July 26
th
 2007). 
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Treasury) is responsible for customs services (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs - HMRC) 
which are the main enforcement agency of the export control apparatus. In addition, the 
Treasury also sometimes applies its own ratings for the prospective customer’s 
creditworthiness
483
. The Department for International Development (DFID), which is 
equivalent to a ministry, also participates in inter-agency consultations with FCO and MOD 
on export authorisation. DFID is mainly interested in exports to a destination in a developing 
country
484
. 
5.2.2. Britain’s Decision Making on Export Controls 
Prior to submitting a formal export application and launching the export control process it is 
possible for the exporter to initiate an informal consultation through UKTI-DSO in order to 
establish at the outset whether the goods or technology are licensable
485
. UKTI-DSO seeks 
prior clearance for the potential export by convening the Arms Working Party (AWP) which 
is an inter-departmental committee of representatives of BIS, MOD, FCO and the Treasury
486
. 
As mentioned, the export control process is only relevant for exporters who are not exempt 
from the process - either they export defence items as part of governmental transactions or 
they obtained an export licence (OGEL) which does not require authorisation. Export 
applications for individual export licences for military and dual-use goods (equipment listed 
in the annexes of EGCO and DUEC) are first assessed by ECO. ECO decides whether it is 
necessary to consult other departments about the application
487
.  
If the export license is for a defence item (included in the Military List of EGCO), or a 
component listed in the MTCR Annex, or is for a destination on the ‘black list’, ECO chairs 
an inter-agency consultation together with MOD and FCO. Regarding the export of dual-use 
items (included in DUEC control List), ECO has a degree of discretion about the necessity for 
an inter-agency mechanism and it asks the views of MOD, FCO, and when appropriate also 
DFID. 
Where conflicting advice emerges from MOD and FCO they create an inter-agency 
mechanism to reach a decision. Normally, a decision is made through a further review by the 
                                                 
483 The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports, p. 143. 
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Release of Military Information Policy Committee (RMIPC) which is an internal MOD 
committee of senior officials, with a representative of FCO. Another procedure for settling 
conflicting advice is through ad-hoc meetings of senior officials or even pertinent 
ministers
488
. 
Another inter-agency mechanism for export control discussion in a wider forum is the 
Restricted Enforcement Unit (REU). REU is an interdepartmental committee aimed at 
information exchange through colleagues, but not intended for decision making. REU chaired 
by the head of ECO includes officials from BIS, MOD, and FCO, the intelligence services, 
and HMRC
489
. 
Sensitive export of defence and dual-use items will normally be discussed at cabinet level: by 
NSC or even by the full Cabinet and/or the Prime Minister. REU can also be the venue for 
discussing sensitive export applications
490
. 
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5.3. Germany's Export Control Mechanisms 
Unlike other countries discussed in this chapter Germany is not a nuclear weapons country 
but it has developed a large nuclear industry that can potentially assist foreign nuclear 
weapons programmes. In addition, Germany is a useful model of a specific country that 
drastically improved its national export control laws in a relatively short period of time. Prior 
to the unification of Germany at the end of the Cold War, West Germany was inclined 
towards the principle of free trade rather than security considerations and proliferation 
prevention. On the other hand, in light of Germany’s problematic history in the twentieth 
century and its responsibility for two world wars, it enforced tough restrictions regarding 
military operations and military cooperation. However, these restrictions were ambiguous and 
were poorly enforced
491. Since the 1990’s Germany has severely tightened its export control 
policies and enforcement procedures
492
. 
The legal framework of Germany’s export controls is based on two laws: The Weapons of 
War Control Act (in German - KWKG) which regulates exports of defence and WMD-related 
items
493
; and The Foreign Trade and Payments Act (in German - AWG) which regulates dual-
use technology and armaments. Although AWG focus is on dual-use goods, it also extends to 
weaponry, and in effect subjects the export of weapons to a dual licensing requirement. 
The regulations for the implementation of the AWG can be found primarily in the Foreign 
Trade Statutory Order (in German - AWV) which stipulates which goods, technologies, 
software and services are subject to export restrictions. AWV includes Export List (in German 
- AL), based on agreements concluded within international export control regimes and on an 
EC control list of dual-use equipment
494
. KWKG includes a control list which covers WMD-
related systems, materials and production facilities, and conventional weapon systems. 
As part of the Germany’s export control mechanisms (and similar to the British licensing 
system), there are three main types of export licences: individual export licence for export of 
equipment to one recipient, collective export licence for export to several specific recipients 
and general licence for which no application by the exporter is necessary. 
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5.3.1. The Structure and Framework of Germany’s Export Control Mechanisms 
On the ministerial level, the Federal Security Council (in German - BSR) is the highest level 
of decision making which gives political instructions on national security issues, including 
export control matters. BSR is a Cabinet committee chaired by the head of the federal 
government (the Chancellor) and is made up of ministers for defence, economics and 
technologies (in German - BMWi), foreign affairs, finance, and the interior.  
Furthermore, an inter-agency mechanism, the Foreign Trade Group (FTG), was established 
and is chaired by BMWi. FTG was created for the ongoing review of non-proliferation issues 
and for the preparation of legal and regulatory amendments. It includes representatives from 
the foreign, defence and finance ministries, the Office of the Chancellor, and the intelligence 
services
495
.  
Normally BMWi would decide whether or not to grant a licence for a specific weapon sale
496
, 
and it is the main player within the export control mechanism. In this regard, it exercises its 
authority through a designated agency for export control issues, the Federal Office for 
Economics and Export Control (in German - BAFA). BAFA is in charge of export licensing, 
both for dual-use and defence items
497
. BAFA has sole responsibility for export licensing. 
BMWi is also the leading agency for managing the export control lists although any proposed 
amendments are discussed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
498
.  
Compliance and enforcement procedures are mainly structured around the work of the 
Customs Criminal Investigation Service (in German - ZKA) subordinate to the Ministry of 
Finance. Both the customs authorities and BAFA carry out company audits which include the 
supervision of export matters
499
. 
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5.3.2. Germany’s Decision Making on Export Controls 
Prior to the formal legal application for an export licence it is common practice in respect of 
weapon transfers for an informal consultation process to take place between industry and 
MFA. MFA usually consults BMWi and MOD before reaching a decision. Occasionally, such 
pre-application requests are forwarded directly to BSR for a decision. The resulting pre-
application ‘advice’ then forms the basis of the negotiations between the exporting company 
and the customer. When the formal application is eventually filed, in practice the legally 
required decision is more or less a formality
500
. 
A distinction is drawn between applications for export of weapons of war in accordance with 
KWKG and dual-use and other military-related exports under AWG. Authority for licensing 
under KWKG rests with BMWi, while authority for licensing under AWG lies with BAFA.  
For the export of defence items under KWKG permission for an export licence must be 
obtained from BAFA or BMWi (depending on the nature of the specific equipment). MFA 
and MOD are consulted: If none of the three ministries objects, the export licence is granted. 
If disagreement exists or if it is a sensitive export the case is referred to BSR for a decision.  
Applications for export of dual-use goods and other military equipment under AWG are 
normally considered only by BAFA. Export applications for nuclear items and items included 
in Category One of MTCR’s control list are sent to BMWi for consultation501. Sensitive 
export applications are referred to BMWi for consultation with MFA. Particularly sensitive 
cases are decided by FTG. 
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5.4. The Structural and Organisational Dimension of Export Controls of Western 
Countries 
As discussed earlier, the US, Britain, and Germany have export control mechanisms which 
evolved under distinct historical circumstances in relation to their organisational culture and 
the nature of their state bureaucracy. Each country restructured its control system over private 
sector organisations which develop WMD-related technologies and defence industry in 
accordance with the different connections and power balance between government agencies 
and between the state apparatus and R&D entities. These countries were forced to confront 
the tension between strengthening export control capabilities and expanding external trade by 
a lenient export licensing process.  
An examination of the structure of the different export control mechanisms and their 
efficiency in preventing proliferation will be based on the parameters of the ‘structural 
approach’ which were elaborated upon at the beginning of this chapter. The following table 
(table 1) summarises the main organisational parameters for evaluating the structure of a 
control system and how western export controls abide by them: 
Country 
Comprehensive 
Legislation and 
Control Lists 
Influential 
Foreign 
Ministry 
Designated 
Civilian 
Export 
Control 
Agency 
Involvement 
of the 
National 
Leadership 
Extensive 
Inter-
Agency 
Mechanisms 
Non-
Exemption 
from the 
Export 
Control 
Procedures    
Exclusion of 
R&D 
Organisations 
of WMD from 
Decision 
Making 
(beyond 
professional 
assessments) 
US   ×     
Britain      ×  
Germany      ×  
 
The first parameter is the involvement of the national leadership in the export control process. 
As elaborated upon at the begining of this chapter, the participation of the political leadership 
can potentially contribute to non-proliferation efforts. In all three countries, the ministerial 
level and above (President/Prime Minister) is actively involved in the export control 
mechanisms, particularly in decision making on sensitive exports and in formulating 
guidelines and policies. In Britain and Germany a senior forum equivalent to the national 
Table 0: Main Structural Characters of Export Control Mechanisms in the US, Britain, and 
Germany 
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security council determines the general principles for export controls and decides on 
complicated export applications. 
The structure of the control system and its orientation strengthen its nature as a non-
proliferation apparatus. The export control bureaucracies in all the three countries of the 
analysis are dominated by civilian agencies. The interests of the defence establishment are 
mainly represented by Defence Ministries which are strong civilian agencies dedicated to 
supervising the armed forces and which  prevent  national security being undermined by the  
export of advanced technologies: these ministries act as more than just administrative 
umbrellas which cater  to the needs of the military. The military high command and the 
defence corporations which can potentially advocate the export of technologies related to 
defence industries and nuclear programmes have a secondary role in the control mechanisms, 
mainly as advisors.  
In western countries, the defence industry and its export subsidiaries are part of the private 
sector and not directly subordinate to the Defence Ministry. Export corporations of defence 
equipment have to apply for an export license to the pertinent authorities like other private 
entities which deal with dual-use goods. However, the defence corporations are considered to 
have intimate affiliation to the defence establishment, and they also have connections to the 
armed forces. 
The export control mechanisms are mainly run by MFA (ECO in the UK) and the Commerce 
Ministries (BIS in Britain, and BMWi in Germany). MFA is a leading agency in all export 
control processes and has both the largest capability and interest in preventing nuclear 
exports. The Commerce Ministries play a significant role in light of their responsibility for 
promoting external trade and its relevant regulations. In the UK and Germany there is also a 
designated export control agency which is responsible for export controls both from state-
owned and private entities. 
The principle of Inter-Agency collaboration at almost every stage of decision making is well 
rooted in all three countries, and it helps to curb any one agency which might perceive the 
transfer of dual-use goods and advanced technologies as in its own interest. Apart from the 
core export control agencies, other ministries and R&D organisations are called upon to 
participate in the licensing process and present their professional opinion. In the US, the 
licensing of nuclear-related and dual-use goods has a separate process like other categories of 
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WMD items. Furthermore, as already mentioned, in all these three countries the political 
leadership is involved in inter-agency consultations when sensitive export is concerned. 
As a consequence of the above discussion, a model of export control system over R&D 
organisations of WMD evolving from western experience is illustrated in the following 
figure: 
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The western model for export controls is not flawless and has inherent problems. Most of the 
export control agencies have a wider agenda which is to promote export and to increase 
national revenue. This argument mainly reflects on MOC: its prime objective is to promote 
commercial transactions. MOD too is usually eager to promote defence exports as part of 
expanding military cooperation. MFA is the agency most dedicated to international 
obligations, but it also considers the expansion of trade as a vital ingredient in promoting 
foreign policy goals. 
Furthermore, the defence industry has considerable influence on some of the agencies of the 
export control mechanisms and usually on the defence and commerce ministries. Defence 
exports are considered an important factor in overall external trade, as a contribution to the 
national economy, and as a substantial means of promoting foreign policy objectives. As a 
consequence, the financial consideration will always be an important factor of the export 
control mechanisms when it is deliberating the export of defence equipment, including 
technologies related to WMD programmes (such as nuclear reactors, satellites vehicles, etc.). 
In light of the magnitude of the private sector in western countries and its involvement in the 
export of dual-use and advanced technologies, the export control apparatus delegate some 
responsibilities for non-proliferation to companies through guiding the companies to create an 
internal compliance system. Private companies in Britain and Germany with a clean record, 
i.e. with no violations of export control regulations, can receive a permanent export licence 
and be exempt from the export control process. Furthermore, in Britain export entities are 
exempt from export control mechanisms if their contract is part of official cooperation with 
foreign countries. Both of the above-mentioned procedures have the potential to undermine 
non-proliferation objectives. 
6. Non-Western Experience in Export Control Mechanisms 
Apart from western countries with adequate export controls there are also other countries 
which successfully developed nuclear weapons programmes and maintain an advanced 
defence industry. Akin to western countries, non-western countries were also forced to deal 
with the dilemma of defence exports versus the potential hazards to national security inherent 
in transferring advanced technologies and nuclear-related items. In addition, these countries 
had to enable their national control system to convert to a command and control apparatus for 
directing their strategic capabilities in an emergency situation. 
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The two non-western countries chosen as test cases for the analysis are Russia and India. 
They were chosen in view of their status as nuclear weapons countries (Russia since 1949, 
and India since 1974), and their extensive defence industry which includes R&D 
organisations of WMD. The magnitude of their industrial defence complex poses a challenge 
to their respective national control systems, and the experience obtained from supervising this 
industry and state-owned export corporations is expected to draw an alternative paradigm to 
the western model of export controls over R&D organisations of WMD. Furthermore, both 
countries have held reservations regarding global non-proliferation arrangements aspired to 
by western countries, and they refused to be dictated to on how to orchestrate their export 
control mechanisms. 
♦♦♦ 
Additionally, the experience of Russia and India in operating export control processes is 
relevant to analysing the test case of Pakistan’s export controls in light of the resemblance in 
circumstances which shaped the supervision of nuclear agencies in all three countries. India 
has a similar bureaucracy to Pakistan as both of their administrations originated in the 
colonial period of British India and the two countries also share similar practices and 
organisational structures. As for Russia, it shares with Pakistan a traditionally influential 
defence establishment and totally controlled defence industry: in both countries all the R&D 
institutes are under state control.    
♦♦♦ 
Another country, China, bears even more resemblance to Pakistan’s export controls and the 
factors which determined its nature. Hence, the next chapter will be devoted to a comparative 
analysis of the export control mechanisms of the two countries with emphasis on 
modifications in the Chinese processes and whether they are applicable to Pakistan. 
The export controls over R&D organisations of WMD of Russia and India will be analysed in 
a similar pattern to the examination of western export control mechanisms and their main 
agencies, decision-making processes, and licensing procedures will be discussed. Following 
the analysis the discussion will focus on the salient features of export controls which are 
shared by both countries. 
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6.1. Russia’s Export Control Mechanisms  
Russia is an important actor on the export control scene because of its developed military 
R&D programmes and its possession of a vast number of nuclear materials, and dual-use 
technologies. Russia has made significant progress in reorganising the previously existing 
bureaucracy and establishing a comprehensive framework for non-proliferation export 
controls, and it was able to draw upon the technical expertise and experience of the Soviet 
state apparatus, although the Soviet Union did not have a comprehensive export control 
law
502. It should be emphasised that defence export is one of Russia’s main routes to gain 
international influence and substantial income, together with its energy resources.  
Russia’s export control apparatus has known substantial modifications since the collapse of 
the USSR. These reforms were introduced mainly as a result of leadership changes that reflect 
the power structure: the shift of power in 1999 from former Presidents Boric Yeltsin to 
Vladimir Putin, and Putin’s new position as Prime Minister following the 2008 presidential 
elections. Furthermore, the US and western countries’ concern about nuclear proliferation and 
armament smuggling from Russia led to the establishment of bureaucratic mechanisms for 
export control which adopted international standards. 
Regarding export of defence items the legal framework of the export control mechanisms 
codifies the priority for state-owned corporations which are also defence exporters: ‘The 
Federal Law on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States’ of 1998 determines that 
only “national negotiators” authorised by the government can export defence items503. As for 
the export of dual-use technologies by entities in the private sector, ‘The Federal Law on 
Export Control’ of 1999 sets Russia’s policy504. These export control laws include export 
control lists for all the materials and equipment relevant to WMD programmes, and for dual-
use items
505
. 
6.1.1. The Structure and Framework of Russia’s Export Control Mechanisms 
Russia’s bureaucratic structure has undergone numerous changes and continues to remain in 
flux. In the area of export control, bureaucratic restructuring has been a major obstacle to the 
                                                 
502 Ibid, p. 264. 
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504 Ibid, 273-274. 
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implementation of a coherent policy, as agencies are renamed, reconfigured, or dismantled
506
. 
As part of the consolidation process of the state authority in economic and commercial 
activities, the export control mechanisms also experienced a centralisation of authorities under 
the defence establishment.  
The President of Russia has an active role in the export control mechanisms and he defines 
the basic guidelines of Russia's export control policy. Furthermore, he ensures coordination 
between various government agencies responsible for conducting export control. The 
President also approves lists of controlled goods and technologies
507
. The President is also the 
chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign 
Countries (MTC). The committee formulates the guidelines for defence cooperation and sets 
the long-term plans in this field. However, it appears that the committee is not a forum for 
export control decision making as it usually discusses and approves specific defence 
contracts. 
At ministerial level, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible for implementing 
export control policy, including compliance with international export control regimes of 
which Russia is a member (NSG and MTCR). Furthermore, the cabinet determines the 
principles of procedures for conducting foreign trade of controlled items. The high ranking 
official who is currently responsible for Russia’s export control mechanisms is the Deputy 
Prime Minister for the Military-Industrial Complex. He exercises his power as the chairman 
of two intra-agency committees that supervise the entire defence industry and the export of 
any advanced technology or dual-use items by the private sector:  
1) The Military-Industrial Committee (MIC) is the most important national Decision-making 
body on export controls. MIC is an inter-agency forum at ministerial level which 
supervises all the activities of the military-industrial complex. MIC includes the ministers 
for defence, foreign affairs, and industry and trade as well as senior officials from the 
military, federal agencies, and R&D organisations. However, it is not clear what the 
definitions are for the submission of a defence export application to MIC as part of the 
export control process. Moreover, the director general of Rosteknology, the state 
                                                 
506  To Supply or to Deny, p. 101. 
507 See: The Federal Law about Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States (July 19th 1998) - in 
Russian. <www.fsvts.gov.ru/materials/492A334D72F0E528C325745C00335DEF.html> Accessed on March 
12
th
 2012. 
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monopoly over defence exports, is a member of MIC although his enterprise is under the 
supervision of this committee. 
2) The Federal Export Control Commission (ECC) coordinates all the relevant issues of 
export controls at ministerial level such as improving Russia's export controls and 
resolving disputes within the export control apparatus
508
. ECC is an inter-agency 
mechanism which includes senior representatives from various state entities such as the 
ministries for defence and foreign affairs, the intelligence services, the military and 
federal agencies.  
As mentioned, the export control mechanisms are under the dominant influence of the defence 
establishment: most of the administrative authority over export controls is centralised in two 
agencies which were established under the preview of the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
509
. 
These agencies are directly subordinate to the Executive Office of the President
510
: 
1) The Federal Service for Military-Technology Cooperation (FSMTC)511 controls and 
supervises governmental authorities and entities which are part of the military-industrial 
complex and are involved in defence export. FSMTC has two main somewhat 
contradictory functions: granting export licences for the export corporations of the 
military-industrial complex in accordance with international norms; and commercially 
promoting defence export. FSMTC also determines whether an export application should 
be reviewed as a dual-use or defence item and if its review process should fall in the 
preview of MOD or the Ministry of Economy Development and Trade (MEDT)
512
. 
2) The Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC) was designated as the 
executive secretariat of ECC which decides on export applications from the private sector. 
Unlike FSMTC, FSTEC only administrates the licensing process for exporting dual-use 
                                                 
508 Herbert J. Ellison, Russian-American Relations, in Stephen K. Wegren (ed.), Russia's Policy Challenges: 
Security, Stability, and Development (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 89. 
509 Recent Developments in the NIS: 2004 Updates and Changes in NIS Export Control Systems and Legislation, 
NIS Export Control Observer (December 2004/January 2005), p. 3. 
<http://cns.miis.edu/observer/pdfs/ob_0412e.pdf> Accessed on March 12
th
 2012. 
510 Cristina Chuen, Russian Government Reorganises, Restructures Nuclear Agencies, NIS Export Control 
Observer (August 2004), p. 9. <http://cns.miis.edu/observer/pdfs/ob_0408e.pdf> Accessed on March 12
th
 
2012. 
511 The agency also known in Russian as FSVTS. 
512 Igor Khripunov, Chapter 6: Export Control Assistance to Russia and Other FSU States, in Robert j. Einhorn 
and Michèle A. Flournoy, Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An 
Action Agenda for the Global Partnership,  (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
2003). 
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equipment by commercial entities from the private sector and it is not a decision-making 
agency
513
. 
 
                                                 
513 Elina Kirichenko, New Licensing Agency Created in Russia, NIS Export Control Observer (August 2004), 
p.2. <http://cns.miis.edu/observer/pdfs/ob_0408e.pdf> Accessed on March 12
th
 2012. 
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Apart from the above agencies, MOD is the leading competent ministry for export control 
issues. MOD mainly focuses on supervising defence export and military cooperation with 
foreign states. The Ministry of Industry and Trade
514
 (MIT) was established in 2008 as the 
responsible federal ministry for the civil and defence industry sectors. MIT is also responsible 
for implementing state regulations for foreign trade activities through its Department of State 
Regulation of Foreign Affairs (DSRFA). In addition, MIT is responsible for the supervision 
of exports of biological and chemical materials that can be used for military purposes
515
. The 
ministry has representatives in MIC and ECC. 
Regarding export controls on nuclear materials and technologies, The Federal Service for 
Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (FSETNS)
516
 evaluates all contracts and 
agreements signed by the nuclear industry sector. FSETNS decides on the export of nuclear 
products and technologies, and reviews the export license for certain nuclear items
517
. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) supervises the international aspects of export control 
policy in order to monitor compliance with international obligations and promote national 
security interests. However, MFA does not have a representative in MIC which decides on 
export from the defence industry complex. The primary body of MFA responsible for export 
control issues is the Export Control and Conversion Directorate which is part of the 
Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs (DSDA)
518
.   
Regarding enforcement and customs, they are under the responsibility of the Federal Customs 
Service (FCS) which deals with export controls under the preview of the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade (MEDT). In addition, the intelligence and security 
agencies also take part in the export control mechanism: The Foreign Intelligence Service (in 
Russian - SVR) and The Federal Security Service (in Russian - FSB) analyse the end-use of 
exports, and are in charge of gathering intelligence and investigating domestic exporters and 
foreign entities
519
. 
                                                 
514
  In Russian the ministry called Mintroporg. 
515
 Government decree on the Ministry of Industry and Trade (August 12
th
 2008) - in Russian. 
<http://www.minprom.gov.ru/ministry/docs/25> Accessed on March 12th 2012. 
516  In Russian called Gosnadzor. 
517 See FSETNS website (in Russian). <http://www.gosnadzor.ru/osnovnaya_deyatelnost_slujby/> Accessed on 
March 12
th
 2012. 
518 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, Russia’s Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990’s: SIPRI 
Research Report No. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 49.  
519
 Ibid, p. 46.  
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Furthermore, there are state enterprises for R&D that participate in the decision-making 
processes on export control in light of their technological and scientific expertise: the State 
Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM) which is responsible for both the nuclear industry 
and the nuclear weapons development complex; the Federal Space Agency (ROSCOSMOS); 
and the Academy of Sciences (RAS) which is the supreme scientific organisation in Russia. 
6.1.2. Russia’s Decision Making on Export Controls 
Russia’s evaluation process of export applications for both defence and dual-use items are 
structured according to the affiliation of the exporter: if it is a private company or an export 
corporation of the military-industrial complex, owned by the government. Currently, only two 
state enterprises, Rosobornexport and Rostekhnology, have authorisation to export defence 
products.  
When approving an export application of a state-owned corporation, formally the foreign 
customer (and not the Russian corporation) directly applies to FSMTC that decides which 
defence industry will receive the contract. Most probably in practice the foreign entity 
submits the export request after concluding the commercial negotiation with its Russian 
counterpart. FSMTC formulates its position and issues an export licence. When the export 
application includes sensitive defence exports of advanced technologies or problematic 
destinations, only the President can approve it
520
. 
When approving an export application from a private company, FSTEC registers the export 
application and submits it to ECC for its consideration. ECC usually forms a group of experts 
which consists of representatives of federal executive authorities with technological expertise 
(like ROSATOM for nuclear-related items). On the recommendation of ECC, FSTEC and 
MOD examine the export application and FSTEC issues the export license to the exporter
521
. 
                                                 
520 Ibid. 
521
 See the official guidelines for exporters (“The Decision Process of Licensing”) published on FSTEC website 
(in Russian, the first document on the list). <http://www.fstec.ru/_exp/_3proc2resh.htm> Accessed on March 
13
th
 2012. 
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6.2. India's Export Control Mechanisms 
India’s experience in developing nuclear programmes is different from the above-mentioned 
countries: unlike western countries and Russia, India was an ardent opponent to international 
export controls which intentionally deprived developing countries from free access to 
advanced technologies which might be relevant to the R&D of nuclear weapons and other 
strategic capabilities. Furthermore, India has developed nuclear weapons programmes and 
undermined, under the NPT, the international consensus of the nuclear non-proliferation 
principle. As a result, India’s export controls were consolidated with little reference to the 
advanced practices of export control stipulated by international export control regimes and 
their member countries. 
Only in the 1990’s, as part of its economic reforms and its transition from a government 
controlled economy to a much more privatised market, India began to facilitate modern export 
control mechanisms. These procedures became increasingly critical both to India and to the 
global non-proliferation effort parallel to India’s growing export of dual-use items and 
technologies
522
. 
However, the Indian government has maintained control over the development and 
manufacture of almost all defence related items. The same applies to the R&D of missile-
related technologies and most of the development entities are under direct government control 
(although they are also open to the participation of the private sector)
523
. Regarding strategic 
trade in nuclear items, a very limited number of private companies, and also government 
agencies, are involved in the export of nuclear dual-use substances
524
.  
India’s main legal framework for export controls is the Export-Import Policy Regulations 
(EXIM) which emanate from The Foreign Trade Development and Regulation Act of 1992 
(FTDR)
525. India’s unified export control law is the WMD and their Delivery Systems Act of 
2005. This act provides the legal basis necessary for supervising transfer of nuclear, chemical, 
                                                 
522 
 Seema Gahlaut and Anupam Srivastava, Nonproliferation Export Controls in India: Update 2005 (Athens, 
GA: Centre of International Trade and Security, 2005), p.10. 
523 Government companies are also called Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU); Export Control Law and 
Regulations Handbook, pp. 196-197; Press Note of the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, No. 5(6)/2000 FC 
I (May 21
st
 2001). <http://siadipp.nic.in/policy/changes/press4_01.htm> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012. 
524 Nonproliferation Export Controls in India, p.9 
525 Directorate General of Foreign Trade (Government of India/Ministry of Commerce and Industry), Foreign 
Trade Policy 2004-2009. <http://dgft. delhi.nic.in> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012; Export Control Law and 
Regulations Handbook, p.186, 189. 
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biological, and missile-related equipment and technologies
526
. Furthermore, an export control 
policy has been exercised through designated laws governing nuclear, chemical and biological 
related items
527
. 
It should be emphasised that according to the Foreign Trade Order (under FTDR) the export 
of dual-use goods by a government authority is exempt from the export control process
528
. 
However, the provisions of the WMD act of 2005 also applies to persons in the service of the 
government
529
. Regarding exporting defence items, India lacks the relevant contemporary 
laws and it still relies on legislation from the 1950’s and 1960’s530.   
Regarding control lists, dual-use items related to WMD programmes, and other sensitive 
items have been consolidated in the Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and 
Technologies List (SCOMET)
531
. The SCOMET list is similar to the control lists of 
international export control regimes and to the EU and the US control lists
532
. As for the 
control list of military items, India’s EXIM policy permits free exports of certain listed 
military stores that are low tech in nature
533
. All other military items are included in a control 
list which is part of the trade regulations
534
. 
6.2.1. The Structure and Framework of India’s Export Controls  
Unlike in other countries with an advanced defence industry and WMD programmes, there is 
no direct involvement of India’s national leadership in the export control process. The only 
exception is export licenses involving trade with ‘countries of concern’ that could be sent to 
the Prime Minister for approval. However, there are no legal procedures that demand the 
Prime Minister’s participation535. 
                                                 
526 The Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 
2005. Ministry of External Affairs’ website <http://meaindia.nic.in/actsadm/30aa08.pdf> Accessed on March 
13
th
 2012. 
527 Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook, p. 196. 
528 Foreign Trade (exemption from application of rules in certain cases) Order, 1993; Clause 3(2)(a). The Central 
Board of Excise and Customs website <http://www.cbec.gov.in/customs/cs-act/formatted-htmls/forgntrade-
order.htm> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012. 
529 
The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems Act, 2005; clause 3(4)(E). 
530 Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook, pp. 187-188. 
531 This is listed as Schedule II, Appendix 3 of the ITC (HS), - the Indian Tariff Classification (Harmonised 
System) which assigns items a classification number and includes conditions that govern each item’s import 
and export. The ITC (HS) is published by the DGFT, Ministry of Commerce. 
532 Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook, p. 186 
533 
This list is specified in Appendix 1 to Schedule II of the ITC (HS), Classifications of Export and Import 
Items. 
534 Schedule I, chapter 93 of the ITC (HS). 
535
 To Supply or to Deny, p. 155.  
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The ‘Higher-Level Committee (HLC)’ for export control issues is the highest national level of 
decision making. The committee is chaired by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) 
from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI). HLC has policy-level representation 
from core agencies: the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Atomic 
Energy (DAE), and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which is 
responsible for most of the defence industry. HLC meets whenever there is a need to review 
or establish policy-level procedures, and not necessarily to decide on a specific export 
licence
536
. The Inter-Ministry Working Group (IMWG) reaches a consensus on export 
applications. IMWG is also headed by an official from DGFT and is composed of 
representatives from various ministries and government agencies. Representatives from other 
technological departments, such as the Department of Science and Technology or the 
Department of Information Technologies, are invited if their input is requested
537
.  
The Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of MOCI is India’s main export control 
agency. License applications for exports of WMD-related items (except nuclear-related items) 
are submitted to DGFT, which issues export licences
538
. DGFT’s main responsibilities are 
much wider, and it deals with many issues besides license applications for dual-use items. 
DGFT is responsible for implementing Foreign Trade Policy with the main objective of 
promoting India’s exports539. Within the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the 
Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA) is the main section 
involved in export controls. Similar to other ministries of foreign affairs, MEA is mainly 
responsible in inter-agency mechanisms for preventing exports which might contradict India’s 
international adherence to export control regimes
540
. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has two 
responsibilities regarding export control mechanisms. Its Department of Defence Production 
(DODP) is the designated agency for the issue of No Objection Certificate (NOC) for the 
export of military equipment already stored (excluding items which are non-lethal in nature as 
specified by DGFT)
541
. Another agency of MOD, DRDO, participates in inter-agency 
consultations regarding export applications for dual-use items. 
                                                 
536 Nonproliferation Export Controls in India, p.22-23  
537 Ibid p. 23 
538 Ibid p. 22 
539
 Director General of Foreign Trade, (Ministry of Commerce and Industry/Government of India), Annual 
Report 2009-2010, p. 89-91. <http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/statrep/rep0910/are0910.pdf> Accessed on 
March 13
th
 2012. 
540 Nonproliferation Export Controls in India, p.23 
541 India’s Ministry of Defence website: <http://mod.nic.in/product&supp/welcome.html> Accessed on March 
13
th
 2012. 
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6.2.2. India’s Decision Making on Export Controls 
Given that India’s exports of dual-use technologies are growing, the licensing process is 
adequately defined and involves all relevant agencies. These agencies coordinate their 
licensing activities formally through the licensing process, as well as informally through 
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exchanges of information via a small group of officials working across agencies
542
. 
 
                                                 
542 Nonproliferation Export Controls in India, p. 23-24. 
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Export applications for dual-use items under the SCOMET list (except for nuclear-related 
items which are evaluated in a separate process detailed below) are submitted to DGFT. 
During the review of export applications, DGFT consults the relevant government agencies, 
such as DAE, MOD, and MEA. Export applications regarding nuclear-related items 
(‘Category 0’ of the SCOMET list) are processed differently: the applications are submitted 
directly to DAE which issues the NOC and the export license. 
DGFT conducts a technical assessment with technological agencies to secure NOC. Technical 
assessment can include the participation of R&D organisations, MEA, intelligence agencies, 
and the customs service (Central Board of Excise and Customs- CBEC)
543
. If NOC is granted, 
DGFT forwards the application to IMWG. Export licenses involving trade with ‘countries of 
concern’ receive special scrutiny from MEA and the intelligence agencies’ representative in 
IMWG. The decision of IMWG is arrived at by consensus and conveyed to DGFT, which in 
turn notifies the exporter
544
. In the event that the IMWG is unable to agree on a licensing 
decision, the matter is referred to HLC for resolution
545
. 
Regarding the export of defence items, it is restricted to authorised entities, both government 
and private
546
. As mentioned, the export of military items is permitted subject to NOC from 
the DODP of MOD. MOD examines each export application and usually conducts inter-
agency consultations
547
.  
6.3. Experience of Non-Western Countries: Examining their Export Controls 
According to the ‘Structural Approach’ 
The export control mechanisms of Russia and India are different in their nature from the 
export controls of western countries. As evident, the export control practices are more 
centralised and less transparent than the equivalent systems in western countries. 
Furthermore, it appears that the defence establishment and the scientific and technological 
cadre have more influence on the process than the official involvement of their colleagues in 
western countries. The differing character of the export control mechanisms appears to 
influence the evaluation of Russia’s and India’s export control according to the ‘structural 
approach’ which is summarised in the following table:  
                                                 
543 Ibid, p. 22. 
544 Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook, p 203; India’s Export Controls, p.23. 
545 Nonproliferation Export Controls in India, p. 20. 
546 Export Control Law and Regulations Handbook, p. 197-198. 
547
 Defence Minister’s reply to the lower house of parliament (September 15th 2003). 
<http://mod.nic.in/samachar/sep15-03/html/ch11.htm> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012. 
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    Table 2: Main Structural Characters of the Export Controls of Russia and India 
Country 
Comprehensive 
Legislation and 
Control Lists 
Influential 
Foreign 
Ministry 
Designated 
and 
Independent 
Export Control 
Agency 
Involvement 
of the 
National 
Leadership 
Extensive 
Inter-
Agency 
Mechanisms 
Non-
Exemption 
from the 
Export 
Control 
Procedures    
Exclusion of 
R&D 
Organisations 
of WMD from 
Decision 
Making 
(beyond 
professional 
assessments) 
Russia  × ×    × 
India   × ×  ×  
 
♦♦♦ 
As can be seen in the above table, the export controls of both countries lack fundamental 
elements of the ‘structural approach’. They indeed adopted a legal framework for export 
controls and routinely use Decision-making procedures, but almost half of the elements (three 
out of four) are partial in one of these countries. 
The dominant position of the defence establishment in Russia and the secondary national 
priority of export controls in India are the main factors behind the missing elements. In 
Russia, the defence establishment directs the entire export control process: the two export 
control agencies are part of MOD and thus entirely serve its interests; the national leadership 
evolved and is tightly bound to this establishment; and the state-owned export corporations 
are part of the defence establishment and have a separate route controlled by MOD for 
approving their export applications (both defence and dual-use items). As a result, Russia’s 
MFA is powerless to halt problematic exports promoted by the defence establishment. 
Although inter-agency consultations are assimilated into the export control mechanisms, the 
agencies which are not part of the defence establishment have little influence over the final 
decision: representatives from the defence establishment enjoy a dominant position in these 
forums. 
As for India, the missing parameters are a result of the business-like approach of the federal 
government towards export controls. Unlike in Russia, India’s defence establishment cannot 
force its interests, but the national leadership is not involved in decision making on export 
applications and a designated export control agency is absent. Moreover, India’s government 
apparently perceives export controls as mainly intended to supervise the private sector and the 
government exempted from the export control process the state-owned defence entities which 
are the main players behind defence export. 
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♦♦♦ 
On the other hand, the centralisation of Russia’s and India’s export controls and the de-facto 
domination of state-owned corporations over the export market of defence and WMD-related 
goods minimise the possibility of unauthorised export to a private entity. It appears that 
although incidents of private initiative of proliferation might occur, significant proliferation of 
non-conventional technologies can primarily take place only if the state-owned defence 
industry and R&D institutes receive an official directive to grant assistance to WMD 
programmes of foreign countries. Export control mechanisms according to non-western 
experience are illustrated in figure 21:  
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7. Final Analysis: Evaluating Pakistan’s Export Controls according to the 
‘Structural Approach’ in comparison with Western and Non-Western 
Countries.   
As discussed in this chapter in order for Pakistan’s export control mechanisms to be effective 
it needs to be organised according to parameters which strengthen its efficiency in preventing 
proliferation of nuclear-related items. As analysed at the beginning of this chapter, in recent 
years Pakistan has adopted most of the practices needed to conform to the ‘practices 
approach’ for competent export controls to prevent proliferation. Nevertheless, the structure 
of the system and decision-making processes raise questions as to whether the system is 
indeed ready to deal with countering assistance to nuclear programmes of foreign countries 
and their other R&D efforts for military purposes. 
♦♦♦ 
As illustrated in figure 22 (see p. 225), Pakistan has unique export control mechanisms 
principally managed by the defence establishment and particularly the military. Pakistan has 
the only export control mechanisms among nuclear weapons countries (and other countries 
with advanced military oriented R&D programmes) where the military has sole responsibility 
for the nuclear organisations. In the above mentioned countries the assignment of armed 
forces to the control mechanisms is mainly to deploy and operate nuclear weapons and other 
strategic capabilities
548
. Unlike in most countries (but with a resemblance to export controls in 
India and Russia), Pakistan’s export controls are neither divided according to the type of 
exported item (military goods and dual-use goods) nor by its destination or the record of the 
exporter: the division highlights whether the exporter is a state-owned organisation.     
♦♦♦ 
The unique nature of Pakistan’s export controls is evident from the direct subordination of all 
WMD-related organisations, known officially in Pakistan as ‘strategic organisations’, to a 
military directorate, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Furthermore, the military is heavily 
represented in the National Command Authority (NCA) which is the highest decision-making 
forum on issues concerning the nuclear programmes. The chiefs of the armed forces are NCA 
members and they constitute almost half of the entire forum. Hence, it is clear that the 
parameter of involvement of national leadership in the ‘structural approach’ is undermined, 
                                                 
548 The deployment of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities is done by the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in each of 
the armed forces. 
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and the ability of the national leadership to seize full control of the nuclear programmes is 
limited: although NCA includes a notable representation of the national leadership (the Prime 
Minister, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, and Finance), it is shared 
with the military command. In addition, the secretariat of NCA, the SPD, is a military entity 
which is the only official source of information about the nuclear organisations
549
. 
Moreover, the Development Control Committee (DCC), which is the relevant committee of 
NCA
550
 responsible for supervising the functioning of the nuclear organisations, is totally 
comprised of NCA’s military members with the Prime Minister as its chairman. Although not 
officially declared, the DCC appears as the designated forum for export control issues with 
the minimal weight of the national leadership
551
. In addition, NCA and its committees 
convene on specific occasions, and in practice routine supervision and decision making on 
nuclear issues are made by the Army chief and the head of SPD reports directly to him. 
♦♦♦ 
One of the main characteristics of Pakistan’s export controls is the sweeping exemption of all 
state agencies from the process which is a considerable deviation from one of the elements of 
the ‘structural approach’. This situation is even more critical as government agencies, such as 
nuclear organisations, hold almost all nuclear R&D, and are practically the sole potential 
nuclear exporters. As a consequence, in practice, Pakistan’s legal framework is unable to 
prevent nuclear proliferation since it only applies to private companies which are incapable of 
exporting nuclear equipment
552
.  
♦♦♦ 
As discussed in this chapter, exemption from export controls is also a common practice in 
Britain and India. However, in none of these countries is the exemption as widespread as in 
Pakistan. In the UK and India all export entities, including state-owned (in Britain also private 
                                                 
549 The functions and formation of NCA are arranged in the ‘National Command Authority Act, 2010’. For the 
full text of the act see: Senate Secretariat (of Pakistan), National Command Authority Act, 2010, Gazette of 
Pakistan (March 11
th
 2010). <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560_193.pdf> Accessed on 
January 3
rd
 2012. 
550  The second known committee of NCA, the Employment Control Committee (ECC), is responsible for the 
operational dimension of Pakistan’s non-conventional capabilities and is responsible for decisions on the 
deployment of the nuclear forces and for nuclear doctrine. See: Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), Nuclear Black 
Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan, and the Rise of Nuclear Proliferation Networks, a Net Assessment (London: 
The International institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 111.  
551
 Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (January 
14
th
 2008), Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for US Congress, p. 5. 
552 Nuclear Black Markets, p.115. 
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companies with an open license) are liable to export control laws, including penalties for 
assisting WMD programmes, and the exemption of state corporations is mainly in 
government-to-government contracts. Furthermore, as for Russia, the state-owned defence 
export corporations enjoy a separate export control process which is dominated by the 
defence establishment, but they are not exempt from the mechanisms which include the 
evaluation of an inter-agency forum. 
In Pakistan, the export policy order, which is a main pillar of the legal framework of export 
controls, determines that the export laws will not apply to “...any goods... exported under an 
export authorisation issued by any officer authorised by the Ministry of Defence on its 
behalf
553”. As a consequence, any agency affiliated to MOD or authorised by him is 
completely exempt from the export control mechanisms, and all the nuclear organisations are 
considered as affiliated to MOD
554
. Moreover, the Export Control Act of 2004 and the 
regulations and procedures stem from the act, which supervises the export of WMD-related 
and dual-use items, is legally subordinated to the Export Policy Order; thus, the Export 
Control Act does not apply to agencies granted MOD authorisation or affiliated to it
555
.  
The principle of inter-agency mechanisms is also undermined in Pakistan’s control system. 
As mentioned above, it is not clear if DCC is indeed an inter-agency forum at ministerial level 
also for export control issues. In addition, export controls over the nuclear organisations are 
opaque, and SPD is the only institution responsible for supervising these organisations
556
. 
There is no updated information which might suggest that SPD needs to share the decision-
making process with civilian agencies and the legal framework does not include any such 
                                                 
553 Clause 4(2)(c) of the Export Policy Order 2009 [SRO 767(I)/2009)]. On March 2011 MOC published an 
amendment to the above clause of the Export Policy Order which states that items included in control lists 
(published by MOFA as Control Lists of Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear 
and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems, SRO 1078(I)/2005 - see footnote no. 412) needs to be 
authorised for export. However, the amendment does not designate a specific agency for authorisation. See: 
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, SRO 243(I)/2011 (March 14
th
 2011). 
<http://www.commerce.gov.pk/SROs/243_2011.PDF> Accessed on January 12
th
 2012. 
554 The nuclear organisations are subordinate to SPD. SPD is administratively part of JSHQ which is officially 
under the administrative control of MOD. See: Defence Division Yearbook 2004-2005 (Rawalpindi: 
Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, 2005), pp. 37-38, 113. 
555 Clause 14 of the Export Policy Order clearly states that all restrictions and conditions made under the Export 
Control Act of 2004 (and also other legislations), will be subordinate to the order;  hence the exemption of 
MOD affiliated agencies. In addition, Clause 11 of the Export Control Act of 2004 states that the provisions 
of the act are in addition to the other legislations already in force - such as the Export Policy Order which is 
an annual update of the Imports and Exports Act of 1950.        
556
 Nuclear Black Markets, p. 109. 
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obligation
557
. It seems that SPD operates export control mechanisms in accordance with 
internal military procedures and with the consent of the Army chief. 
In parallel, the new legal framework for export control, which has developed since the 
exposure of AQ Khan’s network, contains inter-agency mechanisms when evaluating export 
applications, mainly from the private sector. According to the statutory regulations of 2009 
mentioned earlier in this chapter (‘Export Control Rules558’), The Strategic Export Control 
Division (SECDIV), which was established as an export control agency (under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs - MOFA), initiates an inter-agency review with representatives of MOFA, the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), and other relevant 
ministries. The inter-agency process follows SECDIV’s own review and takes place before 
SECDIV formulates its final decision about export applications. In the case of disagreement 
the Oversight Board of Export Control (which was created according to the Export Control 
Act of 2004) makes the final decision. This board is also an inter-agency forum headed by the 
Foreign Secretary (equivalent to director general) and includes high level officials from 
MOFA, MOD, MOC, SPD, and other agencies
559
. 
Regarding the influence of the Foreign Ministry, it seems that MOFA does not carry 
significant weight in the export control mechanisms regarding export applications of the 
nuclear organisations. According to SPD’s internal guidelines of 2000 MOFA had to provide 
clearance for their export applications, but it is not clear if this procedure is still in force. The 
Foreign Minister is a member of NCA, but not of DCC which is potentially the highest forum 
for export control issues. On the other hand, MOFA has a significant role in the export control 
mechanisms of the private sector. SECDIV, the designated export control agency for dual-use 
exports, is positioned administratively under MOFA. The Oversight Board of Export Control 
which supervises SECDIV’s decisions is chaired by the Foreign Secretary and includes 
another senior official of MOFA
560
.  
                                                 
557
 According to SPD’s internal guidelines of 2000 for the nuclear organisations, MOFA had to give clearance to 
their export applications. It is not clear if this internal procedure is still valid and how it is being implemented 
in light of the development in the last decade of the legislative framework. About the internal guidelines see: 
Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik, Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security, 
Arms Control Today, Vol. 37 (December 2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo> 
Accessed on March 13
th
 2012.  
558 Export Control (Licensing and Enforcement) Rules, SRO 450(I)/2009. 
559 See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Government of Pakistan, Oversight Board of Export Control Act [SRO 
693(I)/2007], Gazette of Pakistan (July 13
th
 2007). The regulations were published as INFCIRC No. 712 on 
IAEA website <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc712.pdf> Accessed on 
January 4
th
 2012.   
560 See: Oversight Board of Export Control Act, clause (3). 
Chapter Four 
114 
 
Furthermore, the principle of a designated export control agency is also partly implemented in 
the Pakistani export control mechanisms. SECDIV was established as such an agency, but it 
lacks authority on defence exports which are handled by the Ministry of Defence Production 
(MODP), the ministry responsible for the defence industry. MODP is also responsible for 
granting a NOC to private exporters who wish to trade in missile components, in addition to 
evaluating such an export application by SECDIV
561
. As mentioned, in light of state control 
over most of the nuclear field, and SECDIV’s main authority as an export control agency for 
the private sector, it has a very limited role in preventing nuclear proliferation
562
.  
SPD serves as the export control agency of the nuclear organisations, but this responsibility 
contradicts the agency’s other duties deriving from its overall management of the nuclear 
programmes
563
, such as the financial interests of R&D organisations. Hence, SPD, as the 
critical non-proliferation agency in Pakistan, has a broader mandate which might prevent the 
enforcement of export controls
564
. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the element of a comprehensive legal framework is 
inherent in Pakistan’s export controls. The assimilation of the new procedures was the result 
of a reform process in the control system over the nuclear organisations which began after 
Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 1998, and the enhancement of the overall legislation following the 
exposure of AQ Khan’s proliferation network. Regarding the participation of nuclear 
organisations in forums and decision making on export controls, it is known that DCC of 
NCA includes representatives of the nuclear establishment, though it is not clear if DCC is 
indeed an export control forum. 
 
                                                 
561 See: Export Policy Order, 2009, Schedule II, Serial 11, 13. 
562
 As part of the reforms in the control system, Pakistan also established in 2001 a Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
(PNRA) which according to the Export Control Policy of 2009 (clause i of serial no. 14 of schedule II) is also 
involved in authorising nuclear export by non-exempted entities. 
563 SPD also established a directorate for conventional and open programmes that probably have a significant 
role regarding the supervision of defence industries. See: Naeem Salik (SPD official), Changes in Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Structure since 1998. Presentation at the conference on ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Security’ (Washington DC, April 30th 2007). 
<http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/Salik_Nuclear_Establishment.pdf> Accessed on 
January 7
th
 2012. 
564 Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security; Tariq Osman Hyder (Additional Secretary, Pakistan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dimensions of Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets. Presentation at the 
Workshop on ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security’ (Washington DC, April 30th 2007). 
<http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/hyder_threat.pdf> Accessed on January 6
th
 2012.  
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As manifest from the above analysis of Pakistan’s export controls, it is missing significant 
elements in comparison to western and non-western countries, which were discussed in this 
chapter. Western export control mechanisms include most of the elements of the ‘structural 
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Figure 11: Main Agencies of Pakistan’s Export Control System  
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approach’ and in particular extensive inter-agency mechanisms, an influential Foreign 
Ministry and involvement of the national leadership in assessing sensitive export applications. 
Even when comparing Pakistan’s export controls with non-western equivalent mechanisms 
the latter contain more elements which could compensate for the omitted components: Russia 
combines the involvement of the national leadership with inter-agency mechanisms, while 
India merges an influential Foreign Ministry with comprehensive inter-agency consultations. 
 
Table 3: Main Structural Characters of Pakistan’s Export Controls 
Country 
Comprehensive 
Legislation and 
Control Lists 
Influential 
Foreign 
Ministry 
Designated 
and 
Independent 
Export Control 
Agency 
Involvement 
of the 
National 
Leadership 
Extensive 
Inter-
Agency 
Mechanisms 
Non-
Exemption 
from the 
Export 
Control 
Procedures    
Exclusion of 
R&D 
Organisations 
of WMD from 
Decision 
Making 
(beyond 
professional 
assessments) 
Pakistan  × × × × × × 
  
♦♦♦ 
Pakistan’s export controls over nuclear organisations are in practice under the responsibility 
of a single agency, SPD, which regularly answers to the Army chief. This chapter exemplifies 
a paradox when evaluating the efficiency of export control mechanisms over nuclear 
organisations in preventing proliferation. On the surface, centralised export controls might be 
perceived as an advantage in simplifying the process, and subordinating the duties of export 
control to militaries which are a disciplined and hierarchical organisation. However, without 
the necessary checks and balances which exist in other countries, Pakistan’s military has the 
option to abuse its dominant authority and initiate nuclear assistance to promote its agenda 
and perceptions about national security. The military character of the export controls was 
even more obvious before the reforms which commenced in the late 1990’s. The ‘practices 
approach’ is unable to expose this inherent problem in such a striking way, unlike analysis 
conducted according to the ‘structural approach’ which also compares Pakistan’s and other 
countries’ export controls. 
It seems that the above-mentioned situation in Pakistan’s export control mechanisms and its 
military nature are significant reasons for the existence of the conditions which enabled AQ 
Khan and his associates from the nuclear organisation of KRL to initiate a nuclear 
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proliferation network. As apparent from the analysis of Pakistan’s export controls according 
to the ‘structural approach’, if AQ Khan and his associates in KRL were indeed almost likely 
unable to orchestrate a nuclear export project in a wide scale and for a long period without 
any awareness of the authorities (as discussed in Chapter One) nuclear proliferation from 
Pakistan could only occur with military consent and knowledge, if not on the latter’s 
initiative.  
♦♦♦ 
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Chapter Four: Glossary of Abbreviations 
ACEP - Advisory Committee on Export Policy 
AECA - Arms Export Control Act 
AG - Australian Group 
AL (German) - Export List 
AQ Khan - Abdul Qadeer Khan 
AWG (German) - Foreign Trade and Payment Act  
AWP - Arms Working Party 
AWV (German) - Foreign Trade Statutory Order 
BAFA (German) - Federal Office for Economics and Export Control 
BIS - Bureau of Industry and Security (of the United States) 
- Department of Business, innovation, and Skills (of the United Kingdom) 
BMWi (German) - Ministry of Economics and Technology 
BSR (German) - Federal Security Council 
BWC - Biological Weapons Convention 
CAS - Chief of Air Force Staff 
CBEC - Central Board of Excise and Customs 
CBP - Customs and Border Protection 
CCL - Commerce Control List 
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency 
CJ - Commodity Jurisdiction 
CJCS - Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJCSC - Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
CNS - Chief of Navy Staff 
COAS - Chief of Army Staff 
CRS - Congressional Research Service 
CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention 
D&ISA - Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division  
DAE - Department of Atomic Energy 
DCC - Development Control Committee 
DDTC - Directorate of Defence Trade Control 
DFID - Department for International Development 
DGFT - Director General of Foreign Trade 
DHS - Department of Homeland Security 
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DOC - Department of Commerce 
DOD - Department of Defence 
DODP - Department of Defence Production 
DOE - Department of Energy 
DOPC - Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee  
DOS - Department of Space (of India) 
- Department of State (of the United States) 
DOT - Department of Treasury 
DPSU - Defence Public Sector Undertakings 
DRDO - Defence Research and Development Organisation 
DSDA - Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs 
DSO - Defence Export Service Organisation 
DSRFA - Department of State Regulations of Foreign Affairs 
DTSA - Defence Technology Security Administration 
DUEC - Dual-Use and Related Goods (Export Control) Regulations  
EAA - Export Administration Act 
EAR - Export Administration Regulations 
EARB - Export Administration Review Board 
EC - European Commission 
ECC - Employment Control Committee (of Pakistan) 
- Federal Export Control Committee (of Russia) 
ECO - Export Control Organisation 
EGCO - Export of Goods (Control) Order, 1994 
ELT - Export Licensing Team 
EPA - Export Policy and Assurance 
EU - European Union 
EXIM - Export-Import Policy Regulations 
FAS - Federation of American Scientists 
FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FCS - Federal Customs Service 
FSB (Russian) - Federal Security Service 
FSETNS - Federal Service for Ecological Technological and Nuclear Supervision 
FSMTC - Federal Service for Military-Technology Cooperation 
FSTEC - Federal Service for Technical and Export Control 
FTDR - Foreign Trade Development and Regulation Act, 1992 
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FTG - Foreign Trade Group 
GAO - General Accounting Office 
HLC - High Level Committee 
HMRC - Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICP - Internal Compliance Programme 
IMWG - Inter-Ministry Working Group 
INFCIRC - Information Circular 
ISI - Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence 
ISIS - Institute for Science and International Security 
ITAR - International Traffic and Arms Regulations 
ITC (HS) - India’s Tariff Classification (Harmonised System) 
JSHQ - Joint Staff Headquarters 
KRL - Abdul Qadeer Khan’s Research Laboratories 
KWKG (German) - Weapons of War Control Act 
MCTL - Military Critical Technologies List 
MEA - Ministry of External Affairs 
MEDT - Ministry of Economy Development and Trade 
MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MIC - Military Industrial Committee 
MIT - Ministry of Industry and Trade 
MOC - Ministry of Commerce 
MOCI - Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
MOD - Ministry of Defence 
MODP - Ministry of Defence Production 
MOF - Ministry of Finance 
MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOI - Ministry of the Interior 
MTC - Ministerial Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries  
MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime 
MTEC - Missile Technology Export Control Group 
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCA - National Command Authority 
NDAA - National Defence Authorisation Act 
NGO - Non-Government Organisation 
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NIS - New Independent State 
NNCA - National Nuclear Security Administration 
NOC - Non-Objection Certificate 
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSC - National Security Council 
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group 
OC - Operating Committee 
OFAC - Office of Foreign Assets Control 
OGEL - Open General Export Licence 
OIEL - Open Individual Export Licence 
PM - Prime Minister 
PMA - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
PNRA - Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
PRIF - Peace Research Institute Frankfurt  
R&D - Research and Development 
RAS - Russia Academy of Sciences 
REU - Restricted Enforcement Unit 
RMIPC - Release of Military Information Policy Committee 
ROSATOM (Russian) - State Atomic Energy Corporation 
ROSCOSMOS (Russian) - Federal Space Agency 
RUSI - Royal United Services Institute 
SARS - Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
SASSI - South Asia Strategic Stability Institute 
SCOMET - Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies List  
SECDIV - Strategic Export Control Division 
SFC - Strategic Forces Command 
SIEL - Standard Individual Export License 
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
SNEC - Subgroup for Nuclear Export Control 
SPD - Strategic Plans Division 
SRO - Statutory Regulatory Order 
SVR (Russian) - Foreign Intelligence Service 
SXWP - Strategic Exports Working Party 
UK - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
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UKTI - United Kingdom Trade and Investment Organisation 
UN - United Nations 
UNSC - United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR 1540 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
US - United States of America 
USML - United States Munitions List 
USSR - United of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WA - Wassenaar Arrangement 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
ZKA (German) - Criminal Investigation Service 
 
 
The Role of Pakistan’s Military in the Control System over Nuclear Programmes 
 
133 
 
 Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis between China’s and Pakistan’s 
Experience in Export Controls  with Emphasis on the Military 
Involvement 
1. Introduction 
♦♦♦ 
In the previous chapter (Chapter Four) Pakistan’s export control over nuclear organisations 
were examined by comparing export controls of other countries from a structural perspective 
(by using the ‘structural approach’). In the final analysis, it was clearly noticed that Pakistan’s 
export controls lack important elements, essential for an efficient control system, which can 
offer an explanation for the unprecedented nuclear proliferation from Pakistan. In this chapter 
the analysis will try to reaffirm the insights of Chapter Four by presenting the evolution of 
China’s export control system and its organisation in comparison with Pakistan’s. As will be 
exemplified in this chapter, in these nuclear weapons countries the military played a dominant 
role in controlling the R&D agencies which are responsible for the nuclear programmes. 
Hence, it is anticipated that a comparative analysis between the two cases be useful in 
tracking the malfunctions of Pakistan’s control system as a result of being militarised.    
♦♦♦ 
The objective of this chapter is to suggest insights into Pakistan’s export control system by 
comparing its status with the export control system over R&D organisations of WMD and the 
private sector in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The comparison with China’s export 
control system is not obvious: the two countries have different historical experience; there are 
cultural differences between them which influence their perception when operating 
government apparatus; and they have their own perspectives on international affairs and on 
their strategic situation. However, China and Pakistan are the only nuclear weapons countries 
which have experienced a significant military involvement in their export control systems. 
While in western countries the supervision over R&D organisations related to nuclear 
programmes was left to civilian agencies, the military in China and Pakistan were not only 
involved in export control mechanisms, they also shaped the entire national framework for the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation from these countries, and both countries’ arms control 
policy.  
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In light of the militarised nature of the export control systems in China and Pakistan, the first 
part of this chapter will present the main features and compare the armies of both countries. 
These armed forces will be the focus of the analysis regarding their involvement in the control 
systems over nuclear organisations. The similarities and differences between the two armies 
will be explored in order to reaffirm the rationale for the comparison between PRC’s and 
Pakistan’s export control systems. Following the discussion about the armed forces of both 
countries, the export control systems will be evaluated from a structural perspective. First, 
Pakistan’s export control system will be compared to China’s system before it was reformed 
in the late 1990’s in order to emphasise the similarities between their structure and 
procedures. Then, Pakistan’s export control system will be evaluated in comparison with 
China’s contemporary export control system with an emphasis on the factors which improved 
its competence in preventing proliferation. The conclusion of this chapter will focus on the 
missing elements of Pakistan’s export control system as evident from the comparative 
analysis and the significance for possible nuclear proliferation from Pakistan. 
2. The Pakistan Army and the Ground Forces Brach of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) of China: Similarities and Differences 
In this section, the origin and nature of the above-mentioned armed forces will be presented in 
order to allow a better assessment of their role in national control systems over nuclear 
organisations. The two armies were created and shaped as part of the historical context of 
their respective countries. The Pakistan Army and the PLA’s Ground Forces565 were both 
developed and organised as state armed forces in the second half of the twentieth century. 
However, both armed forces had a dominant role as internal players before the formation of 
their respective country/regime. The PLA was constructed in 1927 as one of the pillars of the 
Communist Party of China (CCP). Its top command consisted of CCP’s leaders, and it was 
used by the party as a tool for gaining power - and ultimately to create a communist regime in 
China. The PLA was the armed force which guaranteed the establishment of PRC in 1949 
after a lengthy civil war with China’s ruling party (the national party of China - the 
Kuomintang), and a military conflict with Japan
566
. As a result, the PLA’s generals secured 
their position and influence within the national leadership. 
                                                 
565 In the benefit of a maintaining a clear and simple style any reference to the PLA is to the PLA’s Ground 
Forces, unless specified otherwise.  
566 Andrew Scobell, China's Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua, Armed Forces and Society 
31:2 (Winter 2005), pp. 227-228, 231-234. 
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The constitution of the Pakistan Army also existed before Pakistan’s independence on the 
basis of the old British Indian Army. The cadre of Muslim officers in the military of the 
British Raj, whose Muslim personnel mainly comprised Punjabis, became the backbone in the 
creation of the Pakistan Army
567
. Moreover, the Army’s structure and concept of operation 
were adopted as a result of the experience of the British Army, and this is reflected in the 
British Indian Army, particularly as the first Commanders in Chief (C-in-C) of the Pakistan 
Army were British officers
568. Immediately following Pakistan’s independence in 1947 the 
Army became an important player in the country’s internal political struggles. In 1958, only a 
decade after Pakistan’s independence, the military seized power and established the first of 
four martial regimes the country has experienced so far (in the years: 1958-1969, 1969-1971, 
1977-1988, and 1999-2007). 
In addition, both armies have played a significant role in their countries’ internal arena. The 
PLA was one of Mao’s staunchest supporters in his reform initiatives, such as the Cultural 
Revolution
569
. The economic reforms since the 1980’s and after Mao’s era were initiated by 
his successor, Deng Xiaoping, who secured the PLA support for his leadership. The PLA has 
remained an integral part of CCP until today, and the generals hold influential positions in the 
party’s establishment. The Pakistan Army too has an active role in national political 
developments: as mentioned for more than half of the period since Pakistan’s independence in 
1947 the country was under martial regime. During the remaining period Pakistan was ruled 
by civilian governments but with restrictions dictated by the Army and after accepting the 
Army’s dominance over national security issues. 
Furthermore, similar to other armed forces in the international community the armies of China 
and Pakistan consider themselves as the protectors of the nation. Both armies see themselves 
as responsible for preserving their countries’ integration and national identity. They are 
strongly committed to their countries’ national vision; hence, the two armies value public trust 
in their organisation and they make efforts to gain consensual support for their operations and 
for their policies
570
. The Pakistan Army and the PLA are part of developing countries which 
tend to suffer from the low performance of their administration. These two armies routinely 
interact with civilian bureaucracy and are forced to handle widespread negative phenomena in 
                                                 
567 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 99-102. 
568 Ibid. The two British officers which were C-in-C of the Pakistan Army: General Sir Frank Messervy (August 
1947 - February 1948) and General Sir Douglas Gracey (February 1948 - January 1951). 
569 Charles Neuhauser, The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960’s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution, China 
Quarterly, Vol. 32 (October-December, 1967), pp. 24-25. 
570
 China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations, p. 235.  
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public service, such as corruption, nepotism, and incompetence. Hence, a significant part of 
the attention of the PLA and the Pakistan Army is dedicated to minimising the effect of the 
public sector on the soldiery of officer rank
571
.  
The PLA and the Pakistan Army have both been involved in operating economic ventures in 
their countries. These economic ventures were initiated in order to improve the welfare of 
their manpower, or to sustain the militaries’ self sufficiency due to severe economic situations 
and a lack of government financial resources. One of the ramifications of the armies’ 
involvement in the private sector has been a vested interest in avoiding economic reforms 
which might jeopardise the character of the economic market and the revenues for both 
armies
572
. As a result, both armed forces have consistently increased their internal influence 
and aspired to play a dominant role in civilian matters, such as industry, public funding, and 
infrastructure. Although the PLA still controls private companies, since the second half of the 
1990’s it has given away most of its economic empire and the PLA’s ventures were divided 
among several federal and provincial authorities
573
. 
There are also significant differences between the two armies. In this regard, the pattern the 
two armed forces took to consolidate their internal position was quite different. Since its 
formation, the PLA has been an armed organisation committed to CCP. The PLA was also an 
important link between the party and the masses: its notion of guerrilla warfare and the 
importance of popular support for its success led to the creation of units for armed civilian 
groups under the PLA command. The PLA was designed as a large conventional force 
consisting of millions of soldiers, in addition to militia forces and local civil defence 
groups
574
. Regarding the Pakistan Army, its notion was of a professional force whose senior 
command is comprised of elite groups, and most of its officers are from the middle and upper 
classes
575
.         
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The Pakistan Army also has a different perspective from the PLA on military-civilian 
relations. The Pakistan Army addresses civilian authorities as instruments subordinate to the 
stratagem of its national security objectives. The Pakistan Army uses various measures to 
manipulate the political system while holding its grip over the civilian bureaucracy. The 
Army refrains from loyalty to the national leadership as evident from the occasional military 
coups in Pakistan’s short history. On the other hand, the PLA in China was far from enjoying 
the relaxed supervision of the civilian authorities and CCP leadership. The PLA was under the 
constant weight of CCP political masters: CCP’s formidable leader, Mao Zedong, emphasised 
that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and thus the PLA must always stay 
under party control
576
. Although the party leaders did not hold a military rank, the first 
generations of CCP leaderships were deeply admired in the military for their involvement in 
military planning and operations during the civil war and guerrilla warfare of the 1930’s and 
1940’s against imperial Japan. This pattern of relationship in PRC between the military 
command and the national leadership is still viable despite the shift in the collective character 
of CCP leadership in recent decades: most of them do not have any experience in military 
affairs and they rose to seniority as party technocrats, usually because of their economic 
experience and their social affiliation to the party’s elite group577.  
Both armies also differ in their position in their country’s defence establishment. The Pakistan 
Army is the main state agency which sets national security directives. The military expects 
the other state agencies to follow them and join military efforts in their implementation. In 
China, the PLA can influence the strategy on defence issues, and it is fully integrated in the 
decision-making process. However, the strategy itself is determined by the civilian leadership 
of CCP which also directs the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). 
♦♦♦ 
Despite the differences in nature in some aspects, the shared character of the PLA and the 
Pakistan Army can explain their approach towards the control system over R&D of non-
conventional capabilities and advanced weaponry. These technological capabilities are 
considered valuable assets for national security. Both armies consider themselves as the 
                                                 
576 James R. Holmes, Military Culture and Chinese Export Controls, Nonproliferation Review, 12:3 (November 
2005), p. 479. 
577
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nation protectors and thus aspire to gain dominant control in the sphere of nuclear 
capabilities. Moreover, both armed forces have a lack of confidence that civilian agencies will 
perform their duties in the export control system over non-conventional organisations any 
better than the civilian problematic performance in other areas of responsibility. Furthermore, 
both armies have wide influence through their structural position both in decision making and 
in their responsibility for executing the major part of national security policies. The above 
argument applies more to Pakistan which has a dominant Army, but the PLA too has the 
power to determine defence policies. 
♦♦♦ 
As will be discussed, the two armed forces are important players in their respective countries 
in the formation of the export control system. Prior to the discussion about the nature of the 
control mechanisms on a comparative scale, there is a need to present the fundamental aspects 
in the structural/organisational position of the PLA and the Pakistan Army that contribute to 
the understanding of their involvement in the control systems.    
2.1. The Structural Arrangements which Manifest the Power of the Army Institutions 
in PRC and Pakistan 
As mentioned, both in China and in Pakistan the Army has an important role in decision 
making regarding national security issues. The PLA has a majority among CMC members, 
the highest official forum which deals with PRC’s national security. CMC is the only state 
entity responsible for all armed forces: Army (the PLA Ground Forces), Navy (the PLAN) 
and Air Force (the PLAAF). Moreover, the different staff divisions of the PLA, such as the 
General Political Department (GPD), and the General Logistics Department (GLD) are 
directly subordinate to CMC. The PLA’s General Staff is also a department (the General Staff 
Department/Headquarter - GSD) under CMC
578
. There is no joint staff command at the level 
of senior military command and CMC directly controls military regional commands
579
. CMC 
also controls (jointly with the Ministry of Public Security) the People’s Armed Police (PAP) 
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which is a paramilitary force responsible for maintaining public order and confronting riots 
and public unrest
580
. 
The Pakistan Army has more influence over national decision making than the PLA in China. 
Within the armed forces, the Pakistan Army has a dominant role that overshadows the other 
military forces (see Chapter Two). The Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) is the most 
influential position in Pakistan’s military. The Army chief is also a prominent player in 
Pakistan’s internal power struggles: in several instances in Pakistan’s history he initiated a 
coup and became head of state parallel to preserving his military position. The key forum in 
Pakistan for national security issues is the Corps Commanders’ Conference (CCC) of the 
Army, and the forum usually convenes every month. CCC includes all the senior officers in 
the Pakistan Army
581
. Nominally, the Cabinet Committee for Defence (DCC) which is chaired 
by the Prime Minister as chief executive has a senior status over the commanders’ conference; 
however (as discussed in Chapter Two), it seems that DCC does not carry significant weight 
in the decision making over national security issues which are perceived as the Army’s 
prerogative
582
. In short, the Pakistan Army has full autonomy over its internal affairs and a 
powerful position to influence national security policies while the PLA is a strong and 
influential institution in decision making, but with strict supervision of the civilian leadership.  
Furthermore, the PLA has a unique command structure which limits its autonomy on military 
affairs: instead of joint staff mechanisms (such as an HQ and a coordination forum of the 
chiefs of the armed forces), it has several divisions all answerable to CMC which is the CCP 
civil-military forum for national security issues. On the other hand, Pakistan’s armed forces 
have full autonomy over cooperation between the different military services. A designated 
HQ was created for military coordination, the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ), and also an 
official forum for routine briefings with the armed forces’ chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Committee (JCSC). Both of these organisational arrangements are under the control of a 
military general (usually from the Army), the Chairman of JCSC (CJCSC). Unlike the 
political participation in China’s CMC, in Pakistan there is no involvement at the political 
level in military inter-services’ procedures. 
                                                 
580 Ibid, p. 18. 
581 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan, Survival, 40:2 (Summer 1998), p. 98.   
582 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup 1979-1999: In Search of a Policy 
(New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 35-40. 
Chapter Five 
141 
 
There were initiatives by Pakistan’s martial heads of state, such as Generals Pervez Musharraf 
and Zia ul-Haq, to establish a National Security Council (NSC) which would be somewhat 
equivalent to CMC in China, but dominated by the military generals. NSC was designated to 
discuss all aspects of Pakistan’s national security, including the social and economic situation, 
and to comprise members of the military, the government and the political system (such as the 
speaker of the National Assembly). However, due to fierce objections from the political 
system, which feared institutional military involvement in all national spheres, NSC never 
played a role in defence issues. Once the civilian regime was restored, NSC was instantly 
marginalised
583
. 
Furthermore, the subordination of the Pakistan Army to civilian authorities is partial. 
According to the constitution, Pakistan’s President is head of state and thus also controls the 
armed forces
584
. The Prime Minister who is the chief executive and responsible for the 
operation of the government does not have authority over the armed forces. Furthermore, 
there is no strict civilian control over the Army: the main official contact between the civilian 
leadership and the military chiefs is based on occasional briefings about defence issues.  
Apart from direct contacts between the national leadership and the military command, in 
China and in Pakistan there is partial supervision over the armed forces. The Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) in Pakistan and the parallel organisation in China (the Ministry for National 
Defence - MND) are not part of the chain of command: the military service chiefs do not 
answer to the Defence Ministers. In China, the Minister for National Defence is a member of 
CMC, but MND mainly administers military cooperation with foreign countries, and 
facilitates the work of China’s military attachés around the world585. In Pakistan, MOD has 
similar objectives. The Defence Minister is a member of DCC and is also in the National 
Command Authority (NCA) which is the highest forum responsible for the nuclear 
programmes. However, COAS and the other military chiefs are not directly subordinate to 
MOD. Pakistan’s MOD deals with administrative work which is related to the operation of 
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the armed forces, such as the allocation of the defence budget, promotions procedures, and 
several logistic works
586
. 
Another issue regarding civil-military relations is the control over the state security agencies 
and the intelligence apparatus in light of their influence on national security and on decision 
making. China’s intelligence apparatus is based on both civilian and military intelligence 
agencies, and on research institutes affiliated to these agencies and to government ministries. 
The civilian Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the central intelligence agency of PRC, and it 
is responsible for information collection and operations. There are also intelligence 
organisations operating under the State Council (China’s government), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and other government authorities. These organisations are responsible for 
managing different intelligence missions for the analysis and collection of information. The 
responsibility for analysing military threats and China’s strategic situation lies with the 
different military intelligence units which work under the PLA General Staff Department 
(GSD). These units have their own intelligence collection resources and direct access to all 
senior national forums: CMC, CCP leading group, and the State Council. There are also 
designated intelligent analysis units in the Navy and Air Force
587
. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies have a dominant 
role over the civilian ones. Pakistan’s central intelligence agency is the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) which is responsible for coordination within the intelligence 
community, and for all the important intelligence arenas: internal stability, strategic situation 
assessment, military and terror threats. The ISI also has capabilities in covert operations. The 
agency is known for its wide ranging contacts with armed groups in Pakistan, in Afghanistan 
and in the Indian-controlled part of the Kashmir region
588
. Officially, the ISI Director General 
(DG ISI) reports directly to the President and to the Prime Minister and the agency has 
civilian personnel among its ranks. Nevertheless, DG ISI is usually an Army general 
subordinate to COAS. The ISI is an independent military directorate with its own HQ, and it 
is well integrated in the military apparatus and most of its personnel are from the armed 
forces
589
. 
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In addition to the ISI, a Military Intelligence directorate (MI) operates in the Army HQ 
(GHQ). MI has a broad framework for activity that partially overlaps with the responsibilities 
of the ISI. Apart from collecting and analysing information on military issues and threat 
assessment regarding the possibility of war braking out, MI also has connections to the 
political system and it focuses its concern on internal and external threats to Pakistan’s 
internal stability
590
. The third intelligent agency is the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and it is a 
civilian intelligence agency under the Ministry of Interior which answers directly to the Prime 
Minister. Its main responsibilities relate to internal security matters
591
. 
♦♦♦ 
In short, both armies of PRC and Pakistan have the capability to project significant influence 
within their countries’ establishments, and their position is secure in all issues pertaining to 
defence and national security. However, as evident from the above presentation, the Pakistan 
Army holds much more power than the PLA in China and usually manages the entire 
planning and decision making on strategic issues - from relations with India and the US to 
matters related to the nuclear programme development and to operating militant groups in 
Afghanistan. After discussing the nature of both armies and their position in their respective 
defence establishments and in decision making, their role in the national control systems will 
be explored. There will be two comparative analyses to illustrate the nature of both export 
control systems: between Pakistan’s export control system and China’s former and 
contemporary export control systems. In each analysis the role of the two armies will be 
emphasised versus the position of the civilian leadership and bureaucracy. 
♦♦♦ 
3. China's Export Control System and the PLA’s Role before the Reforms: 
Comparison with Pakistan’s Contemporary Export Controls592 
3.1. The Principles of the Chinese Control System until 1997 and its Structure 
Non-proliferation export controls are relatively new practices in PRC in comparison with 
western countries. The main factor behind PRC’s reluctance to adopt a non-proliferation 
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policy was its perspective that non-proliferation norms are a pretext for the US and western 
countries to preserve their monopoly over advanced technology and WMD capabilities
593
. As 
a result, PRC did not establish export control mechanisms until the 1990’s in a less 
ideological era. China gradually began to formalise and institutionalise its export control 
policy by formulating and publicising legally based regulations governing the export of 
sensitive goods controlled by various non-proliferation treaties and agreements. The changes 
in the Chinese export control system were closely connected to shifts in US-China political 
relations, and efforts by the Chinese government to improve its international status. 
Until the mid-1990's, China's controls on exports of WMD-related goods and technologies 
were either nonexistent or were based on opaque internal procedures. There was no formal 
licensing system based on government laws and regulations. At that time, these internal 
controls could only loosely be called a system. The government used the old framework of 
administrative controls, which contrasts with the system of ‘legally based’ export controls. 
Such administrative controls remained from the legacy of CCP’s planned economy. The 
framework of administrative controls had several features. First, all control manifestations 
were internal executive decrees, not grounded in Chinese law
594
. It was never clear which 
equipment, materials, and technologies were included in these internal lists, or if the control 
lists even existed. One of the most glaring gaps in these control lists was the apparent lack of 
comprehensive coverage of dual-use goods
595
. A final failing of such administrative controls 
was the absence of clear policy standards to judge whether to export sensitive items to certain 
countries
596
. 
Second, under this framework of administrative controls the State Council had designated 
certain State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as the only entities permitted to export sensitive 
items, and particularly nuclear, missile, and conventional military items. This monopoly of 
trading rights provided the government with a degree of control over entities which exported 
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sensitive items
597
. Financial incentives appeared to be the strongest motivation in decision 
making about their export, and it was not until the early 1990's that China began seriously to 
consider the impact of these sales on its international position. Furthermore, there were also 
extensive problems with this framework, given the penchant for companies to ignore or 
circumvent these stipulations due to the Chinese government's broader political agenda of 
promoting economic development and trade. A third attribute of the framework of 
administrative controls was the centralised control of export decisions within one industrial 
bureaucracy like in the nuclear industry: for many years, there was little, if any, inter-
ministerial coordination or vetting process
598
.  
This system of monopolistic administrative export control authority was modified in the late 
1980's and early 1990's. Key industrial firms in the nuclear and aerospace industries began to 
consult about pending sales with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which provided an 
impact assessment on foreign policy
599
. The export control mechanisms also included another 
civilian agency, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). 
MOFTEC only assumed a nominal role which included participation in inter-agency 
consultation, and the issue of export licences for WMD related-items (but not for defence 
exports)
600
. 
The main export control entities in China were under the heavy military influence of the PLA. 
CMC gained responsibility for formulating export control policy, and for supervising the 
defence industries and R&D organisations of WMD. Officially, the State Council was also 
involved, but in light of the central role in the regime of CCP apparatus, considerably more 
than the official government, it seems most likely that CMC (as part of CCP) set the 
framework for defence exports which was included in its overall responsibility for national 
security. It should be noted that although the chairman of CMC was a civilian figure and 
regularly CCP’s General Secretary, military generals exercised wide influence within CMC 
and comprised a majority in this forum
601
. 
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Under CMC operated a Military Products Export Leading Small Group as a decision-making 
forum for sensitive defence and WMD-related exports (such as uranium enrichment 
technologies and missile systems). This high-level group was also under the influence of the 
PLA and was comprised of very senior members from CMC, the PLA, MFA, defence 
industries, and the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence 
(COSTIND) - a state agency for administrative control over the entire defence industry 
complex (both conventional and non-conventional R&D)
602
. 
The PLA had actual control over the industry-defence complex, and particularly the nuclear 
and aerospace industries through COSTIND. Furthermore, COSTIND was the designated 
agency to authorise defence exports of conventional weaponry and of missile related-items. 
All the management positions in COSTIND were manned by military officers (although 
COSTIND had civilian personnel too), and it was subordinate to CMC. Only nominally, 
COSTIND was also subordinate to the State Council
603
. 
In addition, the State Authority Committee for Military Product Trade (SACMPT) was 
established in 1989
604
 as an inter-agency forum. SACMPT supervised and administered the 
export control process for all defence and dual-use items, and issued export licences through 
the State Bureau of Military Product Trade (SBMPT)
605
. SBMPT authorised export 
applications following an inter-agency consultation with MFA and other agencies. SACMPT 
authorised large scale military contracts with the approval of CMC and the State Council
606
. 
Although SACMPT was a civilian agency, it was under the PLA influence: alongside 
representatives from MFA, MOFTEC, and other relevant agencies, there were also 
representatives from COSTIND and the PLA’s GSD (under the authority of CMC). 
Furthermore, SACMPT was subordinate to CMC as well as to the State Council
607
. 
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Figure 13: China’s Export Control System until the late 1990’s in Comparison with Pakistan’s 
Export Control System - Main Agencies 
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Regarding the control over R&D organisations, as mentioned, the PLA controlled the entire 
defence and WMD-related industries through its dominant role in COSTIND and in CMC. 
The defence industry complex was consistently centralised under government agencies: in 
1993 the defence industry complex was organised into five corporations, each one responsible 
for a different defence R&D: nuclear, aerospace, aviation, maritime, and military ordnance
608
. 
In addition, via GLD, the PLA owned and managed defence export corporations that sold 
military items and equipment from the PLA’s inventory609.   
3.2. The Similarities between the Past Chinese Export Control System and Pakistan’s 
Contemporary Export Controls 
♦♦♦ 
As evident, PRC’s export control system in its pre-reform period (until 1997) has, in 
principle, a similar nature like Pakistan’s control mechanism. The two systems are alike in 
three main dimensions of control mechanisms: structure, procedures and practices. In all of 
these dimensions, the military in both countries played a leading role in formulating the 
policy for export control, setting the institutional activities and exercising them. In both 
countries, the civilian agencies played a marginal role in export controls in the national 
security sphere. 
♦♦♦ 
Both China and Pakistan were reluctant about transparency in their export controls. Pakistan 
did publish a legal framework for its export control mechanisms and its regulations for 
considering license applications from private companies, but not for its defence industry or 
nuclear organisations. China chose a similar modus operandi until the end of the 1990’s: it 
was reluctant to formulate export control lists or to pin-point the competent authorities and 
their division of responsibility, both for the military and the civilian sectors. 
On the national decision-making level, the military had a dominant role in both countries. The 
military high command (with a solid majority of Army generals) had a significant number of 
representatives around the decision-making table of the national security forums: Even 
nowadays, four out of ten members of NCA in Pakistan are military generals, and in China, 
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except for the chairman of CMC, almost all the other members are usually military generals. 
Furthermore, Pakistan’s designated export control forum at ministerial level (the 
Development Control Committee of NCA) is comprised mainly of military generals or 
representatives from nuclear organisations which are subordinate to the military. As 
mentioned earlier, in China the situation was quite similar: the CMC Military Products Export 
Leading Small Group was also under the heavy influence of the PLA. 
Furthermore, both in Pakistan and in China the military is involved in the activity of the main 
civilian export control agency. In Pakistan, the Oversight Board for Export Control has 
military representatives from the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) while the Strategic Export 
Control Division (SECDIV) is administratively under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA). In China, the situation was very similar: the PLA had representatives in SACMPT, 
and SBMPT, although its administrative body apparently did not include military personnel. 
The supervision over the defence industries and R&D organisations of WMD was similar in 
both countries. SPD in Pakistan and COSTIND in China received control over the entire 
defence industry complex. In both countries there was a tendency to subordinate military 
R&D institutions under umbrella organisations (such as NESCOM in Pakistan) in order to 
centralise state supervision over them. It should be mentioned that there were differences in 
the nature of the two agencies: SPD has a much more dominant role than COSTIND in the 
control system and has more responsibilities regarding the supervision over nuclear 
organisations. Furthermore, SPD is a military directorate connected to the Joint Staff 
Headquarters (JSHQ) while COSTIND was nominally a civilian agency with military 
personnel under the joint control of CMC and the State Council. On the other hand, unlike 
COSTIND, SPD does not have direct control over the defence industry sector of conventional 
weapons (under the supervision of Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence Production - MODP610), 
although COSTIND did not control military corporations which trade in military items from 
the PLA inventory. 
Regarding civilian agencies, both in Pakistan and in China these agencies played a marginal 
role in export control mechanisms. MOFA in Pakistan (excluding SECDIV), and MFA in 
China did not have official responsibilities within the export licensing processes
611
, and both 
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of them were disconnected from the defence industry complex: Almost all responsibilities 
were under agencies affiliated to the military. Furthermore, both in Pakistan and in China the 
ministries of commerce (MOC and MOFTEC, respectively) only fulfilled administrative 
responsibilities in the export licensing process: issuing export licenses and updating the export 
control regulations. 
3.3. The Differences between the Former Chinese Export Control System and the 
Current System of Pakistan 
Despite the similarities in character of PRC's control system before initiating the reforms of 
1997, and Pakistan's export control system, the overall structural environment which 
facilitated their establishment was different. In China, the PLA was integrated within the 
regime through its massive participation in CCP’s institutions and by its complete obedience 
to the party leadership. On the other hand, the Pakistan Army exists as a separate bureaucratic 
system with some extensions into the state administration, and only nominally subordinate to 
the civilian governments. Furthermore, the Pakistan Army conducted coups and took control 
over the country while the PLA avoided taking this extreme measure, even during a national 
crisis. The PLA did not withhold itself from political involvement in the CCP power struggle. 
However, the PLA did not perceive its relations with the civilian authority as a ‘them and us’ 
situation in the same way as the organisational thinking of the Pakistan Army towards the 
civilian government. 
Hence, the main organisational difference between China’s and Pakistan’s control systems 
was the scale of involvement of the militaries of both countries. While the PLA in China had 
significant influence (an informal one in some instances) over the export control mechanisms 
and the defence industry complex, the Pakistan Army supervises the entire process and 
exercised strict control over the nuclear organisations. In Contrast, in spite of its influence and 
involvement, the PLA was never considered the internal player in China determining the rules 
and framework. 
These differences are exemplified in SPD’s role in Pakistan. SPD is a military directorate 
under the direct control of Army chief, authorised by the national leadership (through NCA) 
to supervise the nuclear organisations. SPD jurisdiction is wider than the combined authority 
                                                                                                                                                         
it is not clear what the capability of the private sector is to manufacture a significant number of advanced 
dual-use items, and this sector apparently does not have R&D capabilities in the nuclear field.  
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of COSTIND and SACMPT in China, and as presented the latter agencies are not military 
organisations or part of the PLA. 
♦♦♦ 
Hence, China and Pakistan had a comparable export control system which shared the 
principle that the export controls are, to a large extent, a military responsibility. However, 
PRC reformed its export control system and the reform limited the PLA's role in export 
control mechanisms. Pakistan is still determined to preserve its military-centred export control 
system over its nuclear organisations. 
♦♦♦ 
4. China's Export Control System and the PLA Role after the Reforms: 
Comparison with Pakistan’s Export Controls 
4.1. The Reforms and the New Structure of China’s Export Control System 
The comprehensive reforms in China’s export control system were an outcome of the 
reorganisation of the defence industry. These reforms were initiated in 1998, during the 9
th
 
Meeting of the National People’s Congress (China’s lower house of parliament) as part of 
significant downsizing and a restructuring process of the state bureaucracy
612
. PRC moved 
from an administratively based and largely ad-hoc export control system to a system based on 
the rule of law
613
. 
Moreover, one of the main goals of the reforms in the defence industry was to distance the 
PLA from financial businesses, including the defence enterprises
614
. These economic 
operations were considered both in CCP and in the PLA as holding a negative influence on 
the officers’ corps by degenerating and corrupting a significant number of its members. In 
turn, it undermined the PLA professionalism and combat readiness
615
.    
The consolidation of China’s export controls was also as a result of the concern of the US 
government regarding PRC’s proliferation track record. Since the 1980’s, and parallel to the 
decline in state subsidies and funding for SOEs, Chinese enterprises have begun to allocate 
                                                 
612 Evan S. Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China’s System for Export Control on WMD-Related 
Goods and Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 24; Chinese Arms Exports, pp. 
57-60; China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations, pp. 234-235. 
613 Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, p. 13. 
614 Military Culture and Chinese Export Controls, p. 488. 
615 China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations, pp. 234-235. 
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other sources of revenue. They gradually expanded their assistance to WMD programmes in 
other countries, namely in the Middle East and South Asia
616
.  
The US placed a high priority on non-proliferation issues in its bilateral relations with China, 
and on several occasions Washington pressurised Beijing to formalise its non-proliferation 
commitments in specific export control regulations. At varying times in US-China relations, 
the US made a linkage between upgrading China’s export controls and improving relations 
with China
617
. The result was numerous improvements in China’s export control 
mechanisms
618
. 
In response to international concerns, and long before the structural changes in the defence 
industry complex, China began to take steps in order to prevent American pressure and to 
improve its international status. As a result, during the 1980’s and 1990’s China joined the 
main arms control treaties: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
619
.  
Furthermore, although PRC held reservations about the concept of export control regimes, in 
1997 it joined the Zanger Committee (the export control regime of NPT), and in 2004 it also 
became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In addition, China announced on 
several occasions its adherence to other international export control regimes: the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australian Group (AG) in the biological and 
chemical field. As a consequence, China’s export control lists were formalised to correspond 
with the lists of the above international regimes
620
. 
US pressure combined with China’s eagerness to become a respected global power led China 
to adopt international norms regarding export control systems
621
. As mentioned, PRC based 
its export control lists upon existing lists of different international export control regimes. 
Furthermore, China assimilated in its internal export control regulations legal tools that are 
                                                 
616 Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 5-7. 
617 There are several examples of these linkages. In 1997, China’s promulgation of nuclear-specific export 
regulations was a specific precondition of the United States to move forward with the implementation of a 
dormant nuclear cooperation agreement from 1985. Furthermore, China’s relative unwillingness for years to 
issue missile-related export control regulations was closely tied to Chinese opposition to US arms sales to 
Taiwan. 
618
 Chasing the Dragon, p. 17. 
619
 Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 7-8, 28. 
620 Ibid, pp. 51-56. 
621 Chasing the Dragon, pp. 18-19. 
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mandatory in order for its control system to be considered effective according to international 
standards and concretely by the US and western countries
622
. 
Moreover, the most noteworthy outcome of the reforms was the principle of transparency of 
the new control system. China published its entire export control regulations, control lists and 
the designated authorities. From the information which was released by PRC’s government 
one is able to learn about its official export control decision-making processes and about the 
responsibilities of each state agency in this apparatus
623
. However, the criteria for evaluating 
export control applications were not made public. For example, the parameters for 
transferring an application for the final decision of a higher body are not clear nor the extent 
of the export control agencies’ judgement regarding their obligation to consult other agencies 
(like MFA). 
From an administrative point of view the main reorganisation in 1998 was the reconstruction 
of COSTIND as a civilian ministry under the State Council. COSTIND was officially 
disconnected from the PLA and CMC. In 2008 COSTIND was reorganised again and was 
merged as the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry (SASTIND) into the 
new Ministry of Industry and Information (MII)
624
.  
SASTIND has responsibility for most of the defence industry complex and its export 
enterprises
625
. Only nine state corporations are entitled to export defence and WMD-related 
                                                 
622 Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 20-21, 28. 
623 In light of the limited space of the discussion, China’s legal framework and licensing processes of export 
controls will not be systematically analysed here. Chasing the Dragon (of RAND Corporation) and Export 
Controls in the People’s Republic of China (of the Centre of International Trade and Security) provide a clear 
and extensive characterisation of the subject.   
624
 Tai Ming Cheung, Dragon on the Horizon: China’s Defence Industrial Renaissance, Journal of strategic 
Studies, 32:1 (February 2009), p. 37. 
625 At the heart of the reforms, the entire defence industry complex was reorganised in order to generate 
competition among its defence conglomerates and with foreign defence industries which potentially can also 
cater to the PLA’s needs. As a result, the defence industries were reorganised into nine enterprises. Some of 
the defence conglomerates run export corporations which are the only ones authorised by the state to export 
military and dual-use items. The following defence SOEs are under SASTIND supervision (see also footnote 
no. 626): 
1) In the nuclear sector, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is responsible both for military and 
civilian nuclear programmes. CNNC controls an authorised entity for nuclear export: China Nuclear Import 
Export Corporation (CNIEC). Another entity, China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation (CNEC), 
is mainly involved in construction of nuclear reactors and defence-related nuclear facilities.  
2) In the aerospace sector, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) has expertise in the 
production of launching vehicles, manned spacecraft and satellites, and strategic and tactical missiles. CASC 
controls the China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation (CPMIEC) for the exportation of its 
products. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) specialises in guided missiles, air 
defence, and cruise missiles systems. 
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items. These export corporations represent SOEs of the defence industries, and most of them 
are under SASTIND control
626
. However, in contrast to its jurisdiction until 1998 
COSTIND/SASTIND is no longer involved in the direct management of defence industry 
corporations
627
. Furthermore, since its merger with MII, SASTIND has no responsibility for 
China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) which is the main administrative agency of the 
nuclear industry
628
. 
According to the new export control regulations which were published between 1997 and 
2003, SASTIND nowadays is the primary agency responsible for reviewing export 
applications for military items and aerospace systems and technologies. It also serves as the 
licensing administrator for exports in the above-mentioned fields
629
. Furthermore, SASTIND 
is one of the agencies which participate in consultations regarding the export of dual-use 
items in the missile and nuclear fields. SASTIND is the designated agency for reviewing 
requests to export nuclear materials, mentioned in the control list. SASTIND also gives 
                                                                                                                                                         
3) In the aviation sector, Aviation Industries Corporation of China (AVIC) is responsible for the development 
and production of combat aircraft, transport aircraft, helicopters and civilian products. AVIC manages China 
National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation (CATIC) as its export corporation. 
4) In the military ordnance sector, China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) mainly manufactures 
tanks, armoured vehicles and munitions supplies. NORINCO has its own export corporation. China 
Ordnance Equipment Corporation mainly manufactures civilian vehicles. 
5) In the maritime sector, China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) is the principle supplier to the PLA 
Navy. CSSC manufactures missile destroyers, frigates, and submarines. CSSC runs China Shipbuilding 
Trading Corporation (CSTC) as its export corporation. 
6) In the electronic sector, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation is the main enterprise. It runs 
China Electronics Import Export Corporation (CEIEC) as its commercial subsidiary. 
Regarding the export corporations, some of them (like CPMIEC and NORINCO) are also part of the China New 
Era Group (also known as Xinshidai) which is an arms trade conglomerate. Xinshidai is jointly controlled by 
SASTIND and GSD of PLA.    
626 There are nine authorised export corporations for conventional military goods (including aerospace systems 
and technologies, equivalent to items in Category I of the MTCR control list) :  
1) Under the joint supervision of SASTIND and the PLA (see also footnote no. 625): Xinshidai, CPMIEC, 
NORINCO, CATIC, CEIEC, and CSTC. 
2) Under the sole control of the PLA: Poly Technologies (military and missile-related items), and China 
Xinxing General Corporation (military supply and logistics). 
3) Under the control of PAP: China Jingjan Corporation (small arms, riot control and security equipment). 
In addition, there are corporations which are authorised to export WMD controlled items : 
1) For nuclear controlled items: CNIEC (see also footnote no. 625) and China Zhongyuan Export Corporation 
(CZEC). 
2) For chemical controlled items: SINOCHEM, China Haohua Chemical Industry Group, and Dalian Material 
Dyeing Plant. 
References: Chasing the Dragon, pp. 52, 63, 70; Chinese Arms Export, pp. 53-54; Daniel A. Pinkston, 
China’s Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis, statement at the US Senate, US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (109
th
 Congress, 1
st
 session, March 10
th
 2005), pp. 8-9. 
<www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/transcripts/05_03_10.pdf_/> Accessed on May 26
th
 2010; Dragon on 
the Horizon, pp. 39-40; Military Culture and Chinese Export Controls, pp. 486, 488. 
627
 A New Direction for China’s Defence Industry, p. 34. 
628 Dragon on the Horizon, p. 37. 
629 Chasing the Dragon, pp. 35-36. 
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technical assistance in reviewing major nuclear exports e.g. for constructing nuclear reactors 
and other nuclear facilities
630
. On the other hand, SASTIND has no official involvement in the 
export control process over chemical items, although in the past COSTIND was part of some 
interagency consultations
631
. 
It should be emphasised that SASTIND’s main objective is to promote defence export by the 
defence industry complex and to facilitate their marketing requirements. As a result, there is a 
conflict of interests between SASTIND’s leading role as export promoter and as an export 
control supervisor. These contradicting responsibilities can potentially influence SASTIND’s 
effectiveness as an export control agency
632
. 
Although the PLA lost a significant part of its control over the development and production 
entities in the defence industry complex, following the creation under the State Council of the 
new COSTIND/SASTIND, it still maintains extensive influence on defence export entities: 
GSD of the PLA, jointly with SASTIND, controls the New Era Group (also known as 
Xinshidai Group) which includes authorised export corporations. Most of the other defence 
export corporations (with authorisation for the export of missile-related items) are under the 
sole control of the PLA
633
. 
Furthermore, a new PLA division was established under CMC, the General Armament 
Division (GAD). GAD received, from COSTIND, the responsibilities for procurement and 
maintenance of the PLA weaponry. GAD is the PLA’s representative in the export control 
mechanism: it takes part in consultation processes on export applications for military and 
aerospace items, if the specific item is part of the PLA’s arsenal or its export could impair its 
military capabilities
634
. Moreover, it seems that GAD is the export licensing authority for 
export corporations which are under the direct control of the PLA
635
. 
The PLA’s involvement in export control mechanisms through its participation in CMC is 
less significant. CMC still vet, in concert with the State Council, export applications for 
major/sensitive conventional military items, and aerospace/missile items. However, under the 
new reforms, CMC does not join the State Council in the evaluation process of major export 
                                                 
630 Ibid, pp. 50-56; Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 32-33. 
631
 Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, p. 29. 
632 Chasing the Dragon, p. 36. 
633 See footnote no. 626.  
634 Chasing the Dragon, p. 37. 
635 Ibid; Military Culture and Chinese Export Controls, p. 485. 
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applications in the nuclear, chemical and biological spheres
636
. The State Council is also the 
forum which promulgated the regulations for the export of dual-use items
637
. Thus, the State 
Council is officially the highest national entity which is most influential in export controls. 
In order to establish an export control system according to international norms and which 
resembles to export control practices in western countries, civilian agencies acquired a 
stronger position in the Chinese system. MOFTEC as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
is involved in all export control mechanisms (the licensing process for military and aerospace 
items remains under the responsibility of COSTIND/SASTIND)
638
. MOFCOM replaced 
SACMPT as the leading agency for export controls on nuclear, chemical and missile dual-use 
items: MOFCOM coordinates the license application process and leads the interagency 
consultations on such applications
639
.  
MOFCOM also participates in the inter-agency consultations regarding export applications 
for all controlled items, but the review process is handled by designated agencies and not by 
MOFCOM: CAEA for nuclear items, SASTIND for aerospace and missile items, and the 
CWC Implementation Office
640
 (CWCIO) for chemicals
641
. Furthermore, MOFCOM was 
authorised by the State Council to coordinate enforcement efforts on non-proliferation 
issues
642
.   
Another civilian agency, MFA, also gained a greater role in export control mechanisms. In 
1997, a new MFA department was established: the Department for Arms Control and 
Disarmament Affairs (DACDA). DACDA was designated to deal with export controls and 
non-proliferation issues
643
. According to new regulations on export controls which were 
published during the reform period (1997-2003), MFA is involved in all export control 
decision making for defence and WMD-related items if foreign policy considerations are 
                                                 
636 Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, pp. 26, 30, 32-33. 
637
 Chasing the Dragon, p. 17. 
638 Ibid, p. 21. 
639 Chasing the Dragon, p. 24. 
640
 The CWCIO is subordinate to the State Development Control Commission which is under the State Council. 
The CWCIO has existed in various names and forms since China’s accession to the CWC convention in 
1993. For more details, see: Export Controls in the People’s Republic of China, p. 25 (no. 107).   
641
 Chasing the Dragon, pp. 55-59, 64-67, 74. 
642
 Ibid, pp. 25-26, 38. MOFCM coordinates its responsibilities with the customs services (General 
Administration of Customs - GAC) and with intelligence agencies (mainly the Ministry of Public Security - 
MPS).  
643 Chinese Arms Exports, p. 39. 
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relevant. Moreover, MFA participates in internal discussions on all military exports to 
‘countries of concern’644. 
4.2. The Differences between the New Chinese Export Control Mechanism and 
Pakistan’s Export Controls 
♦♦♦ 
As appears from the discussion above, the reforms in PRC’s defence industry sector since 
1997 have modified its nature and diminished the PLA’s involvement and influence. As a 
consequence, the reforms have limited the PLA’s role in export control mechanisms. The 
discussion in this section will focus on the differences between the new Chinese export 
control system and the Pakistani one. The following debate will be dedicated to a comparative 
analysis between China and Pakistan regarding the new position of the different agencies in 
export control mechanisms, and to the principle and phases of the reform process in China. 
♦♦♦ 
It should be emphasised that the core rationale of China’s reorganisation was financial, and 
not necessarily for the improvement of export control procedures. The reforms in the defence 
industry aimed to form new business conglomerates as SOEs. These new corporations are 
market orientated, and are expected to project profits by their own industrial capabilities 
(including the modification of some of their manufacturing capabilities for civilian products), 
and without dependence on government subsidies. In parallel, the reforms were also designed 
to reduce to a minimum the PLA’s function as a business entrepreneur in light of the negative 
influence financial ventures might have on the officer’s corps. As a result, the civilian 
agencies took control of most of the defence industries. 
China’s defence industry is significantly different from that of Pakistan. China’s defence 
export enterprises are world leading companies, and sell significant quantities of armaments 
and weaponry to foreign countries. Furthermore, since the beginning of the economic reforms 
in the 1980’s, China has advanced rapidly in its technological and industrial capabilities, and 
it has a private sector with an intense growth rate: thousands of companies trade in dual-use 
goods which can be converted to military applications and for WMD programmes. As a 
                                                 
644 Chasing the Dragon, pp. 27-28. 
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result, China had to devote its efforts to organising its control system in order to preserve its 
authority and to guarantees the success of the economic reforms.  
On the other hand, Pakistan’s defence sector is relatively small and its private sector is less 
developed than that in China: most of the entities in Pakistan which can export defence or 
dual-use products are government organisations or their subsidiary companies. Hence, unlike 
China’s control system, Pakistan’s system should be primarily scrutinised according to its 
relevance to the defence industries and to the nuclear organisations.     
As discussed in Chapter One, the objectives behind the formation of Pakistan’s control system 
were not economic as in PRC, but mainly to consolidate military dominance in decision-
making processes regarding the nuclear programmes. Although there is a continuous effort to 
sell defence products (mainly conventional weaponry) from defence industries and nuclear 
organisations (with ordnance division), they are R&D organisations that support Pakistan’s 
military needs. As a result, they enjoy generous government grants and they are not expected 
usually to raise most of their funds through competition in international defence markets. 
Although there were some attempts to improve defence industry marketing capabilities, the 
formation of the control system was not considered part of this effort. 
♦♦♦ 
Furthermore, the reforms in China’s defence industry complex and in its control system 
comprised two phases that were not part of the formation of Pakistan’s export control system. 
At the beginning of the process in March 1998 (during the 10
th
 conference of China’s 
People’s Congress), as part of a reduction in government bureaucracy, it was declared that the 
PLA would no longer be involved in private businesses. Most of the defence industry 
complex and its export enterprises were removed from the PLA’s control to civilian 
responsibility (such as the reorganised COSTIND), and the military lost is dominant position 
in export control mechanisms. The PLA’s role was limited through the establishment of GAD 
under CMC to specific inputs in export controls over missile-related items and conventional 
weapon systems. 
In the second phase, following the publication of most of the export control regulations in 
2002 and 2003, MOFCOM and MFA, civilian agencies minded of China’s international 
obligations, received the leading role in preventing proliferation from China. Every export 
application must be reviewed by MFA if it could influence China’s foreign policy and its 
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international commitments. Furthermore, the State Council and not CMC became the final 
arbiter in granting export licenses for both military and dual-use items. Officially, the defence 
establishment faced considerable loss of authority on export control mechanisms and was no 
longer involved in decision making on dual-use exports and on non-sensitive nuclear, missile, 
and chemical exports.  
♦♦♦ 
The above process of shifting power did not take place in Pakistan, and its defence 
establishment is far from sharing important responsibilities with civilian agencies. SPD, the 
designated military directorate for controlling nuclear organisations, centralises almost all 
responsibilities including the review of their export applications. No other agency is officially 
involved in the process. 
Although SPD and SASTIND are responsible for the R&D organisations of WMD in their 
respective countries, there are wide differences in their roles in export control mechanisms. 
Similar to SASTIND, SPD is responsible for the financial aspects of the nuclear 
organisations’ R&D projects, and for marketing the nuclear organisations’ products and 
technologies. Nevertheless, SASTIND does not solely conduct the export control 
mechanisms: although SASTIND grants export licenses for military and major aerospace 
exports, it needs to consult with other agencies such as MFA and GAD. Furthermore, 
SASTIND is not involved in the review process of dual-use or chemical item exports, and is 
only one participant agency in the nuclear export process, directed by China Atomic Energy 
Authority (CAEA). On the other hand, SASTIND is also responsible for the conventional 
defence industry while SPD does not have official authority in this sector
645
. 
 
                                                 
645 SPD established a directorate for conventional and open programmes that probably has a role regarding the 
supervision of defence industries. However, this responsibility was never declared officially. See: Naeem 
Salik, (representative of the SPD), Changes in Pakistan’s Nuclear Structure since 1998. Presentation at the 
workshop on ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security’ (Washington DC, April 30th 2007). 
<http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/documents/Salik_Nuclear_Establishment.pdf> Accessed on 
May 3
rd
 2010.   
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The differences between the two national export control systems can be exemplified by their 
different positions in the system of civilian agencies. MFA in China is involved in all export 
control processes over military and dual-use items whenever foreign policy interests are at 
stake. On the other hand, the role of MOFA in Pakistan is ambiguous and has no official role 
in supervising nuclear organisations. According to past internal regulations nuclear 
organisations have to obtain clearance from MOFA for their export application
646
, but it is not 
clear if these regulations are still in effect and what the guidelines of this process are. As 
mentioned in Chapters One and Four, MOFA has a central role through SECDIV in reviewing 
and licensing export applications of dual-use items made by private sector entities. SECDIV 
is coordinated by the Oversight Board of Export Control. The board is chaired by MOFA’s 
director general (the Secretary for Foreign Affairs), but it has representatives from other 
government agencies, including SPD. Hence, SECDIV’s operational framework is influenced 
by various interests, including those of the military. 
The differences are also significant when comparing China’s MOFCOM and Pakistan’s 
MOC. MOFCOM is the licensing authority for all exports of dual-use items and it participates 
in export control mechanisms (except for missile- related items). On the other hand, MOC in 
Pakistan has only an administrative role in formulating the legal framework for export control 
and participate in consultations on export application of dual-use items. It seems that MOC is 
not even the licensing authority, but rather MODP (for the defence industry), SECDIV (for 
the private sector) and possibly SPD (for the nuclear organisations). 
Regarding differences in the legal framework, China’s export control regulations are more 
comprehensive and detailed than the parallel legislations and statutory ordinances of 
Pakistan’s control system. As mentioned earlier, through PRC’s export control legal 
framework and official publications
647
 one can comprehend the division of responsibilities 
between different government agencies and the various steps in the export control 
mechanisms. 
On the other hand, the primary legislation in Pakistan is opaque and the military and federal 
government conceal internal regulations. Thus, it is difficult to determine the precise division 
                                                 
646 Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik, Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security, Arms Control 
Today, Vol. 37 (December 2007). <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo> Accessed on May 2
nd
 
2010. 
647 For example, see: China's Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (September 
2005), Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 
<http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/arms/arms.html> Accessed on March 13
th
 2012. 
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of responsibility between different agencies; which agency participates in the concrete 
consultation process, and if and when government decision-making forums (e.g. NCA, Export 
Control Oversight Board) are part of the export control licensing process. The enigma 
intensifies concerning control over the nuclear organisations responsible for most of 
Pakistan’s nuclear-related technologies and materials. 
4.3. The Similarities between China’s New Export Control System and Pakistan’s 
Control Mechanism 
Although China’s export control system underwent significant changes as a result of the 
reform process in its defence industry complex, it seems that the SOEs of its defence industry 
are more likely to receive greater sensitivity in the consideration of their export applications. 
The lenient approach can be exploited both by the export control agencies and the export 
corporations. 
Most of the defence export enterprises are subordinate to SASTIND. They have a legal 
monopoly over trade with conventional military weaponry and aerospace controlled items. 
However, SASTIND has two hats: it is the designated agency that reviews their export 
applications, and it is also the chief government organisation for the promotion of defence 
exports. Moreover, some of the export corporations are under the PLA’s direct control and 
still apply to GAD for export licenses - and not to a civilian agency. As a result, the export 
control mechanisms could be bypassed by export enterprises connected to the PLA: they can 
trade their products by using military enterprises, which are not constantly subject to civilian 
scrutiny, and use them as their mediators
648
. 
The above situation is similar to the one in Pakistan: the nuclear organisations are supervised 
by SPD which is responsible for preventing proliferation parallel to increasing the budget of 
the nuclear organisations from marketing their products (including conventional weaponry). 
The same applies to the defence industries under MODP which is responsible for the Defence 
Export Promotion Organisation
649
.  
In addition, the PLA still exercises influence on export control mechanisms beyond its official 
role. As mentioned, the PLA’s military enterprises are exempt from a civilian review of their 
export applications. Furthermore, major/sensitive export of controlled military or aerospace 
items is decided jointly by the State Council and CMC which includes a majority of military 
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649 See: MODP website <www.modp.gov.pk> Accessed on May 4th, 2010. 
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generals: they probably show more sensitivity towards the requests of the military-affiliated 
enterprises. CMC is the highest decision making forum for national security issues and it 
directs China’s entire defence establishment. Hence, CMC is likely to carry more weight on 
defence exports. 
China and Pakistan share a similar approach of minimum necessary transparency regarding 
their export controls. China has gone a long way towards greater openness, but like Pakistan 
China has never made it clear what the position of the military in the control system is: the 
PLA sustained to a great extent its influence over the defence industry complex. China never 
fully explained how it intended to transform its general guidelines into specific measures. 
China explicitly declared it would examine the approval of defence exports could influence 
china’s national security and international obligations, the regional and internal stability of the 
recipient country. China also determined that one of its considerations is the record of the 
recipient country in pursuing a WMD program or actively sponsoring terrorism
650
. Yet, unlike 
western countries, China refrained from publishing ‘black lists’ of countries and companies as 
an administrative tool for defence and sensitive export control. 
5. Conclusion 
Since the middle of the 1990’s PRC has made considerable modifications in its export control 
mechanisms. The mechanisms were gradually transferred from the authority and dominant 
influence of the PLA to the jurisdiction of the civilian government. Although the PLA still 
exerts considerable power within the export control system (mainly through its dominant 
position in the defence export sector) the final decision on granting export licenses is usually 
under the civilian agencies’ responsibility. 
PRC was able to reform its export control system from a military oriental to a civilian one 
mainly as a result of structural conditions. First, the PLA constantly acknowledged the 
authority of the civilian leadership and the legitimacy of CCP. Second, it was necessary for 
the PLA to realise the negative implications of its involvement in private businesses and 
concretely in defence exports. Lastly, the Chinese government integrated western principles 
into its framework of export controls. Furthermore, the Chinese government was able to 
enforce its writ on SOEs, and to subordinate most of them to export controls under the 
responsibility of civilian agencies. The government was also able to establish legal, 
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procedural, and structural frameworks for export controls. This framework proved to be more 
effective in preventing proliferation than the system in place until the late 1990’s as evident 
from the decline in the involvement of defence export enterprises in assistance to WMD 
programmes of foreign countries
651
. 
However, private Chinese companies and entities still assist WMD programmes usually by 
supplying dual-use items. PRC establishment still struggles to enforce its policy over the 
private sector which grows significantly each year. Most of the problems in exercising export 
controls relate to the level of professionalism of the manpower which deals with export 
applications. Furthermore, it is possible to manoeuvre the export control process by creating a 
smokescreen regarding the final destination of the export and by exploiting the tolerated 
corruption within the establishment (mainly based on well-rooted social networks knows as 
Guanxi).  
Nevertheless, China’s export control mechanisms are still evolving and improving. The level 
of professionalism is on the rise and the supervision of the defence industry complex is more 
effective. The PLA’s diminished role in export controls contributed to the professionalism of 
the control system: the military potentially complicated export control processes because of 
its conflicting responsibilities for the expansion of defence exports and the limitation of 
problematic international character. Furthermore, the PLA is most probably less sensitive than 
civilian government agencies (specifically MFA and MOFCOM) to international norms and 
to the negative implications of assisting nuclear programmes. 
♦♦♦ 
Pakistan still has a long way to go in order to achieve the level of efficiency of PRC’s export 
control system in preventing nuclear proliferation. Hence, it will be a considerable challenge 
for Pakistan to adopt western practices for its export controls. The main flaw in Pakistan’s 
export control system is the marginalisation of civilian agencies and their absence from the 
supervision over the nuclear organisations. 
The dominant control of Pakistan’s military over nuclear programmes enables it to decide on 
sensitive export of nuclear-related items and technologies without major interference and 
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monitoring from other state organisations. The PLA was in a similar position until 1997 and 
indeed used its jurisdiction to allow defence exports and sensitive exports to countries which 
developed strategic capabilities. Nowadays, the PLA has lost much of its capability to export 
sensitive items without interference from other state agencies, although it can still use its 
influence and responsibilities in order to determine the outcome of the export control process. 
Chinese experience in constructing an export control system indicates that the first step in 
establishing a viable system in Pakistan is to place its civilian authorities at the centre of its 
control mechanisms and create an authentic partnership between its government and the 
defence establishment. Nowadays, unlike China’s State Council and CMC, Pakistan’s 
national leadership seems to have limited and marginal involvement, in reviewing export 
applications. In addition, Pakistan’s civilian agencies must be an integral part of the export 
control process over the nuclear organisations. 
♦♦♦ 
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Chapter Five: Glossary of Abbreviations 
AG - Australian Group 
AQ Khan - Abdul Qadeer Khan 
AVIC - Aviation Industries Corporation of China 
BWC - Biological Weapons Convention 
C-in-C - Commander in Chief 
CAEA - China Atomic Energy Authority 
CASC - China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 
CASIC - China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 
CATIC - China National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation 
CCC - Corps Commanders’ Conference 
CCP - Communist Party of China 
CEIEC - China Electronics Import Export Corporation 
CMC - Central Military Commission 
CNEC - China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation 
CNIEC - China Nuclear Import Export Corporation 
CNNC - China National Nuclear Corporation 
COAS - Chief of Army Staff 
COSTIND - Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence 
CPMIEC - China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation 
CSSC - China State Shipbuilding Corporation 
CSTC - China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation 
CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention 
CWCIO - Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Office 
CZEC - China Zhongyuan Export Corporation 
DACDA - Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs 
DCC - Cabinet Committee for Defence 
- Development Control Committee 
DG ISI - Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence 
GAC - General Administration of Customs 
GAD - General Armament Department  
GHQ - General Headquarters 
GLD - General Logistics Department 
GPD - General Political Department 
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GSD - General Staff Department/Headquarters 
HQ - Headquarters 
IB - Intelligence Bureau 
ISI - Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence 
JCSC - Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
JSHQ - Joint Staff Headquarters 
MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MI - Military Intelligence Directorate 
MII - Ministry of Industry and Information 
MND - Ministry of National Defence 
MOC - Ministry of Commerce 
MOD - Ministry of Defence 
MODP - Ministry of Defence Production 
MOFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of Pakistan) 
MOFCOM - Ministry of Commerce (of China) 
MOFTECH - Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation 
MPS - Ministry of Public Security 
MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime  
NCA - National Command Authority 
NESCOM - National Engineering and Scientific Commission 
NORINCO - China North Industries Corporation  
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSC - National Security Council 
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group 
PAP - People’s Armed Police 
PLA - People’s Liberation Army 
PLAAF - People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN - People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PRC - People’s Republic of China 
R&D - Research and Development 
US - United States of America 
SACMPT - State Authority Committee for Military Product Trade 
SASTIND - State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry 
SBMPT - State Bureau of Military Product Trade 
SECDIV - Strategic Export Control Division 
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SOE - State-Owned Enterprise 
SPD - Strategic Plans Division 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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 Conclusion  
1. The Insights into Pakistan, its Defence Apparatus and the Nuclear Export 
Phenomenon    
The main objective of this thesis was to reveal the fundamental problems in Pakistan’s control 
system over its nuclear organisations by exposing the interconnection between the 
bureaucratic procedures of the control system and the perceptions and organisational culture 
of Pakistan’s defence establishment. Similarly to a train which travels wherever its rails take 
it, the strategic context of operating the control system determines the latter’s actual ability to 
prevent proliferation. Understanding the environment in which the control system was created 
and operates might provide explanations why this system could not prevent the nuclear 
exports of AQ Khan’s network and why its efficiency is questionable regarding preventing 
nuclear exports from recurring. 
1.1. AQ Khan’s Nuclear Proliferation Network and Pakistan’s Defence 
Establishment: the Organisational Dimension 
This thesis demonstrates that the nuclear control system is an integral part of Pakistan’s 
defence establishment, and Pakistan is almost the only nuclear weapons country (perhaps 
together with North Korea) whose control system over its nuclear organisations has a strong 
military character. As discussed in length in Chapter Two, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) 
connected to the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) is the prominent agency which centralises 
the responsibilities of the nuclear organisations. As a result, SPD has great influence over 
nuclear related transfer. SPD participates in any deliberation about nuclear programmes and 
their security, and might take part if technology and information sharing arises. 
Not only are the nuclear programmes supervised by the military, but decision making on their 
progress is also under dominant military rule. SPD is controlled by the Army and it receives 
instructions regarding nuclear programmes from the Army chief (COAS) who usually 
consults on routine decisions with a small circle of aides, all of whom are senior military 
officers: CGS (responsible for staff work of the Army HQ), DGMO (in charge of all military 
planning) DGMI (head of  intelligence activity), the head of SPD and the head of the ISI 
(involved in the security apparatus of nuclear programmes, and in the past responsible for 
clandestine operations involving  procurements and transfer of nuclear-related items). Apart 
from the senior officers within the Army HQ (GHQ), COAS probably needs to consult on 
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major decisions in the nuclear programmes with other senior Army generals who are usually 
considered as his close circle of aides: the prominent corps commanders responsible for the 
defences on Indian and Afghan fronts and for the protection of the national command and 
control centres in and adjacent to the capital city, Islamabad. 
♦♦♦ 
As evident, within the military, decision making on strategic issues strongly tends to be 
centralised with the participation of a small group of confidants. Even the chiefs of other 
military services (the Air Force and the Navy) and the nominal chief of the armed forces (The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee - CJCSC) are in the margin of the core 
group of decision makers. These generals can be consulted when necessary (particularly 
CSCJC who is responsible for administrative support of SPD and for international military 
cooperation) but they are unlikely to exert considerable influence on a decision made by the 
Army-ISI nexus to assist the nuclear weapons project of a foreign country. 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that the military’s dominant position in the control 
system over the nuclear organisations enables it to decide whether to offer nuclear assistance 
to foreign countries without any interference from the civilian agencies in the export control 
mechanisms. Among all the civilian agencies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
participates in deliberations about the nuclear issue due to its valuable experience in 
diplomatic and international bodies and forums. Consequently, MFA will probably be called 
upon to give its opinion on the implication of nuclear assistance, but most likely without a 
voice in the decision making itself.  
The other civilian agencies which are supposed to supervise the defence apparatus (such as 
the Ministry of Defence) appear to lack considerable weight in the decisions making on the 
nuclear issue. Moreover, even the civilian leadership (the President and the Cabinet) heavily 
depends on information about nuclear programmes provided by the military. The heads of 
government participate in the National Command Authority (NCA) which is officially in 
charge of the control system, but it is powerless to exercise authority and rarely convenes. As 
a result, Pakistan’s national leadership has been probably powerless to prevent or to halt a 
scheme of the military chiefs and their close circle of associates to assist foreign countries in 
the development of nuclear weapons programmes. 
♦♦♦ 
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The comparative analysis of Pakistan’s export control system and China’s contemporary and 
past export control mechanisms emphasises the main features in the system which enabled 
nuclear proliferation from Pakistan. The proliferation of WMD-related technologies and 
materials from China declined parallel to the reforms in the export control system which 
limited the role of China’s armed forces, the PLA. There is still proliferation from China, its 
control system has critical flaws in the implementation of China’s non-proliferation policy, 
and the PLA still holds significant influence over the defence industry and its export 
corporations. However, the origin of most assistance to WMD programmes of foreign 
countries shifted to the private sector and emanates from export corporations in whose 
management the PLA is involved.  
The process of allocating responsibility to civilian agencies and integrating inter-agency 
practices into the work of the export control mechanisms proved to be an important element 
in preventing assistance for nuclear programmes by one of the state entities. Particularly 
important was designating government ministries as responsible for the export control 
process. Pakistan still preserves the military-centred control system with no substantial 
involvement of civilian agencies that China had until the middle of the 1990’s, and the 
proliferation record of AQ Khan’s network is comparable to the past involvement of Chinese 
state-corporations in nuclear assistance to Iran, Algeria, North Korea and Pakistan itself
652
. 
Unlike the Chinese reforms, the reforms of 1999-2000 in Pakistan’s control system and the 
creation of NCA and SPD lack a real shift in the power centres of the system and appear 
mainly designed to reaffirm the Army’s dominant role in the supervision over nuclear 
organisations, and thus had no affect on improving Pakistan’s ability to prevent assistance to 
foreign nuclear weapons programmes. The connection of the nuclear organisations to the 
Army received formal recognition following the construction of the legal framework for the 
operation of the control system. Moreover, the affiliation of the nuclear organisations to the 
Army exempts them from the export control process which has been in existence since the 
reforms of 1999-2000 (for example in the Export Control Act of 2004), and practically 
thwarted even a minor attempt to strengthen a civilian government’s ability to prevent nuclear 
exports. 
                                                 
652 Nowadays, China supports Pakistan’s nuclear programme and provides nuclear reactors. Although China’s 
nuclear assistance is critical for Pakistan’s efforts to expand its nuclear capabilities and contradicts the spirit of 
China’s international obligations, Pakistan is already a nuclear weapons country; thus, China’s support is not 
equivalent to its nuclear assistance in the past to non-nuclear weapons countries.  
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The main modification of the reforms commenced in 1999-2000 was tightening the control 
over KRL, the nuclear R&D organisation headed by AQ Khan, and limiting Khan’s free-hand 
in internal issues concerning KRL since his pivotal role in developing Pakistan’s nuclear 
capabilities. The tightening of control eventually led to the removal in 2001 of AQ Khan from 
his position in KRL. AQ Khan’s strong stance enabled him to execute the nuclear assistance 
venture and operate the proliferation network outside Pakistan in the period 1987-2003. 
However, the Army, with the help of the ISI always vigorously maintained various means of 
supervising KRL which facilitated the  nuclear export project: from assigning military officers 
to KRL’s negotiations on nuclear assistance with foreign delegates to facilitating the import 
and export operations of the nuclear proliferation network. The Army also positioned senior 
officers to protect KRL’s assets (equipment and knowledge) against various external attacks.   
♦♦♦ 
This thesis concludes that AQ Khan’s financial and ideological motivations coexisted with a 
structure of military control that was sufficiently strong to point his activities in directions that 
were congruent with Pakistan’s strategic interests as interpreted by influential officers. 
Nevertheless, the situation in Pakistan is hardly a clear-cut case: AQ Khan was a powerful 
official in Pakistan’s nuclear complex. Khan’s high public profile (which is unusual for a 
nuclear programme manager) and his image as “the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb” 
strengthened his internal position. As a result of the above, Khan and his associates in the 
proliferation network were probably the instigators behind several shipments of nuclear-
related equipment from Pakistan. Although conclusive information is absent, judging from the 
widespread phenomenon of corruption and irregularities in all Pakistan’s social and 
governmental systems they probably also have a hold on the control system and on the 
nuclear organisations: AQ Khan and his associates were probably able to exploit the lenient 
approach of some military officers on some occasions rather than work to military direction. 
♦♦♦ 
In addition, although the nuclear export is perceived throughout this thesis as a well-
implemented project it varied according to circumstances: different proposals for nuclear 
assistance were offered to different countries at different periods of time. It seems that there 
was no consistent and organised effort involved in nuclear proliferation, but rather a desire to 
grasp business opportunities. For example, the connection with Iran was limited at first by 
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COAS General Zia ul-Haq to the supply of nuclear related technology and knowhow (gas 
centrifuges,  their parts and designs), but  later, during General Aslam Beg’s tenure as Army 
chief, the assistance evolved into propositions for much broader assistance at all stages of the  
nuclear weapons development. These proposals for assistance eventually materialised 
partially under Beg’s successors, and Iran received an advanced model of gas centrifuges 
together with very sensitive data on developing the nuclear device. 
1.2. AQ Khan’s Nuclear Proliferation Network and Pakistan’s Defence 
Establishment: the Agenda that Propelled the Project 
♦♦♦ 
In spite of the circuitous nature of Pakistan’s nuclear assistance, a strategic rationale appeared 
to generate it. This rationale was part of a valid paradigm of the Pakistan Army and this 
paradigm continues to determine the nature of the control system. Equal to other nuclear 
weapons countries, the magnitude of the nuclear dimension places it at the epicentre of 
Pakistan’s national security thinking. The insights from this thesis into the causes behind the 
decision of Pakistan’s defence establishment to offer nuclear assistance enabled it to highlight 
core elements of Pakistan’s national security thinking, its assumptions and its objectives. 
♦♦♦ 
As broadly discussed in Chapter Three, India is the focus of the Army’s paradigm as 
Pakistan’s main adversary, and the Army’s main objective is to achieve a strategic balance 
with its dominant neighbour. In order to achieve this highly ambitious strategic objective or at 
least to prevent further erosion of Pakistan’s position in the power equation (in light of the 
growing gap with economically, militarily, and internationally empowered India), it seems 
probable that elements in Pakistan’s defence establishment have desperately adopted a radical 
policy of advocating extreme measures, such as nuclear export and sponsoring terrorism: for 
example, since the 1970’s Pakistan has been able to influence power sharing in Afghanistan, 
and in the 1990’s to receive North Korea’s valuable assistance in developing nuclear missiles. 
Terrorism and nuclear proliferation have become destined to help Pakistan confront India’s 
military superiority, and to mobilise international awareness of the conflict as part of the 
campaign to pressurise India on Kashmir. 
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In the context of the rivalry with India, Pakistan’s nuclear development and assistance are 
inter-related with Islamabad’s relations with the US. Pakistan’s defence establishment has 
striven for decades to secure American support. However, the strategic failure to achieve a 
military alliance with the US against India or even to secure America’s military and economic 
assistance on a long term basis has evolved into bitterness within the defence establishment 
towards what was perceived as US duplicity and unreliability. At first, developing nuclear 
capabilities was aimed at diminishing the need to rely on US support, but later it seems there 
is a strong possibility that as a by-product of Pakistan’s Indian-centred thinking its nuclear 
programme became central to a ‘blackmail policy’ towards Washington in order to secure US 
military and economic assistance.  
It appears that in practice the above policy has been perpetuated by Pakistan’s defence 
establishment in two stages. In the first stage, the defence establishment contemplated the 
perception to Washington that the current regime in Pakistan (dominated by the defence 
establishment) was the only alternative to the rise of a radical Islamic regime equipped with 
nuclear weapons. By adopting this view the US has lost much of its leverage on Pakistan by 
practically restraining the US from taking any punitive measures that might significantly 
damage the resilience of the Pakistani regime. Even when the US imposed economic and 
military sanctions on Pakistan between 1990 and 2001 it avoided labelling Pakistan as a 
“country of concern”  (like North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria) despite its involvement in 
nuclear proliferation and terrorism.  
In the second stage the defence establishment was probably complicit in giving nuclear 
assistance to some of the US worst adversaries: Iran, North Korea and Libya, parallel to 
contacts with Syria and Saddam’s regime in Iraq. America’s vital interest in nuclear non-
proliferation was damaged, and stability was undermined in the Middle East and North-East 
Asia where the US invested tremendous efforts in diffusing the potential explosiveness of 
these regions. Naturally, the direct benefits of nuclear assistance (such as financial incentive 
and technological contribution) were the main factor behind Pakistan’s nuclear assistance to 
the above countries; however, Pakistan’s defence establishment probably was also ready to 
assist these countries in developing nuclear weapons programmes in order to indicate to the 
US that without nurturing Pakistan the latter could cause irreparable damage to US global 
interests and to American nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Moreover, an increase in the total 
number of nuclear weapons countries, particularly with anti-western agenda, has a great 
potential for Pakistan to divert the US attention from Pakistan’s unique circumstances: 
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unstable country with nuclear capabilities in defiance of the NPT, and the only nuclear 
country among Muslim nations. 
♦♦♦ 
In the final analysis, the main player in the defence establishment, the Army, has the leading 
role in directing the course of the entire country, and it routinely exercised its power to 
impose its agenda on national security policy. As revealed, the main focus of the Army on 
India as Pakistan’s arch enemy is also the perspective of the defence establishment on 
Pakistan’s overall strategic situation. The Army determined the course of the nation based on 
this fundamental conviction. In light of the Army’s main objective to have a strategic balance 
with consistently stronger India, the adopted policy strongly tends to include adopting radical 
means of closing the growing gap in the power equation, such as nuclear assistance to foreign 
countries. 
♦♦♦ 
1.3. Pakistan’s Defence Establishment: the Main Focus of Analysis 
The perspective of this thesis into Pakistan’s control system can offer a comprehensive 
explanation regarding the defence establishment and its decision making. Understanding the 
central role of the nuclear programmes in Pakistan’s national security thinking helped to 
realise the entire organisational rationale of the defence establishment and its overall strategic 
thinking. In turn, these insights can assist in evaluating other important national security 
issues, such as Pakistan’s controversial role in the campaign against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, 
its foreign policy principally towards the US, India, China, and Muslim countries in close 
proximity (mainly Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf principalities and Iran).  
The organisational rationale of the defence establishment was evaluated earlier in the 
discussion about Pakistan’s control system. This establishment appears to function as several 
circles of decision making surrounding the Army chief, Pakistan’s de-facto final arbiter 
throughout most of the period since the country’s independence in August 1947. The inner 
circle is COAS close group of associates, almost all of whom are senior Army officers who 
serve in key positions in GHQ or as corps commanders responsible for the Army’s prominent 
combat units. In this circle all the important decision making on the course of national 
security policy takes place including overall military operations plans, internal affairs, and 
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foreign policy towards neighbouring countries and global powers. COAS is usually first 
among equals, and he needs consensual support for his policies, so the generals will not 
attempt to block his agenda. However, the longer COAS stays in office or serves in addition 
as the official head of the country (as Chief Martial Law Administrator or as President, as in 
the case of Army chiefs Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul-Haq, and Pervez 
Musharraf), the greater authority he acquires and the less consideration he is required to give 
to the views of his fellow officers.  
The second circle of decision makers includes the senior command of the armed forces (Joint 
Staff, Air Force and Navy) whose opinions will be taken into consideration on national 
security issues mainly regarding military affairs such as joint planning, defence budget, and 
cooperation with foreign militaries. The chiefs of the armed forces may also be consulted 
occasionally on important national security issues; however their participation seems to be 
more in an advisory capacity than as equal members in decision making. The third circle of 
decision makers includes the civilian leadership which is supposed to control the defence 
establishment. The President and the Prime Minister are routinely briefed by the chiefs of the 
armed forces and can summon the Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC) which includes senior 
members of the government to set the course of all national security matters. Officially, the 
heads of government also nominate the heads of the armed forces, including COAS, but 
regularly both on national security issues and nominees the Army’s consent is desirable if not 
mandatory. The civilian leadership is informed about the Army policy objectives mainly in 
order to be co-opted and serve as a mean to divert international pressures. 
The forth and last circle of decision making is comprised of the senior mandarins in 
government ministries who deal with the military administrative requirements such as 
budgets, properties, manpower, weaponry and logistics. The military has influence on the 
ministries which are supposed to be its supervisors but they are regularly treated as 
auxiliaries: the ministries of defence and defence production are manned by former military 
officers who look after the needs of their former respective military service. The Army 
approach also applies to the Ministry of Finance on budget issues. As mentioned in Chapter 
Two, MOFA is possibly treated as more valuable in light of the need for its contribution in 
formulating defence policy. 
♦♦♦ 
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The intelligence community plays an unusually dominant role in the defence establishment. 
The main intelligence agency, the ISI, is the military’s fundamental long arm for executing 
the Army’s agenda through clandestine operations and using militant groups as proxies 
against India and in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the ISI is entrusted with preserving the 
Army’s dominant role in Pakistan’s internal system primarily through mobilising political and 
public support for the Army’s agenda by influencing the mass media and the political system. 
The ISI is also responsible for containing any objection to the Army’s dominance from 
opposition factions in the public sphere, such as the media, non-governmental organisations 
and academia. 
♦♦♦ 
As a consequence of the ISI’s vital role as the Army’s main operational agency and its 
responsibility for consolidating the Army’s internal and external interests, the organisation 
can be considered as  an equal partner in the most intimate decision-making circles and is 
probably part of any critical conclusion on national security issues. It seems that the ISI’s 
significant operational role has overshadowed the organisation’s traditional function as an 
intelligence agency like its equivalent in western countries. In addition, most of the ISI’s 
senior directors probably have an operational background and tend to perceive special 
operations as the main solution to any strategic dilemma. As a consequence, the ISI likely 
tends to advocate decisions which include exhorting aggressive means which in turn 
strengthen the ISI’s central role. 
1.4. Nuclear and Terror Proxies as a Critical Element of National Security  
The dominance of the defence establishment and its inherent strong inclination towards 
aggressive means combined with its inability to achieve Pakistan’s strategic objectives by 
using traditional military means transformed into advocating proxies as the main course for 
advancing national security goals. As discussed in Chapter Three, in light of Pakistan’s 
inferiority in the power equation with India, proxies became one of the main tools of the 
defence establishment for pressuring India to incline towards Pakistan’s demands, and for 
having determinable influence on the future of Afghanistan. The ISI was designated to 
manage these operations due to the need of maintaining their clandestine nature: it has been 
crucial to preserve the Army’s capability of denying official involvement and thus having to 
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pay a heavy price in risking a military escalation with India and souring Pakistan’s relations 
with the US and western countries. 
♦♦♦ 
It is possible to indicate that the approach of using proxies is not limited only to connections 
with terror organisations which operate in India and Afghanistan while receiving military and 
financial support from Pakistan: similar methods were apparently employed to operate the 
nuclear proliferation network of AQ Khan. As in sponsoring terrorism, the defence 
establishment contemplated a network of private entities and individuals to promote national 
security objectives: through nuclear assistance allocating funds and technologies for the 
military and the nuclear programmes and in practice undermining American interests by 
supporting the nuclear weapons programmes of US staunchest adversaries. Similar to the 
contacts of the ISI with militant groups, a designated directorate, the SPD (and its 
predecessors), received full responsibility for coordinating the  operations of the nuclear 
organisations, and as a consequence for AQ Khan as DG KRL and to his diverse proliferation 
activities. Akin to the project of sponsoring terrorism, the private entities involved in the 
nuclear proliferation project also seem to receive significant operational freedom as long as 
they delivered the desired results. 
♦♦♦ 
2. The Possible Contributions of this Thesis to Academic Discourse  
2.1. Military Influence on National Decision Making  
The influence of the Pakistan Army, both in its uncontested effect on the running of the nation 
and its consistency for more than half a century is most unusual in the international 
community, even among countries which gained independence after World War Two and 
which had similar historical experience. However, Pakistan as an extreme model for military 
involvement in national decision making can be presented as an example of the main 
character of military participation in decision making and the military’s organisational culture 
in non-emergency periods. 
The eminent feature of the Army and its decision-making processes seems to be strict 
compartmentalisation inside the Army HQ. Only key officials of senior rank and the 
bureaucratic department in the HQ which is under their command participate in the 
Conclusion 
178 
 
consultations on national security issues and are involved in formalising the Army’s position. 
In Pakistan’s test case, there are only two important departments (the Military Operation 
Directorate and the Military Intelligence Directorate) which are responsible for military 
planning and policies, and both of them are under the Chief of General Staff (CGS) who is in 
charge of the smooth operation of the GHQ. Furthermore, even among the senior ranks, the 
decisions are left to a small group of senior Army officers while the others are at best 
consulted on the chosen policy.  
Generally, the Army as a military organisation is a monolithic and conservative organisation 
which advocates discipline. As a result, decision making in the Army always depends on the 
Army chief and his views: he is the final arbiter and he can oppose the consensual opinion of 
his  senior officers. The senior officers are personally appointed by COAS and are considered 
his associates. Although COAS does not formally need wide support for his preferred policy 
it is desirable due to the power of the high command in Pakistan. However, under the strict 
hierarchy it seems that the high command rarely objects to the chosen policy and it is almost 
impossible for them to change the designated course. Hence, the organisational framework for 
the decision making within the Army institution tends to lead to conformity and group 
thinking that cannot halt policy objectives promoted by the Army chief and his close circle of 
advisors. 
Regarding the principle of inter-services cooperation within the armed forces, it seems from 
the Pakistani experience that a too dominant Army marginalises the Air Force and Navy and 
they are excluded from any deliberations on national security issues which are not directly 
connected to their operational missions, for example on foreign policy. The Army’s tendency 
to cast aside the other services only strengthened its inclination towards group thinking. The 
same argument applies to the castration of the Joint Staff HQ and the inter-services forums 
which could potentially provide a sounder opinion on national security issues from a broader 
perspective than one limited to a small group of principle Army officers and corps 
commanders under the command of the Army chief.   
2.2. The Institutional Dimension of Export Control System  
Similar to the anomalous nature of the Pakistani case study in the military context, the 
phenomenon of Pakistan’s nuclear export has been unprecedented since the beginning of the 
‘nuclear age’ in August 1945 (the US nuclear attack on Japan which ended World War Two). 
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By examining the structural malfunctions in Pakistan’s control system over its nuclear 
organisations it is possible to improve general understanding of institutional arrangements 
which are essential for a control system, directed by a non-proliferation policy. 
By illustrating an organisational model for export control mechanisms, mainly based on  the 
rich and diverse experience of western countries (which due to their hold on relevant 
technologies were usually a destination for illicit acquisition efforts), it is possible to 
determine that an efficient export control system is obliged to have effective inter-agency 
procedures. These bureaucratic arrangements are needed for consultations and information 
sharing and are as fundamental as equipping the export control apparatus with the legal and 
administrative tools to conduct an effective process (such as demanding an end-user 
certificate and a catch-all clause inserted in the relevant export regulation).  
The inter-agency procedures are mandatory not just to thwart any attempt of the exporter at an 
illegal commercial transaction, but additionally to prevent a concentration of excessive 
authority in a single agency which in turn could use it to allow nuclear export corresponding 
with its internal agenda. Inter-agency consultations narrow the possibility of clandestine 
nuclear assistance to foreign countries by imposing the need to coordinate it with several 
agencies with contradictory agendas. Moreover, allowing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
play a key role in the export control system is likely to improve the efficiency of its 
supervision. Generally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the most sensitive to the 
implications of proliferation on external relations and it is the greatest advocate in avoiding 
radical initiatives which are likely to infringe upon a country’s international status. As a 
consequence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly tends to impose the adherence of a 
national non-proliferation policy and international commitments. 
In light of the export control system as an important government function which is linked to 
national security interests it usually includes direct contact with the national leadership. It can 
generally be argued that the greater the involvement of the leadership in the decision-making 
processes on export control, the less the chances of proliferation are. The national leadership 
has better awareness of the implications of proliferation on the overall status of the country 
and it tends to have a broader view on national security which diminishes the possibility of a 
decision on assistance for nuclear programmes of foreign countries. As a consequence, a 
decision by the national leadership itself on nuclear assistance is possible but less likely than a 
decision by a state agency which is limited to promoting its narrow interests. 
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Furthermore, from an organisational perspective it is important to avoid the monopoly of 
supervision over the R&D agencies and the defence industry by a single designated control 
agency. These relations could encourage a client-patron relationship or loose control and an 
independent R&D agency. In both instances, either the control agency or the R&D agency 
might exploit their power to initiate export of nuclear-related equipment.    
2.3. The Factors behind the Nuclear Assistance of a Nuclear Weapons Country to a 
Foreign Nuclear Weapons Programme                 
Pakistan’s wide-ranging involvement in nuclear assistance to at least three countries (Iran, 
Libya and North Korea), and the offers of assistance to several others, presents a fundamental 
quandary about the motives behind this assistance: it appears to contradict the principles of 
collective security and might jeopardise the country which assists a foreign one with its 
nuclear weapons programme. As more countries acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear 
weapons country loses its strategic advantage and its upgraded position as a member of the 
exclusive nuclear club. Furthermore, theoretically the nuclear weapons the supplier country 
helped to develop might be turned against it in the future as a deterrent. In an extreme 
scenario these developed capabilities might even be launched against the supplier country or 
transferred to terror organisations which could decide to launch a nuclear attack. 
In addition, in Pakistan’s case, the assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme is more perplexing 
than its contacts with other countries, in light of the complicated relations between the two 
countries. Both countries have disagreements on a series of issues: the religious tension 
between Sunni Pakistan and Shi'ite Iran, the rivalry over regional hegemony in Central Asia, 
the future regime in Afghanistan and their support for rival factions, the close relations 
between Iran and India, the Shi'ite minority in Pakistan who are under constant threat of 
violence and terror, and the Baloch separatists who fight against Iran using Pakistan’s 
territory. 
As it seems, Pakistan’s motives for assisting non-nuclear weapons countries are different 
from the factors behind the decision of nuclear powers to assist a world power (like the 
Russian nuclear cooperation with China) and allied countries (like the French assistance to 
Israel’s nuclear project) in developing a nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan and North 
Korea are the only two countries which have decided to assist other countries in developing 
nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s. 
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Pakistan and North Korea together share the same factors which explain why these countries 
were involved in nuclear proliferation and not India and Israel which are also recognised 
nuclear weapons countries and not global powers. It appears that, as this thesis indicates, the 
dominant military influence on national security thinking and decision making determined the 
inclination of Pakistan and North Korea to provide nuclear assistance: the dominant position 
of the defence establishment affected the marginalisation of international considerations 
during the discussions. Furthermore, both countries had on one hand tense or hostile relations 
with the US and on the other hand maintained close contacts with countries (like Iran, Syria 
and Iraq under the rule of Saddam Husain) which aspire to challenge the current global order, 
including developing nuclear weapons. Contrary to Pakistan and North Korea, in India and 
Israel the defence establishment is under the control of a democratically elected government 
and their relations with rogue regimes are significantly limited. 
3. Epilogue: Pakistan’s Contemporary State of Affairs and a Look towards the 
Future 
The exposure of AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network in late 2003 and the neutralisation 
of the senior members of the network, both in and outside Pakistan, seem to have halted the 
network’s proliferation activities. AQ Khan was put under house arrest for several years as 
were his associates in KRL. However, the unchanged nature of the Pakistani control system 
means that further nuclear export activities cannot be ruled out. First, Pakistan’s defence 
establishment actively maintains its ability to establish illicit networks: There are some 
concerns that Pakistan uses the commercial contacts of the network in Europe to smuggle 
advanced dual-use nuclear technology in a similar pattern to the network’s original operation 
in the first years of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.  
Second, Pakistan is currently expanding its nuclear programmes significantly and aspires to 
construct several nuclear reactors and other necessary facilities relevant to the nuclear fuel 
cycle. The official objective is to handle the country’s acute electric power shortage; however, 
Pakistan does not hide the fact that a major factor is India’s ambition to expand its nuclear 
programmes by using the nuclear agreement with the US and the exceptional status granted 
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in order to receive nuclear assistance. Furthermore, Pakistan 
blocks the US initiative for a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that would freeze the 
global stockpiles of fissile materials. In addition, the expansion of nuclear programmes is 
supervised by SPD which is responsible for all military R&D programmes. 
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♦♦♦ 
Third, Pakistan’s defence establishment continues to have full control over the nuclear 
programmes and does not share the major responsibilities with any civilian agency. As under 
civilian governments in the 1990’s, the military does not allow the political leadership to be 
involved and influence the current course of the nuclear development. Hence, the current 
nature of the control system is similar to the control mechanisms that allowed AQ Khan and 
his network to operate.      
♦♦♦ 
Pakistan is currently involved in fighting Islamist extremist at home while maintaining 
support for Taliban, if not Al Qaeda elements, in Afghanistan. The strategic thinking of 
Pakistan’s defence establishment reflects the duplicity of Pakistan’s role. By aiding the 
Afghan Taliban and its network of militant groups the defence establishment designates them 
to seize power in Afghanistan once the western forces withdraw from that country. In that 
way, Pakistan will be able to ally Afghanistan and block India’s attempts to improve its 
contacts with Kabul. 
As a result, there is a fundamental conflict of interests between Pakistan and the US that 
ultimately surfaced following the American operation in Pakistan in May 2011 to capture Al 
Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin-Laden. The tension between the US and Pakistan is expected to 
worsen if Pakistan continues to aid its terror proxies and the US will insist on denying the 
Taliban and its associate factions a central role in the new Afghan regime after the 
withdrawal. 
♦♦♦ 
It appears that tension with the US promotes the possibility of another nuclear assistance 
episode. The military currently seems reluctant to engage in such activities because of 
Pakistan’s dependence on US military and economic assistance. If this dependency was 
seriously disrupted, however, Pakistan might again become a source for proliferation of 
nuclear technologies.   
♦♦♦ 
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